Judge: Craig Griffin, Case: Doe v. Doe 1, Date: 2022-11-28 Tentative Ruling

The Court finds the motion to amend MOOT.  Specifically, the current complaint already contains a claim for punitive damages, so there is no need to amend. 

CCP §425.14 regulates what can be put in the complaint at the outset of litigation, which is not at issue here. Any notion that §425.14 governs what can be asserted at trial is misplaced. What can be asserted at trial is governed by what is alleged in the complaint. In this case, punitive damages are in the operative complaint, have been the subject of discovery, and were the subject of a prior motion under CCP §3295.

While Defendants could have challenged the complaint by demurrer or motion to strike, it filed an answer, and later filed an amended answer, neither of which mentions CCP §425.14.  Indeed, when Plaintiff sought an order permitting financial discovery for purposes of punitive damages in July of 2021, Defendants likewise failed to cite the statute.  The Court grated the motion, and financial discovery has apparently proceeded.

As Defendants recognize, the purpose of the statute is to create a “pleading hurdle.”  The purpose of this hurdle is “to mitigate the potentially chilling effects upon the practices of religious groups resulting from the threat of litigation over unfounded punitive damages claims. The statute endeavors to insulate religious organizations from the threat of being required to defend against insupportable punitive damages claims—a potentially significant state-imposed burden upon religious practices.” (Emphasis added.)

Rowe v. Superior Ct. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1711, 1732.

Here, Defendants filed their answer over three years ago, and have been subjected to financial discovery relating to punitive damages commencing almost a year and half ago.  With less than a month to go before trial, the purpose of §425.14—to prevent religious organizations from being subjected to litigation over meritless punitive damage claims--would not be served. 

Defendants contend that a finding under § 425.14 is a prerequisite to a punitive damages award.  But the statute does not purport to create a jurisdictional bar to punitive damages, but rather sets a pleading hurdle that can be waived.

Although there appears no case law directly addressing waiver of §425.14, there is analogous authority addressing the issue as it applies to §425.13 (for claims against health care providers). Under §425.13, the right to object to a failure to obtain leave of court to amend has been held to be waived if not raised because it is not a jurisdictional requirement. On this score, the court in Vallbona v. Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1535 analogized §425.13 to Civil Code § Civil Code section 1714.10--requiring court permission to assert a conspiracy claim against an attorney—and relied on the case of in Villa Pacific Building Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 8, which held the issue waived if not timely asserted.  The Court of Appeal in Vallbona held:

“Finding persuasive the analysis in Villa Pacific Building Co. v. Superior Court [1991] 233 Cal.App.3d 8 [], we conclude that section 425.13's requirement of a court order as a condition precedent to including a claim for punitive damages in an action arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider is not jurisdictional, and absent timely objection to a complaint's inclusion of a punitive damages claim without court permission, the protection conferred by section 425.13 is waived. [Citation]   We find nothing in the language of section 425.13—the pattern for Civil Code section 1714.10]—suggesting its benefit cannot be waived.  [Citation]  Further, section 425.13, like Civil Code section 1714.10, is procedural, affecting only a remedy and not a substantive right.  [Citation.]  Hence, by answering plaintiff's complaint and litigating this case for almost a year before raising by motion in limine the issue of section 425.13, defendants waived any rights they might have had under the statute. [Citation.]”

Defendants’ contention that §425.14 should be viewed differently from § 425.13 because of First Amendment issues involved in the former section is unfounded.  The Court of Appeal in Rowe v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1711, 1721-1722 noted the similar intention of the Legislature in enacting the two statutes:

“The legislative history of section 425.14 demonstrates an intent on the part of the Legislature to impose a burden similar to that imposed by section 425.13. As originally proposed, this legislation was an amendment to Civil Code Section 3294 which barred the recovery of any punitive damages against a charitable organization, including a religious corporation. (Sen. Bill No. 1 (1987–1988 Reg.Sess.).) It was amended in the Senate, on January 26, 1988, so as to incorporate charitable organizations into the recently enacted healthcare provider legislation (§ 425.13). The Senate passed this version. It was in the Assembly, on August 26, 1988, where the present wording was adopted, where the attempt to integrate with the healthcare provider statute was dropped and a new section (§ 425.14) was drafted. This new language also narrowed the coverage of the statute from charitable organizations generally and limited it to religious corporations.”

Nowhere in Rowe’s First Amendment analysis is it suggested that §425.14 was intended to give greater procedural protections to religious organizations than healthcare providers are given under 425.13. 

Defendant cites to Little Co. of Mary Hosp. v. Superior Ct. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 261 for the proposition that §425.14 provides broader protection that that provided by §425.13.  In Little Co., a religious health care organization sought writ review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a punitive damages claim associated with a cause of action for elder abuse.  Because a previous Supreme Court case held that elder abuse did not fall within the scope §425.13, the trial court determined it likewise did not fall within §425.14.  The Court of Appeal in Little Co. reversed, holding § 425.14 provided broader protection that would include an elder abuse claim.

Little Co., however, made this determination simply be looking at the plain language of the two statutes, that §425.13 expressly limited itself to “damages arising out of the professional negligence,” while §425.14 had no such subject matter limitation.  But Little Co. expressly recognized that although the breath of the two statutes differed, the mechanism by which the two statues operated was similar:

“Section 425.14 was intended to provide to religious institutions a pretrial mechanism to eliminate unsubstantiated punitive damage claims similar to that contained in section 425.13. (See Legis. Counsel's Digest, Sen. Bill No. 1, Stats.1988, ch. 1410 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) [“Existing law provides that a claim for punitive damages may not be included in a complaint or other pleading against a health care provider unless allowed by the court, as specified. [¶] This bill would enact a similar provision with respect to a complaint or pleading against a religious corporation or a religious corporation sole.”

Little Co., at p. 268. 

Defendants further contend that by defending against Plaintiff’s motion to amend, it is asserting the bar of §425.14 and not waiving it.  But the protections of §425.14 were waived long before Plaitniff’s motion was brought.

Plaintiff to give notice.