Judge: Colin Leis, Case: 24STCV18067, Date: 2025-02-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV18067 Hearing Date: February 26, 2025 Dept: 74
Valladares
et al. v. Ralphs Grocery Company
Defendant Ralphs Grocery Company’s
Motion to Compel Arbitration
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
Yesica Valladares, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for three minors and
as survivor of Jamie Antonio Valladares, (Plaintiff) filed a complaint against
defendant Ralphs Grocery Company (Defendant).
Plaintiff filed a survival action for FEHA discrimination against Jamie
Antonio Valladares (Decedent).
Defendant
moves to compel arbitration.
DISCUSSION
Defendant
alleges that the Decedent entered into a binding arbitration agreement when he
applied for work with Defendant in September 2020. (Villa Decl., ¶ 5.) The Dispute Resolution Agreement (DRA) states
in pertinent part:
“[T]his Agreement is intended to
apply to the resolution of disputes that otherwise would be resolved in a court
of law, and therefore this Agreement requires all such disputes to be resolved
only by an arbitrator though final and binding arbitration and not by way of
court or jury trial.”
(Villa Decl., Ex. 2.) Decedent’s name and purported signature are
included on the second page of the Dispute Resolution Agreement. (Villa Decl., Ex. 2.)
Plaintiff
disputes the signature’s validity.
Typically, to authenticate a signature a witness may testify to (1)
having seen the signatory sign or (2) using personal knowledge of the
handwriting of the supposed writer to determine the authenticity. Here, Tiffany Villa (Villa) states that she
emailed the employment documents to Decedent.
(Villa Decl., ¶ 5.) Decedent returned
the papers, stating that he “hope[s] everything is filled out correctly.” (Villa Decl., ¶ 6; Ex. 1.) In her deposition,
Villa acknowledges that the signature on Decedent’s license, submitted to her
as part of the application process, is noticeably different from the signature
on the DRA. (Wand Decl., Ex. C.) Additionally, the signatures on other
documents from Decedent’s employment do not match the signature on the job
application documents file with its motion.
(Wand Decl., Ex. D, E.) When a signature’s validity is challenged, the
moving party has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the signature was authentic. (Espejo
v. So. Cal. Permanente Med. Group
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060.) Defendant does not meet that burden.
Defendant
argues that the Decedent ratified the signature by receiving the benefits of
employment from Ralphs. Ratification may
resurrect an improperly signed contract when one accepts the proceeds of an
unauthorized contract. (Kadota Fig
Ass’n of Producers v. Case-Swayne Co. (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 815, 819.) Ratification occurs when the “releasor, with
full knowledge of the material facts entitling him to rescind, has engaged in
some unequivocal conduct giving rise to a reasonable inference that he intended
the conduct to amount to a ratification.”
(Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Zimmer (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 524, 532.)
In
Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (2019), a husband signed an
arbitration agreement for his wife while she was mentally competent, but
physically unable to sign. (37
Cal.App.5th 1076, 1081.) The wife did
not object to her husband signing the arbitration agreement on her behalf. (Ibid.) Valentine held that the wife had not
ratified the signature because there was no evidence that she knew the
arbitration agreement existed, that her husband signed it, or that she had a
right to rescind it. (Id. at pp.
1090.) Here, Defendant fails to produce
any evidence that Decedent knew the arbitration existed, that someone else
signed the arbitration agreement, or that he had the right to rescind it. Thus, Decedent did not ratify the
signature.
Finally,
Defendant argues that if the Decedent did not sign the DRA, then he acted fraudulently,
and Plaintiff should be equitably estopped from contesting the validity of the
signature. The elements of equitable
estoppel are “(1) [t]he party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must
intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party
asserting estoppel had the right to believe that it was so intended; (3) the
party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and
(4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury. (Migliore v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 592, 606.)
Plaintiff’s
survival action limits her to recovery to which Decedent would have been
entitled but does not impute to her knowledge whether Decedent signed the
agreement. Plaintiff does not allege that the signature is valid or invalid,
rather, Plaintiff asserts that the signature does not match other documents
signed by Decedent at the time, and that an evidentiary issue exists as to the
validity of the signature. Plaintiff is
not equitably estopped from challenging the validity of the signature when she
does not know whether the signature is or is not valid.
CONCLUSION
The
Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.
Defendant
to give notice.