Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 19STCV34358, Date: 2023-05-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV34358 Hearing Date: May 11, 2023 Dept: 72
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
Date: 5/11/23 (9:30 AM)
Case: Beverly Hills Police Officers’
Assn. v. City of Beverly Hills et al. (19STCV34358)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant City of Beverly Hills’ Motion for Summary
Judgment/Summary Adjudication is GRANTED.
All evidentiary objections are OVERRULED. The Court
exercises its discretion to consider the late-filed declarations filed by
plaintiffs and their counsel on April 3, 2023. (Rule of Court 3.1300(d) [“No
paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted
for filing. If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed
paper, the minutes or order must so indicate”]; Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc.
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765 [“A trial court has broad discretion under rule
3.1300(d) of the Rules of Court to refuse to consider papers served and filed
beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good cause for late
submission”].)
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether Defendant City is entitled to
summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ First Cause of
Action for Breach of Contract – Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) because
Plaintiffs’ claim is barred by collateral estoppel.
The Court finds that plaintiffs’ first cause of action is
barred by collateral estoppel.
“As generally understood, ‘[t]he doctrine of res judicata
gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in
subsequent litigation involving the same controversy.’ [Citation.] The doctrine
‘has a double aspect.’ [Citation.] ‘In its primary aspect,’ commonly known as
claim preclusion, it ‘operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit
between the same parties on the same cause of action. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
‘In its secondary aspect,’ commonly known as collateral estoppel, ‘[t]he prior
judgment ... “operates” ’ in ‘a second suit ... based on a different cause of
action ... “as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the
second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The prerequisite elements for applying the doctrine
to either an entire cause of action or one or more issues are the same: (1) A
claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue
litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final
judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being
asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. [Citations.]’”
(Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010)
48 Cal.4th 788, 797.)
Defendant City of Beverly Hills (“City”) presents the decision
of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) in which the ALJ found that plaintiffs
were correctly classified in the 3% at 55 retirement formula. (UMF 15.) Prior
to the ALJ’s decision, California Public Employees Retirement System
(“CalPERS”) previously found that plaintiffs were correctly classified in the
3% at 55 formula. (UMF 2.) Plaintiffs appealed the decision of CalPERS and
requested a hearing, arguing that City’s amendment of its contract with CalPERS
contradicted the language of the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”), from
which the amended contract arose. (UMF 3.)
With respect to whether the parties against whom collateral
estoppel is being asserted, i.e., plaintiffs, were parties in the prior
proceeding, it is undisputed that plaintiffs were represented at the hearing.
(UMF 6.)
With respect to whether the ALJ’s decision was a final
judgment on the merits, “It is settled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
or issue preclusion is applicable to final decisions of administrative agencies
acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.” (Murray v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 867.) “Indicia of proceedings
undertaken in a judicial capacity include a hearing before an impartial
decision maker; testimony given under oath or affirmation; a party's ability to
subpoena, call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce documentary
evidence, and to make oral and written argument; the taking of a record of the
proceeding; and a written statement of reasons for the decision.” (Pacific
Lumber Co. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 921,
944.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that, during the administrative hearing, they
had the ability to examine and cross-examine witnesses, present documentary
evidence, create a record, make oral arguments, and file written briefing. (UMF
6, 7.) Consequently, City demonstrates without dispute that the administrative hearing
from which the ALJ’s decision arose was undertaken in a judicial capacity. Plaintiffs
also do not address defendant’s contention that their right to appeal the ALJ’s
decision expired on January 23, 2023. (UMF 16.) Accordingly, City demonstrates
that the ALJ’s decision was a final judgment on the merits.
With respect to whether the issue raised in the administrative
hearing is identical to the issue in the first cause of action in the instant
action, plaintiffs allege in the operative Second Amended Complaint that City
breached the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding by failing to enroll plaintiffs
in the 3% at 50 retirement plan. (SAC ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs allege that, under
Section 16C of the MOU, they were entitled to benefit from the 3% at 50 retirement
formula because they were hired prior to July 1, 2012, notwithstanding that
they became sworn police officers after this date. (SAC ¶¶ 17, 18, 23.)
In the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ considered “whether [Cal]PERS
correctly interpreted the contract amendment with City [of Beverly Hills] and
whether the contract amendment accurately reflected the retirement provisions
in the 2011 MOU.” (Def. Ex. 21 at 4.) Plaintiffs argue that the ALJ only
determined whether CalPERS and City complied with the Public Employees’
Retirement Law (“PERL”). (Def. Ex. 21 at 19.) Plaintiffs also argue that the
ALJ noted that City’s amendment of its contract with CalPERS used different
terminology and different cut-off dates than the MOU. (Def. Ex. 21 at 24.)
Nevertheless, the ALJ stated that, in order to determine the
issue of compliance with PERL, she “must consider the language of the 2011 MOU
to make these determinations.” (Def. Ex. 21 at 19.) CalPERS had argued that the
ALJ did not have authority to rule on the proper interpretation of the MOU. (Def.
