Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case 21STCV12151 2022-10-11 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 21STCV12151, Date: 2022-10-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV12151 Hearing Date: October 11, 2022 Dept: 72

MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

Date: 10/11/21 (8:30 AM)

Case: La-Keeya Monique Loman et al. v. American Honda (21STCV12151)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiffs La-Keeya Monique Loman and Robert Earl Loman Jr.’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One is GRANTED IN PART.

The Court finds that plaintiffs demonstrate good cause for the discovery sought. Based on plaintiffs’ allegations regarding electrical and infotainment defects in their vehicle (FAC ¶ 13), plaintiffs are entitled to discovery which is probative of (1) defendant’s knowledge of these defects in 2019 Honda Odysseys, including in vehicles other than the subject vehicle, and (2) defendant’s handling of complaints. (Donlen v. Ford Motor Company (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 143-44; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4^th 967, 973-74, 994.)

This is so because willfulness in violating the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act would entitle plaintiffs to a civil penalty not exceeding two times the amount of actual damages. (FAC ¶ 120 [allegation that defendant’s failure to comply with Song-Beverly was willful]; Civ. Code § 1794(c); CACI 3244.) A defendant is willful under Civil Code § 1794(c) when the defendant “knew of its legal obligations and intentionally declined to follow them.” (CACI 3244.) Defendant’s knowledge gained from other instances of the defects about which plaintiffs complain may evidence defendant’s knowledge that the electrical and infotainment systems were not repairable and that therefore defendant had an obligation to replace or repurchase the vehicle under Civil Code § 1793.2(d)(2).

Plaintiffs seek four categories of documents:

I. Subject Vehicle (Nos. 1 and 9)

With respect to No. 1, defendant responded by stating that it would comply in part and produce specific documents, including the sales file, the non-confidential service records, and the non-confidential vehicle warranty history. Defendant objected that the terms “relating to, referring to, or concerning” render the request overbroad. However, defendant also states: “AHM is not withholding any documents pursuant to the objections, except attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work-product.” (Ryu Decl. ¶ 18 & Ex. 3 at 4:4-5.) AHM states that documents withheld based on the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product objections were “directly related to the defense of this litigation.” (Ryu Decl. ¶ 18 & Ex. 3 at 4:5-7.) Defendant’s response is sufficient. The documents withheld appear to be documents generated in response to defense counsel’s defense against this action, which is not discoverable. No further response is required.

With respect to No. 9, defendant objected but then responded by stating that it will comply in whole. Defendant then listed the documents that it will produce, including non-confidential service records, service bulletins, and tech line contact reports. Defendant’s response complies with CCP § 2031.220. Defendant agreed to produce all the documents encompassed by No. 9. No further response is required.

II. Internal Investigation and Analysis (Nos. 17-20 and 24-26)

With respect to No. 17, which asks for electronically stored information and emails relating to any field technical reports which provide defendants with information relating to repeat repair failures in Honda vehicles. Defendant responded that it would comply “in whole” by producing the field technical report for the subject vehicle.

Defendant contends that plaintiff should be estopped from seeking documents beyond the subject vehicle because plaintiff wrote in the separate statement for No. 17: “This request seeks lemon law documents referring to the ‘Subject Vehicle’.” (Pl. Sep. Stmt. at 22:6.) But, it is the text of the document request that controls. Further, defendant’s assertion that plaintiffs should be estopped from seeking field technical reports for vehicles other than the subject vehicle is without merit. “Judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or an earlier proceeding.” (Textron Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 733, 754.) Here, plaintiffs consistently argue that they are seeking documents pertaining to vehicles other than the subject vehicle. (Mtn. at 1:13-15 [characterizing No. 17 as seeking documents concerning defects in other vehicles]; 10:10-11:11 [discussing why documents concerning defects in other vehicles are discoverable].) Plaintiff’s characterization of No. 17 in the separate statement as pertaining to the subject vehicle only appears to be in error.

