Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 20STCV27675, Date: 2023-05-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV27675    Hearing Date: May 2, 2023    Dept: 72

MOTION TO MODIFY PROTECTIVE ORDER

Date:               5/2/23 (8:30 AM)

Case:               Solomon Aflalo v. Farmers Insurance Exchange et al. (20STCV27675)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Solomon Aflalo’s Motion to Modify Protective Order is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the Complaint in Ruffulo v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, Case No. 2:23-cv-01796, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (“Ruffulo”) is GRANTED, but only for the existence of the documents, not the truth of the matters asserted therein. (See Evid. Code § 452(d); Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-69.)

Plaintiff Solomon Aflalo and purported third-party intervenors, the Ruffulo plaintiffs, move to modify the protective order entered in the instant action. Movants seek to modify the definition of “Proceeding” to include the Ruffulo action and the definition of “Court” to include the U.S. District Court in the Ruffulo action.

As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs in the Ruffulo action purport to be third-party intervenors. However, the Ruffulo plaintiffs have not filed any application to intervene in the instant action, as required by CCP § 387(c). Accordingly, the Ruffulo plaintiffs have no standing to bring this motion.

Based on the holdings of Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584 and Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 1122, the Court finds that modification of the protective order in the manner proposed by plaintiff is warranted. The instant action is similar to the Ruffulo action. In both actions, Farmers Insurance Exchange, Farmers Group Inc., Truck Insurance Exchange, and Fire Insurance Exchange are defendants. (TAC ¶ 2; RJN Ex. 1 [“Ruffulo Compl.”] ¶¶ 30-33.) Plaintiff Solomon Aflalo in the instant action and plaintiffs James Ruffulo and Valerie Yankus in the Ruffulo action are insurance agents. (TAC ¶¶ 9, 10; Ruffulo Compl. ¶¶ 18, 24.) Pursuant to a nationwide pattern and practice, both sets of plaintiffs were allegedly terminated due to their age under the pretext of underperformance. (TAC ¶¶ 17(e), 17(i), 23, 34, 35, 136, 139; Ruffulo Compl. ¶¶ 5, 85, 90-95.) Both the instant action and the Ruffulo action contain allegations that the insurance agents were misclassified as independent contractors. (TAC ¶ 13(a), 107; Ruffulo Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 101, 102.)

Based on the foregoing, there is significant overlap in facts, parties, and issues between the instant action and the Ruffulo action which creates the potential for duplicative discovery, thereby warranting modification of the protective order. (See Raymond Handling, 39 Cal.App.4th at 588, quoting Garcia v. Peeples (Tex. 1987) 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 [“‘In addition to making discovery more truthful, shared discovery makes the system itself more efficient.’”]; Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1131 [“Allowing the fruits of one litigation to facilitate preparation in other cases advances the interests of judicial economy by avoiding the wasteful duplication of discovery”].)  

The modification of the protective order would not “subvert limitations on discovery” in the Ruffulo action, as asserted by defendants. Modification of the protective order would allow plaintiff to share discovery with the Ruffulo plaintiffs, but the Ruffulo court would determine what discovery is permissible. (See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1133 [“[T]he court responsible for the original protective order decides whether modifying the order will eliminate the potential for duplicative discovery. If the protective order is modified, the collateral courts may freely control the discovery processes in the controversies before them without running up against the protective order of another court.”]; Reply at 7:6-11 [“[T]he Ruffulo plaintiffs seek no order compelling the documents at issue produced, only a modification of the protective order allowing them to be produced. Thus, this Court is not being asked to embroil itself in any matter related to the ongoings of Ruffulo, which will be properly left to the discretion of the Ruffulo Court”].) Accordingly, defendants’ assertions that the pleadings are not yet settled and the Rule 26 conference has not yet taken place do not warrant denial of this motion.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Modify Protective Order.  The Court shall sign the Proposed Order, electronically received 3/30/23