Judge: Craig Griffin, Case: Doe vs. Doe 1, Date: 2022-10-03 Tentative Ruling

JANE LT DOE and JANE NT DOE’s Motion For Leave To File An Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

Procedural and Factual History

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on 9/4/2019, alleging 11 causes of action arising out of childhood sexual abuse. Plaintiffs seek punitive damages in connection with the intentional torts. Defendants filed an answer and then later filed an amended answer.

On 8/31/2020, this court ordered admitted the following matters: (1) that Doe 1 is the CEO of Doe 2, (2) that Doe 1 is responsible for the day to day operations of Doe 2, (3) that between 1997 and 2008 Doe 1 worked at temples owned by Doe 2, (4) that between 1997 and 2008 Doe 1 was in contact with minor children at temples owned by Doe 2, (5) that between 1997 and 2008 Doe 1 sexually molested or otherwise inappropriately touched minor children in or around the temples owned by Doe 2 and (6) that between 1997 and 2008 he worked at temples owned by Doe 2. (ROA #93)

On 7/19/2021 this court granted Plaintiffs Jane LT DOE and Jane NT DOE motion for an order permitting pretrial discovery of the financial

condition of defendants DOE 1 and DOE 2. In that motion, the court made a specific finding (ROA #330) which stated in part that as follows: “the plaintiffs have established that there is a substantial probability they will prevail on their punitive damages claims pursuant to C.C.P. §3294.”

On 9/20/2022, this court heard argument on an ex parte application for leave to amend and set the instant motion for briefing. The ex parte was not granted but instead the court ordered that the ex parte was deemed the moving papers for a regular motion and a briefing schedule set with a supplemental opposition due on 9/27/2022. The court informed the parties and stated in its 9/20/2022 order (ROA #693) as follows: “The Court informs the parties that it interprets moving papers to incorporate by reference the Declarations filed in support of plaintiffs' previous motion under California Civil Code §3295(c) and the Court's 7/19/21 ruling thereon.” A supplemental opposition was timely filed on 9/27/2022.

Compliance with Rule 3.1324

The court finds that MP has complied with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court Rule 3.1324 as the Motion includes a copy of the First Amended Complaint; the O’Connell declaration states that the proposed First Amended Complaint contains no new allegations from the original complaint and the amendment will not affect the complaint; counsel states leave to amend necessary due to CCP§425.14 and that he only recently became aware of requirement of 425.14.

Motion To Amend and Opposition

The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(a)(1).) The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(a)(1).) Additionally, any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 576.)

California courts generally allow great liberality, at all stages of the proceeding, in permitting the amendment of pleadings in order to resolve cases on their merits. IMO Development Corp. v. Dow Corning (1982) 135 Cal. App. 3d 451, 461. Because the policy favoring amendment is so strong, “it is a rare case in which a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his case.” Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal. App. 2d 527, 530 (internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true for amendment of answers, as a defendant denied leave to amend is permanently deprived of a defense. Hulsey v. Koehler (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1150, 1159.

“Courts must apply a policy of liberality in permitting amendments at any stage of the proceeding, including during trial, when no prejudice to the opposing party is shown.” (P & D Consultants, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1345.)

The court finds the subject motion is not time barred. While RP contends that CCP §425.14 is a pre-filing requirement, no authority is cited for this contention and such is contrary to existing authority and inconsistent with a fair reading of the statute. As the court in Rowe v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 15 Cal.App.4th 1711, 1735 stated, “It seems clear that, subject to the usual limitations on the amendment of pleadings prior to or during trial, a party seeking to comply with section 425.14 should be able to do so at any time when there is available sufficient evidence to make the required prima facie showing.”

CCP §425.14 states: “No claim for punitive or exemplary damages against a religious corporation or religious corporation sole shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive or exemplary damages to be filed. The court may allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive or exemplary damages on a motion by the party seeking the amended pleading and upon a finding, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established evidence which substantiates that plaintiff will meet the clear and convincing standard of proof under Section 3294 of the Civil Code.”

The language of the statute infers that the motion be made after discovery conducted. The statute refers to the court allowing an “amended pleading” which means that there must be an original pleading. An “amended” complaint does not exist until an original complaint is filed.

The court finds that the Motion meets the standard of CCP §425.14. On 7/9/2021, the court considered the motion, opposition and supporting evidence in connection with MP’s motion for an order permitting pretrial discovery of the financial condition of the defendants DOE 1 and DOE 2. The purpose of statute precluding punitive damages claims against religious institutions unless court determines at pleading stage that there is a “substantial probability” that plaintiff will prevail on the claim is to provide to religious institutions a pretrial mechanism to eliminate unsubstantiated punitive damage claims, similar to that available to health care providers. Little Co. of Mary Hospital v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 261. The court has ruled that the “plaintiffs have established that there is a substantial probability they will prevail on their punitive damages claims pursuant to C.C.P. §3294.” (7/19/21 Order) RP has not submitted any evidence which contradicts or refutes this conclusion. RP’s Supplemental Opposition included a declaration of counsel which points out that MP has not taken certain depositions. However, RP’s Supplemental Opposition does not contain evidence disproving the admitted facts that DOE 1 sexually assaulted minors in and around DOE 2 during the relevant time period or that DOE 2 was CEO of DOE 2 RP’s contention that the 6 admissions by DOE 1 must be disregarded is contrary to the law. RP submits no case authority that the RFA’s should be disregarded in this action. RP only cites to CCP §2033.410 which states that use of the admission is limited to use against the party and only in the pending action. However, as the court stated in Swedberg v. Christiana Community Builders (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 138, 143–144, “In limiting an admission to the ‘pending action only’ and to no other action (§ 2033, subd. (c)) the Legislature manifested its intent on the scope of an admission. Had the Legislature intended that admissions not be used by all parties to a single action, the Legislature would have included that limitation in section 2033, subdivision (c). The absence of such a limitation reflects a legislative intent that admissions may be used by all parties to a single action. This is only logical.” Here, the RFA’s were admitted by DOE 1, who is both a party defendant as well as CEO of DOE 2. DOE 2’s liability is related to the liability of DOE 1.

The court finds there will be no prejudice to RP with the filing of the amended complaint. If the party seeking the amendment has been dilatory, and the delay has prejudiced the opposing party, the judge has discretion to deny leave to amend. Hirsa v. Sup.Ct. (Vickers) (1981) 118 Cal. App. 3d 486, 490; Melican v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (2007) 151 Cal. App. 4th 168, 176; Fisher v. Larsen (1982) 138 Cal. App. 3d 627, 649 (where plaintiff knew for over five months that certain claims had not been properly pleaded, and took no action to amend until after a summary judgment had been granted against it, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend the complaint); Hulsey v. Koehler (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1150. In this action, RP has been on notice of the punitive damage claim since the complaint was filed on 9/4/2019. The RP included affirmative defense no. 14 in its First Amended Answer filed 5/26/2020 asserting there was “no malice, fraud or oppression.” RP did not file demurrer nor did RP file a motion for summary adjudication. RP has had ample time to conduct discovery and investigation to defend against the punitive damages claim.

Counsel for Plaintiffs to give notice of this ruling and to file the First Amended Complaint attached as Exhibit 1 to Declaration of Kevin

O’Connell (ROA # 679) within 10 days.