Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 18STCP02482, Date: 2023-02-02 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 18STCP02482    Hearing Date: February 2, 2023    Dept: 72

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS

                                     PLANTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

                        

Date:                  2/2/23 (8:30 AM)                   

Case:                 Sergio Larios v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC et al. (18STCP02482)

  

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing LLC’s Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED IN PART.

 

Plaintiff Sergio Larios’ Motion to Amend Judgment is DENIED.

 

Plaintiff Sergio Larios’ Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED IN PART.

 

I.                   DEFENDANT SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING LLC’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS

 

Defendant Specialized Loan Service LLC moves to tax the $58,920.55 claimed by plaintiff Sergio Larios in the amount of $43,337.60, including $36,476.25 in expert fees and $6,861.35 for other costs.

 

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff is entitled to claim costs as the party with a net monetary recovery. (CCP §§ 1032(a)(4), (b).) On December 15, 2022, the Court entered an Amended Judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $2,105,000.

 

With respect to $36,476.25 claimed as expert fees, under CCP § 1033.5(b)(1), “[f]ees of experts not ordered by the court” are disallowed. It is undisputed that the Court did not order any experts. Plaintiff maintains that the expert fees are recoverable because defendant rejected a CCP § 998 offer and plaintiff obtained a judgment that was more favorable. (See CCP § 998(c)(1); Grant Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1; Brennan Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B.)

 

The Court finds that the CCP § 998 offer presented by plaintiff to defendant on June 2, 2021 was invalid. CCP § 998(a) states: “The written offer shall include a statement of the offer, containing the terms and conditions of the judgment or award, and a provision that allows the accepting party to indicate acceptance of the offer by signing a statement that the offer is accepted.”

 

While the CCP § 998 offer contained the terms and conditions of the proposed judgment, there was no acceptance provision. After setting forth the terms and conditions of the offer, plaintiff concluded the offer with the statement: “Please review C.C.P. Section 998 with respect to your rights and obligations with respect to this offer.”  This was insufficient.

 

In Mostafavi Law Group, APC v. Larry Rabineau, APC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 614, 619, the CCP § 998 offer at issue did not have an acceptance provision.  The Court thus found the judgment entered pursuant to the signed CCP § 998 offer was invalid, even though the offeree had handwritten the following on the offer: “Plaintiff Mostafavi Law Group, APC accepts the offer.” (Mostafavi, 61 Cal.App.5th at 619.)  In so concluding, the Court explained: “[P]urported acceptance of such a defective [CCP § 998] offer likewise cannot trigger the consequences in subdivision (b)(1) and give rise to an enforceable judgment. This is so because where a section 998 offer is invalid based on its failure to satisfy all of the ‘statutorily required elements[,] ... there is nothing for the receiving party to accept’ in the first place.” (Id. at 623.)

 

Here, recognizing that “to be valid a section 998 offer must include some indication of how to accept the offer” (Perez v. Torres (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 418, 426, fn. 6, citing Puerta v. Torres (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273), plaintiff argues that the concluding sentence of his offer specified how defendant could accept the offer.  That is simply not so.  Plaintiff’s offer ends with the statement: “Please review C.C.P. Section 998 with respect to your rights and obligations with respect to this offer.”  (Brennan Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B at 4.)  The law is clear that “[a] mere reference to the code section cannot supply an acceptance provision that would otherwise be entirely missing….” (Finlan v. Chase (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 934, 941-942 [noting “at a minimum, the offer’s acceptance provision simply must specify the manner in which the offer is to be accepted].)  Thus, in Mostafavi, the Court deemed the offer invalid where the offer clearly referred to CCP § 998 but contained no acceptance provision.  (Mostafavi, 61 Cal.App.5th at 619 [finding invalid offer that stated “Pursuant to California Code of Procedure § 998 . . . PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that if this Offer to Compromise is not accepted within the time specified by § 998 [sic] of the Code of Civil Procedure and Plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, Plaintiff is not entitled to recover court costs (despite being a ‘prevailing party’) and must pay the offering defendants’ costs from the time of the offer”].)

 

Because plaintiff’s offer was invalid, the cost provisions of CCP § 998(c)(1) do not support plaintiff’s claim for expert fees.  Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim of $36,476.25 for expert fees shall be taxed.

 

With respect to $6,861.35 in other costs, defendant argued in the motion that there was insufficient documentation to support the other costs for “Remote appearance fees, Zoom, Document Fee, Travel” in item 16 of the memorandum of costs. (Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267 [“Only if the costs have been put in issue via a motion to tax costs must supporting documentation be submitted”].) In the opposition, plaintiff reduced his claim to $5,234.35, comprised of travel, lodging, and transportation costs that attorney Stephanie R. Tatar incurred for the final status conference and trial, and provided supporting documentation. (Tatar Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. A; Brennan Decl. ¶ 4.) Travel expenses to append depositions are the only travel expenses explicitly allowed under CCP § 1033.5(a).  However, travel fees to attend any other proceedings are not expressly disallowed under CCP § 1033.5(b), which means such travel costs may be allowed or denied in the Court’s discretion, pursuant to CCP § 1033.5(c)(4).

