Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case 19STCV22308 2023-02-07 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 19STCV22308, Date: 2023-02-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV22308 Hearing Date: February 7, 2023 Dept: 72

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Date: 2/7/23 (8:30 AM)

Case: Concepcion Hernandez Garcia v. County of Los Angeles (19STCV22308)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Concepcion Hernandez Garcia’s Motion for Attorney Fees is GRANTED IN PART.

Defendant County of Los Angeles’ evidentiary objections are all OVERRULED.

As a preliminary matter, because judgment in the amount of $250,000 was entered in favor of plaintiff, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees, pursuant to Government Code § 12965(c)(6).

With respect to the claimed hourly rates, the Court finds that the hourly rate of $1,000 for attorney Gregory W. Smith is reasonable. (Smith Decl. ¶¶ 2-9.) The Court declines to reduce the hourly rate of $600 claimed by attorney Leila Al Faiz. Even though attorney Faiz previously claimed an hourly rate of $400 on July 14, 2020 (Muradyan Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. A at ¶ 40), counsel has since started her own employment law practice, settled a whistleblower retaliation matter for $350,000, served as sole handling attorney on a matter that settled for $1.2 million, and served as sole handling attorney on pretrial proceedings in a matter in which a $4 million verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff. (Al Faiz Decl. ¶¶ 10, 12, 13.) The Court thus finds that attorney Al Faiz’s claimed hourly rate is reasonable.

In addition, the Court has reviewed the billing entries from counsel for plaintiff and finds that the billing entries are reasonable. (Smith Decl. Ex. 2; Al Faiz Decl. ¶ 7.)

The Court declines to reduce the fee request based on time spent litigating the retaliation claims brought under the Fair Employment and Housing Act and Labor Code § 1102.5. Although plaintiff dismissed these causes of action on December 9, 2021, “[w]here a lawsuit consists of related claims, and the plaintiff has won substantial relief, a trial court has discretion to award all or substantially all of the plaintiff's fees even if the court did not adopt each contention raised.” (Downey Cares v. Downey Community Development Com. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 983, 997.)

All of plaintiff’s claims, including the retaliation claims, arise from Field Training Officer David Silverio’s sexual harassment of plaintiff and her complaints thereof. (See Compl. ¶¶ 45, 57.) The fact that plaintiff eventually dismissed the retaliation claims, comprising two of the three causes of action, does not mean that her fee request should be reduced by two-thirds. “Attorneys generally must pursue all available legal avenues and theories in pursuit of their clients’ objectives; it is impossible, as a practical matter, for an attorney to know in advance whether or not his or her work on a potentially meritorious legal theory will ultimately prevail.” (Greene v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 418, 424, quoting Sokolow v. County of San Mateo (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 250.)

The Court declines to reduce the fee request for time spent opposing defendant’s motion to compel deposition. The Court notes that defendant sought sanctions against plaintiff for having to bring the motion (cf. Muradyan Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. E at Notice), but the Court declined to sanction plaintiff. (9/3/20 Minute Order.) Accordingly, the Court does not find that the fees spent opposing the motion were unreasonably incurred.

The Court declines to reduce the fee request based on hours that attorney Al Faiz spent at trial. Even if counsel did not examine any witness, present any evidence, or argue any motions during trial, she was the sole handling attorney in the instant action before trial. (Al Faiz Decl. ¶ 11.) Accordingly, counsel’s knowledge of the facts of the case was invaluable in developing trial strategy, drafting trial briefs, and preparing witness outlines based on her observations during trial. (See Al Faiz Decl. Ex. 7 [billing entries during trial].)

The Court finds that a multiplier is not warranted. This was a relatively straightforward employment law case with trial on a single cause of action that did not present overly complex issues. (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1176.) Although the Court recognizes counsel apparently represented plaintiff on a contingency basis, the Court finds that the lodestar award as set forth herein sufficiently compensates counsel for their efforts. (Id.)

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART. Using the appropriate lodestar approach, and based on the foregoing findings and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred for the work performed in connection with prevailing at trial and preparing the instant fee motion is $392,382. Such fees are awarded to plaintiff Concepcion Hernandez Garcia against defendant County of Los Angeles.