Judge: Craig Griffin, Case: Crokin v. Primrose et al, Date: 2022-09-12 Tentative Ruling
On 4/29/22, Defendants filed a Memorandum of Costs, claiming $101,569.57 in costs. Plaintiff responded with this Motion to Tax Costs, as to portions of the sums claimed in Items 1, 4, 5, 8, and 16. The Motion to Tax is GRANTED IN PART.
If items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. But if items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.)
Here, for Item 1, Plaintiff has objected to one $48.92 charge, which the Opposition concedes was necessitated by a personal issue for defense counsel. The Motion as to that sum is GRANTED.
For Item 4, the Motion is GRANTED as to the “Fireside Chat” transcription charge in the amount of $540, which was not a deposition cost, but otherwise DENIED, as Defendants have presented adequate support to show that the other sums to which Plaintiff has objected were both reasonable in amount and reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.
For Item 8(b), the Motion is GRANTED as to the $4,089 sum claimed for Mr. Kahrs on 3/17/22, as Plaintiff has shown that a stipulation had been reached a month prior on the issues to be addressed by that expert, and the Opposition did not address why that sum should nonetheless be recoverable here, but otherwise DENIED.
Where a defendant obtains a judgment more favorable than its C.C.P. § 998 settlement offer, that results in a presumption that the offer was reasonable. (Melendrez v. Ameron Internat. Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 648.) The burden is thus on Plaintiff here to establish unreasonableness or lack of good faith. Plaintiff has not met that burden. In evaluating the reasonableness of the offer, the court considers not just the sum that the plaintiff sought, but also the likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail at trial. (Id. at 649.) Even a “token” offer may be reasonable when a defendant has concluded that he has a very significant likelihood of prevailing at trial. (Bates v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 210, 220.) Here, the sums offered were substantial, and appear reasonable in light of the burdens Plaintiff would face in establishing liability.
Nor did the second offer on 3/16/21 preclude recovery based on the first, since Plaintiff failed to recover more than either offer. (See Martinez v. Brownco Construction Co. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1014, 1023 – 1026 [“last offer rule” does not apply where successive offers are made and rejected, and the offeree does not do better at trial than any of the offers]; Toste v. CalPortland Construction (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 362, 374 [“The policy behind section 998 is to encourage the settlement of lawsuits prior to trial.”].)
For the specific expert witness costs which Plaintiff has disputed, but for the $4,089 sum discussed above, Defendants have presented adequate support to show that the other sums to which Plaintiff has objected were both reasonable in amount and reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.
For Items 8(a) and Item 16, the Motion is DENIED, as Defendants have presented adequate support for the sums to which Plaintiff has objected, and have adequately shown that those costs were both reasonable in amount and reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.
The Court thus finds that the total sum which Defendants may recover for costs is $96,717.95 (which reflects deductions on: (a) Item 1, for the $48.92; (b) Item 4, for $540; (c) Item 5, for $173.70; and (d) Item 8(b) for $4,089).
Counsel for Defendants to give notice of this ruling.