Judge Craig Griffin, Case Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Strange 2022-11-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Craig Griffin, Case: Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Strange, Date: 2022-11-28 Tentative Ruling

“A general demurrer based on the statute of limitations is only permissible where the dates alleged in the complaint show that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. [Citation.] The running of the statute must appear ‘clearly and affirmatively’ from the dates alleged. It is not sufficient that the complaint might be barred. [Citation.] If the dates establishing the running of the statute of limitations do not clearly appear in the complaint, there is no ground for general demurrer.” (Roman v. County of Los Angeles (2000) 85 al.App.4th 315, 324-325.)

1st cause of action for quiet title

“The Legislature has not established a specific statute of limitations for actions to quiet title. [Citation.] Therefore, courts refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine the applicable period of limitations. [Citation.] An inquiry into the underlying theory requires the court to identify the nature (i.e., the ‘gravamen’) of the cause of action. [Citation]” (Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476.)

Defendants assert that the underlying theory of relief is fraud, which has a three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338(d). They argue the complaint alleges that the Judgment was entered on August 27, 2012, Plaintiff conducted an investigation post-judgment, and therefore, the quiet title cause of action must be barred.

Here, Defendants have not demonstrated that the cause of action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations for fraud. As an initial matter, the quiet title cause of action does not necessarily sound in fraud. Specifically, there are no allegations connected to the first cause of action that anyone was misled to their detriment by the filing. The first cause of action appears part of an effort to collect on a judgment, which is governed by a 10-year statute of limitations under CCP § 337.5(b).

Moreover, Defendants own argument shows, and the complaint reflects, the complaint did not allege a date as to when Plaintiff conducted its post-judgment investigation regarding the Fadel Deed of Trust. As such, the quiet title cause of action is not barred on the face of the complaint and the demurrer is OVERRULED.

As for Defendants’ demurrer for uncertainty and failure to allege sufficient facts on the ground that the quiet title cause of action failed to allege delayed discovery, it is OVERRULED. “In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’ [Citation.]” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808.) The delay discovery rule does not apply because the quiet title cause of action does not appear time-barred on the face of the complaint.

2nd and 3rd cause of action for cancellation of instrument and declaratory relief

Defendant Gregory Strange argues that a four-year catch-all statute of limitation or the three-year fraud statute of limitation applies but fail to state when it started to run. To the extent that he relies on Plaintiff’s post-judgment investigation, as discussed, the complaint does not allege the date on which that investigation occurred. The delayed discovery rule does not apply. Defendant Gregory Strange’s demurrer to the 2nd and 3rd causes of action for cancellation of instrument and declaratory relief causes of action is OVERRULED.

As for Defendant Sitara Strange’s demurrer to the 2nd and 3rd causes of action, the complaint and the supporting exhibit show that only Defendant Gregory Strange signed the Fadel Deed of Trust. [Complaint, ¶ 12 and Exh. 3] Plaintiff seeks to cancel that instrument.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Sitara Strange is a proper defendant because she has an interest in the Property and that the cancellation of instrument cause of action is essentially one cause of action with the quiet title cause of action, citing to Leeper v. Beltrami (1959 (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 216.). While it is true that when one seeks to cancel an instrument, quieting title is the relief authorized, as against Defendant Sitara Strange, there is no instrument to cancel or any relief to declare. She may nor may not have an interest in the Property and thus, she is a proper party to the quiet title cause of action. Therefore, unless Plaintiff can demonstrate at the hearing that it can allege Defendant Sitara Strange’s involvement with the Fadel Deed of Trust, her demurrer to the 2nd cause of action for cancellation of instrument and 3rd cause of action for declaratory relief is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Motion to strike

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

“A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (a).) “An immaterial allegation in a pleading is any of the following: (1) An allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense. (2) An allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense. (3) A demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint. (c) An ‘immaterial allegation’ means ‘irrelevant matter’ as that term is used in Section 436.” (Id., § 431.10, subd. (b).)

Defendants move to strike allegations from page 4, line 27 through page 6 line 13 and page 6, lines 14-19 as irrelevant and immaterial.

Those portions of the complaint begin with Defendant Gregory Strange has a “history of recording false documents involving deeds of trust,” provide two examples unrelated to this action, provide background regarding the case that resulted in the assigned Judgment, and allege another case in which Defendant Aurora obtained and recorded a judgment against Defendant Gregory Strange.

The allegations provide context to Plaintiff’s claim that the Fadel Deed of Trust is invalid, unenforceable, and void, and meet the relevance standard. Therefore, the motion to strike is DENIED.