Ex. 21 at 18.) Plaintiffs, however, took the position that the ALJ’s authority
was more expansive than the limitation argued by CalPERS. (Def. Ex. 21 at 18-19.) Thus, with respect to the MOU, the ALJ concluded:
“Limiting the scope of this hearing to whether PERS correctly interpreted the
2012 Amendment without considering the basis for the 2012 Amendment thus would
interfere with respondents’ [i.e., plaintiffs] rights to fully exhaust their
administrative remedies.” (Def. Ex. 21 at 19) Plaintiffs cannot now disavow in
this proceeding their position during the administrative hearing that they
sought a determination regarding whether the MOU required plaintiffs to be classified
under the 3% at 50 retirement formula.
During the administrative hearing, plaintiffs presented
evidence that certain personnel from the City’s Human Resources Department and
the Beverly Hills Police Department represented that plaintiffs qualified for
the 3% at 50 retirement formula. (Def. Ex. 21 at 13-15.) The ALJ found that such
representations were not determinative of the meaning of the 2011 MOU because
the personnel did not participate in the MOU negotiations and because the MOU
was an integrated agreement. (Def. Ex. 21 at 24-25.) Based on extrinsic
evidence concerning the intent of the 2011 MOU negotiators, the ALJ found that the
retirement benefits under Sections 16C and 16D of the MOU applied only to sworn
officers. (Def. Ex. 21 at 22-24.) The ALJ thus ruled that, based on the MOU, CalPERS
correctly classified plaintiffs under the 3% at 55 retirement formula. (Def.
Ex. 21 at 21-25.)
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ’s finding that plaintiffs
were correctly enrolled in the 3% at 55 retirement plan is binding on
plaintiffs.
The motion as to Issue No. 1 is GRANTED. Defendant City of
Beverly Hills is entitled to summary adjudication in its favor with respect to
the first cause of action.
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether Defendant City is entitled to summary
judgment and/or summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for
Breach of Contract – MOU because Plaintiffs cannot establish that they were
third-party beneficiaries of the retirement provisions of the MOU.
Based on the ruling with respect to Issue No. 1, the motion
as to Issue No. 2 is DENIED as MOOT.
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether Defendant City is entitled to
summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ First Cause of
Action for Breach of Contract – MOU because Plaintiffs cannot establish that
the City breached the MOU with the Beverly Hills Police Officers’ Association.
Based on the ruling with respect to Issue No. 1, the motion
as to Issue No. 3 is DENIED as MOOT.
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether
Defendant City is entitled to summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on
Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Breach of Individual Employment
Agreement because Plaintiffs cannot establish a breach of individual employment
contract, as the terms and conditions of their employment is subject to the MOU
and under the Meyers Milias Brown Act, the City could not have entered into a
separate individual employment agreement with Plaintiffs.
City argues that plaintiffs may not benefit from individual
employment agreements when a binding MOU exists. The Court agrees. The Meyers–Milias–Brown
Act (“MMBA”) governs the “collective bargaining process for employees of local
government entities.” (Relyea v. Ventura County Fire Protection Dist.
(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 875, 879.) Under the MMBA, “an individual employee is not
entitled to any different or better benefits than those granted to members of
an employee organization.” (Id. at 879.) Otherwise, collective
bargaining would be undermined, thereby defeating the Act's goals of ensuring
stability in labor management relations and the right of employees to join and
be represented by an employee organization. (Id. at 882, citing Gov.
Code § 3500.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Beverly Hills Police
Officers’ Association negotiated the MOU on behalf of all police officers and
pre-service officers with respect to benefits and that the MOU was adopted by
City. (UMF 91-96.) Accordingly, plaintiffs may not avail themselves of any terms
in employment offers or communications that contradict the MOU. (SAC ¶¶ 31,
32.)
The motion as to Issue No. 4 is GRANTED.
ISSUE NO. 5: Whether
Defendant City is entitled to summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on
Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for Breach of Individual Employment
Agreement because Plaintiffs cannot establish the existence of an individual
employment contract between the City and any of the Plaintiffs.
Based on the ruling with respect to Issue No. 4, the motion
as to Issue No. 5 is DENIED as MOOT.
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether
Defendant City is entitled to summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief because Plaintiffs cannot
establish either of the Breach of Contract – MOU
or Breach of Individual Employment Agreement causes of action, which is a
prerequisite to maintaining a declaratory relief claim.
The fourth cause of action for declaratory relief is based
on the first and second causes of action. (SAC ¶¶ 47 [referencing MOU], 48
[referencing individual employment packages].) Because summary adjudication is
granted with respect to the first and second causes of action, the motion as to
Issue No. 6 is GRANTED.
The third cause of action for petition for writ of mandate
was dismissed on demurrer on December 17, 2020. All causes of action having
been resolved in favor of defendant City of Beverly Hills, the motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED.
Within five (5) days hereof, Defendant City of Beverly Hills
shall submit a proposed judgment in accordance herewith.