Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 18STCV07563, Date: 2023-10-05 Tentative Ruling
Hon. Curtis Kin The clerk for Department 82 may be reached at (213) 893-0530.
Case Number: 18STCV07563 Hearing Date: October 5, 2023 Dept: 82
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER
Date: 10/5/23
(1:30 PM)
Case: Alexander Javaheri et al. v.
Parviz Abdi et al. (18STCV07563)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendants/Cross-Defendants Michael Khorshidi and Nejatolah
Rabbanian’s Motion for Appointment of Receiver is DENIED.
Khorshidi and Rabbanian’s request for judicial notice as to
Exhibits H, M-O, W, X, and Z-DD is GRANTED, pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d).
Khorshidi and Rabbanian’s request for judicial notice as to
Exhibits L, P, and V is GRANTED, but
only the existence of the documents, not the truth of the matters asserted
therein. (See Evid. Code § 452(d); Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6
Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-69.)
Khorshidi and Rabbanian’s request for judicial notice as to
Exhibit U is DENIED, as the Complaint filed in the matter of Mei Mei Cai v.
5th & LA, et al., LASC Case No. 21STCV02902 is not attached to the
declaration of Scott E. Gizer, as required by Rule of Court 3.1306(c). Exhibit
U attached to the Gizer declaration is an email.
Alexander Javaheri and David Javaheri’s request for judicial
notice as to Exhibits 1-3 and 5-9 is GRANTED, pursuant to Evidence Code §
452(d).
The Javaheris’ request for judicial notice as to Exhibit 4
is GRANTED, but only the existence of
the document, not the truth of the matters asserted therein. (See Evid.
Code § 452(d); Sosinsky, 6 Cal.App.4th at 1564-69.)
All evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.
Defendants/Cross-Defendants Michael Khorshidi and Nejatolah
Rabbanian (K&R) seek the appointment of a receiver to manage the joint
venture known as 5th and L.A., of which the parties to the instant
action are partners or joint venturers. K&R contend that the managers of
the joint venture, plaintiffs/cross-defendants Alexander Javaheri and David
Javaheri, are mismanaging the joint venture and its assets by: (1) hiring a
different property manager, Centers Business Management (“CBM”), than the one
provided for in an arbitration award, with CBM refusing to provide rent roll, eviction, and vacancy
documentation to K&R (Khorshidi Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5; Rabbanian Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5); (2)
entering into a contract with a waterproofing company without allowing K&R
to obtain bids from other vendors (Khorshidi Decl. ¶ 6; Rabbanian Decl. ¶ 6); (3) engaging
in litigation against the waterproofing company barred by res judicata (Gizer
Decl. Ex. Q); (4) failing to provide joint venture documents to K&R
(Khorshidi Decl. ¶ 8; Rabbanian Decl. ¶¶ 7, 15); (5) failing to maximize and/or
misappropriating parking income at the joint venture (Khorshidi Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12;
Rabbanian Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9, 11, 12); (6) mismanaging the joint venture and causing
a reduction in the profit margin from 60.86% for 1996-2008 when K&R were
managers to 31.07% in 2021 (Khorshidi
Decl. ¶¶ 14, 15; Rabbanian Decl. ¶¶ 13, 14); and (7) evicting reliable tenants
(Soleymani Decl. ¶¶ 2-4) and employing personnel who are rude and
unprofessional to prospective tenants (see generally Alvarado Decl.; Sedra
Decl.).
Even taking all of K&R’s assertions as true, the Court
still declines to appoint a receiver. A receiver should not be appointed unless
absolutely essential, because no other remedy will suffice. (City &
County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 745.) This is
so because the appointment of a receiver is recognized as a drastic, time
consuming, expensive and potentially unjust remedy to be used as a final
resort. (See Weil & Brown,
Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 9:743 et seq.; see also Alhambra-Shumway
Mines v. Alhambra Gold Mine Corp. (1953) 116 Cal.App.2d 869, 873.) “The
appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy and is one which should not be invoked
unless there is an actual or threatened cessation or diminution of the
business.” (In re Jamison Steel Corp. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 27, 35.) “It
is established…that a court of equity has power to appoint a receiver of a
going corporation upon a showing that there are such dissensions in its
governing body as to create a virtual suspension of its business.” (Golden
State Glass Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1939) 13 Cal.2d
384, 393.)
Thus, even if it were true that the Javaheris could be
earning more income, either by increasing the price of parking on the joint
venture property or increasing the number of tenants, the joint venture is
still operational and profitable, albeit not as much as K&R would like. (Khorshidi
Decl. ¶¶ 14, 15; Rabbanian Decl. ¶¶ 13, 14.) There is no showing here that the
joint venture is at risk of ceasing operations or having its assets dissipate. The
fact that K&R originally sought a receiver in June 2022 but withdrew the
motion, only to file the motion in September 2023, suggests that any ongoing
threat, danger, or harm to the joint venture posed by the Javaheris does not
warrant the extreme remedy of placing it in receivership. (Gizer Decl. ¶ 19.)
To the extent that any mismanagement by the Javaheris causes
harm to the appraisal value of the joint venture, which may affect the price at
which K&R might sell their interest in the joint venture, K&R can
assert a claim for such damages resulting from any lower buy-out price through
their Cross-Complaint in the instant action. (K&R Cross-Compl. ¶¶ 26, 27;
Prayer, First Cause of Action, ¶ 2.) Appointment of a receiver is not the
appropriate remedy to mitigate against such claims of harm.
The motion is DENIED.