 

Here, the Court finds that $5,234.35 of the $6,861.35 claimed by plaintiff for other costs was “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation.” (CCP § 1033.5(c)(2), (c)(3).)  Counsel Tatar’s presence in court for the final status conference and trial meaningfully assisted in plaintiff’s successful prosecution of his case and ability to prevail at trial.  Thus, only the difference of $1,627.00 is taxed based on the failure to support these expenses with documentation.

 

The motion is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff Sergio Larios’ claim for $58,920.55 is taxed in the amount of $38,103.25 (i.e., $36,476.25 expert fees + $1,627.00 other costs).

 

II.                PLAINTIFF SERGIO LARIOS’ MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT

 

Plaintiff Sergio Larios moves for an order amending the judgment to exclude the payment of accrued interest, late fees, and penalties unless defendant Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (“SLS”) prevails on appeal. The Court already stated during the trial on equitable issues that it lacked the authority to reform the home equity loan agreement providing for the accrual of interest, late fees, and penalties.  Further, the Court stated that, even if it had authority to rewrite the terms of the contract pursuant to the Court’s equitable powers, it would not do so.

 

Simply put, plaintiff agreed to interest, late fees, and penalties when entering into the loan.  Per that agreement, those amounts shall continue to accrue so long as plaintiff does not pay off the loan.  So long as SLS decides not to satisfy the monetary judgment in an amount sufficient to permit plaintiff to pay off the loan, statutory post-judgment interest will continue to accrue on that amount, which is sufficient to offset (indeed, likely exceeds) any accruing interest, late fees, and penalties.  The Court explained this to the parties when rendering its decision on plaintiff’s request for equitable relief, and the resulting Judgment and Amended Judgment accurately reflect the Court’s decision and intent.

 

The motion is DENIED.

 

III.             PLAINTIFF SERGIO LARIOS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

 

Plaintiff Sergio Larios moves for attorney fees in the amount of $2,144,658. This request is based on $826,534 incurred by the Law Offices of Robert F. Brennan, A P.C. (“Brennan firm”) and $245,795 incurred by Tatar Law Firm, APC (“Tater firm”). Plaintiff also seeks to apply a 2.0 multiplier on the total fees of $1,072,329 incurred by both law firms.

 

In addition to the fee request in the moving papers, plaintiff seeks an additional $180,127 for work done after the moving papers were filed. This additional request is based on $66,688.50 incurred by the Brennan firm, $23,375 incurred by the Tater firm, and the application of a 2.0 multiple on the total fees of $90,063.50 incurred by both law firms.

 

As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that plaintiff may recover reasonable attorney fees under Civil Code § 1785.31(d) for prevailing on his California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act claim.

 

The Court finds that the attorney hourly rates of $695 for Robert F. Brennan and $550 for Stephanie Tatar are reasonable. (Brennan Decl. ¶¶ 29-31; Tatar Decl. ¶¶ 6-18.) The Court also finds that the paralegal hourly rates of $225 for Robert Bichler, $225 for Rachel Garrison, $175 for Lilli Baur, and $225 for Samantha Jones are reasonable. (Brennan Decl. ¶ 34; Brennan Reply Decl. ¶ 11(c-d).) 

 

With respect to attorney Stephen Crilly, the Court finds that his hourly rate of $475 is unwarranted given that he is not licensed in California. (Brennan Decl. ¶ 32.) Crilly performed legal research and prepared legal briefs for Brennan. (Brennan Decl. ¶ 32; Crilly Decl. ¶ 2.) “No one may recover compensation for services as an attorney at law in California unless that person was a member of the State Bar at the time those services were performed.” (Golba v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1261; see also Bus. & Prof. Code § 6125 [“No person shall practice law in California unless the person is an active licensee of the State Bar”].) However, “[i]t is lawful for an attorney to employ any person to take charge of the management of the work to be done in his office to the extent of drawing pleadings and papers necessary to be drawn by such attorney in his practice....” (Johnson v. Davidson (1921) 54 Cal.App. 251, 257, overruled on other grounds by Crawford v. State Bar of Cal. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 659.) Accordingly, while Crilly may not be compensated as an attorney with a corresponding hourly rate, he may be compensated as a law clerk or paralegal. Accordingly, the Court reduces his hourly rate from $475 to $225.

 

With respect to Juan Sanchez, the Court finds that his hourly rate of $200 is excessive. Sanchez was a law student. (Brennan Reply Decl. ¶ 11.) Sanchez did not have and was not working toward a paralegal certificate. (Cf. Brennan Reply Decl. ¶ 11(b) [Lilli Baur working toward a paralegal certificate.) Nor did Sanchez have decades of paralegal experience like Bichler or Garrison. (Cf. Brennan Decl. ¶ 34.) Accordingly, the $200 hourly rate of Sanchez is reduced to $95.