Even though defendant agreed to produce the field technical report for the subject vehicle, the request also asks for electronically stored information and emails. Moreover, the request pertains to “HONDA VEHICLES,” defined as vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the subject vehicle. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 17 & Ex. 2 at 3:3-4.) As stated above, documents concerning defects in other vehicles are probative of defendant’s knowledge of the possibility of repairing plaintiff’s vehicle. Accordingly, even though defendant purports to comply in whole, defendant’s statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

A further response is required for No. 17.

With respect to Nos. 18-20, 24, and 25, these documents seek emails relating to electrical defects in “HONDA VEHICLES,” defined as vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the subject vehicle. (Ryu Decl. ¶ 17 & Ex. 2 at 3:3-4.) These requests are reasonable and not overbroad. They are limited to vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the subject vehicle. Plaintiffs are entitled to inquire into defendant’s knowledge of transmission defects and handling of the defects, which may be evidenced in the requested emails. (See, e.g., Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104-05.) While Oregel did not directly address the propriety of discovery requests, as defendant argues, the Court of Appeal found there was substantial evidence for the jury to impose a civil penalty in its verdict because there was evidence the defendant manufacturer “was aware that numerous efforts to find and fix the oil leak had been unsuccessful, which is evidence a jury may consider on the question of willfulness.” (Id. at 1104-05.) Because the awareness of the manufacturer of the inability to fix a defect is pertinent to the issue of willfulness, defendant’s emails concerning the electrical defect alleged by plaintiff are discoverable.

Defendant purports to comply with these requests by producing, inter alia, service records, service bulletins, and the field engineering report. Defendant claims that these documents are sufficient for plaintiffs to prosecute their case. Defendant may not dictate what documents are necessary for plaintiffs to prosecute their case. Moreover, defendant’s supporting declaration does not contain any averment necessary for the Court to evaluate defendant’s objections based on undue burden. (See West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417 [“The objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought”].)

Further responses are required for Nos. 18-20, 24, and 25.

With respect to No. 26, which asks defendant to produce all Failure Mode and Effects reports concerning electrical defects in vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the subject vehicle, defendant states it agrees to provide a supplemental response indicating that there are no responsive documents. To ensure that plaintiffs receive a code-compliant response, defendant is ordered to provide a response to No. 26 that complies with CCP § 2031.230, including the reason for the inability to comply (e.g., the category of documents has never existed, has been destroyed, etc.). A further response is required for No. 26.

III. NHTSA Documents (Nos. 55 and 56)

With respect to No. 55, which asks for communications between defendant and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) regarding electrical defects in vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the subject vehicle, defendant states that it will produce communications between defendant and the NHTSA “related to Plaintiffs’ alleged concerns with the Subject Vehicle.” However, the request pertains to vehicles of the same make, model, and year, as “HONDA VEHICLES” is defined in the document requests, not just the subject vehicle. As stated above, such discovery is relevant. A further response and compliance with No. 55 as written are required.

With respect to No. 56, which asks for all NHTSA complaints in defendant’s possession relating to electrical defects in vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the subject vehicle, defendant agrees to supplement this response. A further response to No. 56 is required.

IV. Policies and Procedures (Nos. 8, 41, 43, and 54)

With respect to Nos. 8, 41, and 43, which ask for policies and procedures pertaining to defendant’s handling of customer complaints, defendant states that it is unable to comply because the requested documents have never existed. These responses comply with CCP § 2031.230. No further responses are required.

With respect to No. 54, which ask for training manuals related to the training given to defendant’s employees, agents, and representatives for the handling of consumer lemon law repurchase requests since 2019, defendant states that production will be allowed in part and that all documents to which no objection is being made will be included in the production. Defendant then states that the only documents being withheld are communications between defendants, its employees, and legal counsel. This response complies with CCP § 2031.220. No further response is required.

For all the foregoing reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART. The motion is DENIED as to Request for Production, Set One, Nos. 1, 8, 9, 41, 43, and 54. With respect to the remaining requests, no later than fifteen (15) days from this ruling, defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. is ordered to provide Code-compliant, verified further responses, without objection, to Request for Production, Set One, Nos. 17-20, 24-26, 55, and 56 and produce responsive documents.