Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 19STCV36154, Date: 2023-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV36154    Hearing Date: April 11, 2023    Dept: 72

MOTION TO STRIKE

Date:                  4/11/23 (8:30 AM)                 

Case:                 Uriel Hernandez Jr. v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (19STCV36154)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Kia America, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Third Amended Complaint is GRANTED.

Defendant Kia America, Inc. seeks to strike allegations referencing the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”) or its remedies of replacement or restitution. To the extent that plaintiff Uriel Hernandez Jr.’s sole cause of action for Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“Magnuson-Moss”) references or relies on Song-Beverly, such reference or reliance is improper. The Court previously found on summary judgment that, in accordance with Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, plaintiff may not invoke Song-Beverly because plaintiff purchased the vehicle used. (8/9/22 Minute Order; Rodriguez, 77 Cal.App.5th at 222- 23.)

Plaintiff argues that consumers can recover Song-Beverly remedies through Magnuson-Moss even without viable Song-Beverly claims. However, “Magnuson-Moss¿does not substitute federal law for state law of consumer product warranties, but instead supplements state law.”¿(Orichian v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1330.) “Magnuson–Moss¿‘calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,’¿except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule. [Citation.]” (Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co.¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 833.)¿ The Daugherty court held that the “failure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constitute[s] a failure to state a claim under¿Magnuson-Moss.” (Id.)

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Daugherty on the ground that the defects manifested after the express warranties had expired, whereas the defects in the instant action purportedly appeared during the express warranty period. (Daugherty, 144 Cal.App.4th at 832.) That is a distinction without a difference here. The Daugherty court asserted the generally applicable proposition that a cause of action under Magnuson-Moss rises and falls with an underlying state warranty law claim. That proposition did not depend on any analysis concerning whether an express warranty claim can be based on a latent defect discovered after the expiration of the warranty. The Court finds plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Daugherty unavailing. Accordingly, because the Court previously found that Song-Beverly was inapplicable to plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff may not invoke Song-Beverly to support a Magnuson-Moss cause of action.

In opposition, plaintiff also argues that Magnuson-Moss provides for a refund as a remedy even without a Song-Beverly claim. (15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4); see TAC ¶ 115 [alleging that defendant failed to make restitution].) However, Magnuson-Moss only allows for a refund in the case of full warranties. (15 U.S.C. § 2303(a); MacKenzie v. Chrysler Corp. (5th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2d 1162, 1167, fn. 7.) Plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss claim is based on a limited warranty. (TAC ¶ 10 & Ex. A at 4.) When a warrantor fails to comply under a written warranty, the consumer may sue for “damages.” (15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).) But, Magnuson-Moss is “virtually silent as to the amount and type of damages which may be awarded for breach of an express limited warranty.” (MacKenzie, 607 F.2d at 1166.) In such a case, “a resort to state law is proper in determining the applicable measure of damages under” Magnuson-Moss. (Ibid.) Here, the Court previously found that Song-Beverly is inapplicable. Accordingly, the restitution referenced in paragraph 115 of the Third Amended Complaint is not adequately supported based on a Magnuson-Moss cause of action alone.

The motion to strike is GRANTED. The portions of the Third Amended Complaint set forth in items 1 through 8 of the notice of motion are hereby STRICKEN.

Ten (10) Days to Answer the Third Amended Complaint.