 

With respect to the reasonableness of the billing entries, “[i]n challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Premier Medical Management. Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) The Court has reviewed the billing entries from counsel for plaintiff and finds that the number of hours work is largely reasonable. (Brennan Decl. ¶ 35 & Ex. A; Tatar Decl. ¶ 18 & Ex, A.)

 

However, based on the excessive hourly rate for Crilly and Sanchez, there have been some excessive billings for certain matters. Accordingly, the Court makes the following reductions:

 

With respect to Crilly, defendant Specialized Loan Servicing LLC contends that Crilly billed a total of 457.3 hours. (Opp. at 6:28-7:1.) Plaintiff does not challenge defendant’s assertion. The lodestar for 457.3 hours based on the requested hourly rate of $475 would be $217,217.50. Based on the reduced hourly rate of $225, the lodestar would be $102,892.50. Plaintiff’s fee request is reduced in the amount of the difference between $217,217.50 and $102,892.50, or $114,325.

 

With respect to Sanchez, Sanchez billed one hour for traveling to the recorder’s office to record a notice of pendency of action on 4/11/19 and two hours on 8/24/21 for preparing an exhibit list for trial and arranging all exhibits. The lodestar for three hours based on the requested hourly rate of $200 is $600. Based on the reduced hourly rate of $95, the lodestar should be $285. Plaintiff’s fee request is reduced in the amount of the difference between $600 and $285, or $315.

 

With respect to Bichler, defendant contends that he spent excessive time on certain tasks. In response, plaintiff reduced the request for his fees by 12 hours in the reply. (Reply at 2:26-28.) This reduction is reasonable. Based on an hourly rate of $225, plaintiff’s fee request is reduced by $2,700.

 

While Baur, the junior paralegal, billed 4.3 hours at an hourly rate of $175 for copying and hole punching exhibits and creating binders for trial, it cannot be said that this was a purely administrative task, as the preparation of work could involve the retrieval and sorting of relevant documents, akin to the assistance with document production that is compensable at a paralegal rate. (See Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 288, fn. 10.) Defendant does not identify any other billing entries that may constitute purely administrative tasks. (Cf. Opp. at 11:12-14 [“Moreover, counsel’s billing records contain many time entries for purely administrative tasks such as copying, scheduling, and coordinating travel arrangements”].) Therefore, defendant does not meet its burden to demonstrate that such billing entries are excessive.

 

Defendant also contends that plaintiff should not be compensated for two attorneys performing the same task. Duplication is not necessarily unreasonable. (Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1007.) Considering that both law firms’ work were necessary in prevailing at trial, it was not unreasonable for both firms to incur fees for the initial review of the case. (Opp. at 8:28-9:8.) Similarly, both firms’ review of Crilly’s drafts of oppositions and replies was reasonable. (Opp. at 9:9-9:18.) Further, the Court notes that defendant also used the services of more than one attorney at trial and with respect to pre-trial proceedings.  Defendant does not specifically identify any other billing entries which may be duplicative. Accordingly, defendant does not meet its burden to demonstrate plaintiff’s billing entries are duplicative.

 

It is reasonable for counsel for plaintiff to spend more time summarizing the deposition transcript than to take the corresponding deposition, as typing and analyzing the deposition are time intensive.

 

To the extent that plaintiff was not wholly successful on any particular motion, this is not a bar to recovery of corresponding fees. “Attorneys generally must pursue all available legal avenues and theories in pursuit of their clients’ objectives; it is impossible, as a practical matter, for an attorney to know in advance whether or not his or her work on a potentially meritorious legal theory will ultimately prevail.” (Greene v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 418, 424, quoting Sokolow v. County of San Mateo (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 250.)

 

A multiplier is not warranted.  This is a was a reasonably straightforward credit reporting case that did not present overly complex issues. (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1176.) Rather, the relatively high amount of fees was largely necessitated by defendants’ abundantly aggressive litigation strategy throughout case, including through and after trial on issues large and small.  As discussed above, the Court finds plaintiff is entitled to recover for the relatively high number of hours plaintiff’s attorneys were forced to expend as reasonably necessary to resist defendant’s tactics.  A further multiplier is therefore not necessary.  Lastly, although the Court recognizes counsel apparently represents plaintiff on a contingency basis, the Court finds that the lodestar awarded as set forth herein sufficiently compensates counsel for their efforts. (Id.) 

 

In the reply, plaintiff seeks for fees associated with work performed after the filing of the instant motion, including defendant’s motion to tax costs, motion for new trial, and motion for judgment notwithstanding judgment on the verdict, as well as work performed in preparation of the reply. The Court declines to include such fees in an award because defendant did not have the opportunity to review and oppose the billing entries. Considering the additional $90,063.50 sought in reply, the Court reserves the reasonableness of those fees for any future motion that plaintiff may file.

 

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART. Using the appropriate lodestar approach, and based on the foregoing findings and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred for the work performed in connection with prevailing at trial and preparing the instant fee motion is $954,989.00 ($1,072,329 - $114,325 Crilly - $315 Sanchez - $2,700 Bichler). Such fees are awarded to plaintiff Sergio Larios against defendant Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC.