Judge: Craig Griffin, Case: "Rodriguez v. Pham, et al.", Date: 2022-08-15 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Hong-Lien T. Pham’s (“Pham”) Demurrer to Plaintiff Abad Romero Rodriguez’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint is SUSTAINED with 15 days leave to amend.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to the existence of and legal effect of the records at Exhibits A-B to the RJN.  (Cal. Evid. Code §§ 452(d) and (h); Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264; Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 482.)

Defendant’s evidentiary objection to Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s opposition is SUSTAINED.

“Generally, under the workers' compensation doctrine, when an injured employee is entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits, those benefits constitute the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer and his or her fellow employees. (Lab.Code, §§ 3600, 3601, 3602.)”  (SunLine Transit Agency v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Loc. 1277 (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 292, 303; see also, Cal. Labor Code §3602(a).)

One of the principal exceptions to the exclusive remedy doctrine is stated in Labor Code section 3706: “If any employer fails to secure the payment of compensation, any injured employee or his dependents may bring an action at law against such employer for damages, as if this division did not apply.”

Courts are to liberally construe the Act “in favor of awarding workers’ compensation, not in permitting civil litigation.”  (Arriaga v. Cty. of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055, 1065.)

Here, Pham demurs to the claims alleged against her in Plaintiff’s FAC on the ground that the claims are barred by Labor Code section 3600, the Workers Compensation Act.  Pham contends that Plaintiff previously filed a workers’ compensation claim against Pham for the exact incident that now forms the basis for this civil action and conceded in that filing that Pham is his employer, and thus the Workers’ Compensation Act is his exclusive remedy.  Pham also contends that the FAC lacks any allegations of an applicable statutory exception to the exclusive remedy doctrine.  Plaintiff does not dispute that he filed a workers’ compensation case in which Pham was listed as his employer.

The Court finds that Pham’s arguments are well-taken.  The Court also notes that Plaintiff has abandoned his previous argument concerning the fraudulent concealment exception set forth in section 3602(b).  Rather, Plaintiff now argues that because his employer (defendant Moreno) did not have workers’ compensation insurance and Pham hired an uninsured contractor, these facts somehow authorize him to pursue a tort claim against the homeowner, Pham, despite having already recovered against Pham in the workers’ compensation system. 

Plaintiff’s arguments are misplaced and unsupported by legal authority.  The cases that Plaintiff cites are inapposite.  Marshall v. Foote (1927) 81 Cal.App. 98 and Blinkinsop v. Weber (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 276, involved situations where the employer did not have compensation insurance and the courts held an action at law could proceed against that employer.  In the present matter, Plaintiff does not dispute that Pham had workers’ compensation insurance, which fact is reflected in the documents at Exhs. A-B to the RJN.  Thus, Plaintiff cannot pursue a tort action against Pham under section 3706.  Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Tilbury Constructors (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 286, involved an indemnity claim brought by a crane supplier against an injured construction worker’s contractor employer.  The court merely recognized the general rule that a worker may file a civil tort suit against a third-party tortfeasor.  None of these cases held that an injured worker may bring a civil tort suit against a third-party homeowner after already recovering against that homeowner through the workers’ compensation system.

And as Pham asserts, these cases also do not stand for the proposition that Plaintiff can sue an insured homeowner in tort for another person’s failure to obtain the required insurance.

The FAC and opposition briefly reference the rule that an injured worker hired by an uninsured employer who, in turn, is hired by a homeowner, does not come within the workers’ compensation system when he has not worked the required number of hours.  (See Heiman v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 724, 735.)  However, it is unclear if Plaintiff is arguing that he falls within this exception as there are no facts offered in support of the argument.  Additionally, the FAC contains no allegations that would establish that Plaintiff did not fall within the workers’ compensation system.

The FAC also cites to Vebr v. Culp (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1044.  However, this case is clearly distinguishable because, in that matter, the injured worker had not sought workers’ compensation benefits from the homeowners because he did not qualify for such benefits.  By contrast, in the present matter, Plaintiff did seek and recover workers’ compensation benefits from Pham. 

The pleading again contains no allegations to support an exception to the exclusive remedy rule.  The Court will permit Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend.  (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Moving party to give notice.