Judge Craig Griffin, Case Allison vs. John Bean Technologies Corporation 2022-08-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Craig Griffin, Case: Allison vs. John Bean Technologies Corporation, Date: 2022-08-08 Tentative Ruling

The demurrers by defendants JBT AeroTech Corporation (“JBT”) and John Bean Technologies (“Bean”) to the complaint by plaintiff Michele Leane Allison (“plaintiff”) are SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend.

Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”)

Bean’s RJN of Exhibits A through D and F is GRANTED.

JBT’s RJN of Exhibits A and B is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s RJN of Exhibits 1 through 5 is GRANTED.

The court takes notice of the existence of the court records but not the truth of the matters therein. (Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482-483)]

Demurrers

This action arises out of the unfortunate death of Brandon Allison which occurred when an airport passenger boarding bridge tire, that he was working on, exploded.

On 5/26/2020, plaintiff filed a related action against the manufacturer of the tire, JBT and Bean, OCSC Case No. 30-2020-01141630, alleging two causes of action for: (1) strict liability and (2) negligence. Prior to filing suit, plaintiff’s counsel sent JBT and Bean a letter demanding preservation of the subject tire. (Complaint ¶15) Plaintiff alleges that these defendants “through their conduct and actions, clearly and unambiguously undertook and promised to preserve the subject passenger boarding bridge tire after the incident.” (Id. at ¶17)

During the course of the related litigation, plaintiff discovered that JBT and Bean had preserved the wrong tire and allowed the subject tire to disappear. (Id. at ¶22) This led to plaintiff dismissing the manufacturer from that action, without prejudice. (Id. at ¶23)

Summary judgment was thereafter granted in favor of Bean on the grounds that its liability for Brandon’s death is limited to workers’ compensation remedies and in favor of JBT on grounds that it owed no duty to plaintiff. (Dane Decl. Ex. B).

In the present action, plaintiff pleads one cause of action for promissory estoppel against JBT and Bean claiming that because defendants failed to preserve the subject tire, she was deprived of the opportunity to inspect the tire and proceed with her underlying lawsuit against the tire manufacturer.

Plaintiff argues that Labor Code §3852 imposes a duty on an employer to preserve evidence of industrial deaths for third party and subrogation claims. That statute provides that a claim for workers’ compensation benefits does not affect the rights to pursue a cause of action for damages against any person other than the employer. The statute contains no preservation of evidence language, and plaintiff does not cite to any other authority imposing a duty upon an employer to preserve evidence from an industrial accident. Based solely upon the above statute, the court cannot conclude that Bean and/or JBT owed a duty to plaintiff to preserve the subject tire.

Plaintiff also cites to Coca-Cola Bottling v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273 and Gomez v. Acquistapace (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 740 to support her argument that a spoliation claim against an employer is not barred by the exclusive remedy rule. However, this point is not material to the arguments raised by the demurrer. It makes no difference if a spoilation claim is not barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions, if a spoilation claim is no longer a viable cause of action. (See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (“Cedars-Sinai”) (1998) 18 Cal.4^th1, 17; Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court (“Temple”) (1999) 20 Cal.4th 464; Coprich v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1090).

Plaintiff cites to Coprich where the court commented that the absence of a tort remedy for negligent spoilation does not preclude the existence of duty based on a contractual obligation created by mutual agreement or promissory estoppel. (Coprich, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1091-1092).

With respect to contractual obligation, the complaint here does not plead the existence of a contract between the defendants and plaintiff to preserve the subject tire.

With respect to promissory estoppel, plaintiff relies on Cooper v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (2009) 177 Cal.App.4^th to defeat the present demurrers. However, Cooper is distinguishable from this action because there State Farm expressly informed plaintiff that it would retain the tire. (Id at p. 880, 883) The Cooper court concluded that because State Farm promised to preserve the tire, the plaintiff in that case adequately established a duty owed by State Farm. (Id. at p. 896).

Turning to the complaint, it pleads one cause of action for promissory estoppel.

In order to plead promissory estoppel, the complaint must allege (1) a clear promise, (2) reliance, (3) substantial detriment, and (4) damages. (Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 780). “The party claiming estoppel must specifically plead all facts relied on to establish its elements.” (Smith v. City and County of San Francisco (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 38, 48)

The promise is an indispensable element of promissory estoppel, and the doctrine cannot be invoked without a showing that a promise had been made upon which the complaining party relied to his prejudice. (Garcia v. World Savings, FSB (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1044). The promise must be made in clear and unambiguous terms. (Ibid.) The party seeking to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot rely on extrinsic evidence to explain an ambiguous statement. (Ibid.)

Here the complaint alleges that plaintiff’s counsel sent a preservation letter to JBT and Bean (Complaint. ¶15). That letter by itself did not create a promise by JBT and Bean to preserve the tire.

The complaint then pleads a conclusion that JBT and Bean “through their conduct and actions, clearly and unambiguously undertook and promised to preserve the subject…tire…”. There are no supporting facts describing JBT’s or Bean’s conduct, actions or promises to preserve the tire for plaintiff’s lawsuit against Goodyear. The complaint lacks descriptions of any telephone calls between these defendants and plaintiff or her counsel or any letters or memos or any other evidence of an express promise conveyed by either defendant to preserve the subject tire.

As it plaintiff’s burden to plead all facts to establish the clear and unambiguous promise, and those facts are lacking, the demurrers by JBT and Bean are SUSTAINED with 30 days leave to amend.

Motion to Strike
Bean’s motion to strike portions of the complaint is MOOT in light of the order SUSTAINING its demurrer.

Bean is ordered to give notice of the rulings on its demurrer and motion to strike.

JBT is ordered to give notice of the ruling on its demurrer.