Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 21STCV27900, Date: 2023-03-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV27900 Hearing Date: March 21, 2023 Dept: 72
MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE
Date: 3/21/23 (8:30 AM)
Case: Family Choice Private Duty
Agency, Inc. v. Easton, et al. (21STCV27900)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant/cross-complainant
Kamerron Easton’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories,
Set One is GRANTED IN PART.
Defendant/cross-complainant Kamerron Easton moves to compel
further responses from cross-defendant Shellydale Princess Gray to Form
Interrogatories, Set One Nos. 1.1, 2.5, 2.6, 2.8-2.11, 4.1, 9.1, 9.2, 12.1,
15.1, 16.1, 16.2, 16.10, 50.1(a), 50.1(d), and 50.2-50.6.
As a preliminary matter, Easton contends that Gray’s
verification is insufficient because it was based on information and belief. Easton cites no authority to support this
proposition. Arguments without any legal authority are without merit. (Kensington
University v. Council for Private Postsecondary etc. Education (1997) 54
Cal.App.4th 27, 42-43.) CCP § 2030.220(c), cited by Easton, only requires a
party responding to an interrogatory who does not have sufficient personal
knowledge to fully respond to an interrogatory to so state but to also make a
reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the requested information. The
statute does not dictate the form of a verification to discovery. In any event,
there is no requirement that Gray have personal knowledge of discovery
responses; attorneys, for example, often prepare discovery responses. (Rifkind
v. Superior Court (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1260, quoting Lance, Inc.
v. Ginsburg (E.D.Pa.1962) 32 F.R.D. 51, 53 [stating with respect to legal
contention discovery, “This is what lawyers are for”].) Because Gray signed the
verification under penalty of perjury, the verification is sufficient. (Easton
Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. B.)
“[I]f a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden
is on the responding party to justify any objection.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th
245, 255, citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-21.)
Gray served responses on January 11, 2023 and February 15, 2023 by email.
(Easton Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7 & Exs. B, F.) Based on the January 11, 2023
responses, Easton had until February 28, 2023 at the earliest to serve and file
the instant motion. (CCP §§ 2030.300(c) [45 days from service of response],
1010.6(a)(3)(B) [two court days added with email service].) The motion was
timely served and filed on February 23, 2023. Accordingly, Gray has the burden
to justify any objections to the subject discovery.
With respect to No. 1.1, which seeks the name, address, and
telephone number of each person who assisted in the preparation of the
responses to the form interrogatories, Gray indicated herself. However, Gray
did not provide her address and telephone number. A further response is
required.
With respect to Nos. 2.5, 2.9, 2.10, 16.1, and 16.2, Gray
objected without providing the requested information. Gray did not file any
opposition to the instant motion. Accordingly, Gray did not meet her burden to
justify her objections. Further responses are thus required for Nos. 2.5, 2.9,
2.10, 16.1, and 16.2.
With respect to No. 2.6, which asks for the name, address,
and telephone number of places of employment, the dates of employment, and the
nature of work for each employer, even though Gray only provided years of
employment instead of dates, this is sufficient. (See Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/date
[defining “date” as duration].) Further, responses of “supervision and
management” and “hospice consulting and foreign nurse recruitment” sufficiently
indicate the nature of the employment. Any further details can be ascertained
in deposition. However, Gray did not provide any telephone numbers. A further
response is required.
With respect to Nos. 2.8 and 50.3-50.6, Easton moves for
further responses solely based on the purportedly insufficient verification.
For the reasons stated above, the verification is sufficient. Gray answered
“no” to questions requiring a “yes” or “no” answer and was not required to
answer any follow-up questions. No further responses are required for Nos. 2.8
and 50.3-50.6.
With respect to No. 2.11, which seeks the name, address, and
telephone of the person for whom Gray was acting as the agent or employee, Gray
indicated that she was acting as the owner of Family Choice Private Duty
Agency, Inc. However, Gray did not provide the telephone number of Family
Choice Private Duty Agency, Inc. A further response is required.
With respect to No. 4.1, which seeks the name, address, and
telephone number of the named insured that is covered under any insurance
policy, Gray named Family Choice Private Duty Agency. However, Gray did not provide
the telephone number of Family Choice Private Duty Agency. To the extent that
Lloyds of London, the name of the insurance company that Gray provided, is
incorrect, this is not a proper basis for a motion to compel further response.
(See CCP § 2030.300(a).) The interrogatory asked for the name of the
insurance company that covers or may cover the subject incident, and Gray
provided this information. With respect to the telephone number of Family
Choice Private Duty Agency, a further response is required.
With respect to No. 9.1, which seeks the nature and the
amount of damages that Gray attributes to the subject incident, “contractual
damages as against the Estate” sufficiently describes the nature of the
damages. Gray also indicated that the amount of damages is $63,312. The
interrogatory does not ask how the amount of damages was calculated. However,
the interrogatory also asks for the name, address, and telephone number of the
person to whom an obligation was incurred. Gray named Family Choice Private
Duty Agency, Inc. but did not provide its telephone number. A further response
is required.
With respect to No. 9.2, which seeks the name, address, and
telephone number of each person who has documents supporting the existence or
amount of damages, Gray did not provide the name, address, and telephone number
of the persons who have the invoices, agreement, and timesheet purportedly
supporting the damages. Easton’s concerns regarding the ambiguity of certain
provisions in the subject contract or the non-production of invoices is outside
the scope of No. 9.2. With respect to the name, address, and telephone number
of each person who has documents supporting the existence or amount of damages,
however, a further response is required.
With respect to No. 12.1 which seeks the name, address, and
telephone number of witnesses to the subject incident, Gray provided the last
known telephone numbers of Ofelia de la Cerna and Nancy Uy. Gray maintains that
the numbers are incorrect. However, this is not a proper basis for a motion to
compel further response. (See CCP § 2030.300(a).) Easton asked for phone
numbers, and Easton obtained a verified response with telephone numbers.
Nevertheless, Gray did not provide the address of Ofelia de la Cerna and Nancy
Uy. Gray only states that they relocated to the Philippines. During the meet
and confer process, Gray’s former counsel indicated that Gray did not know the
current addresses of the two witnesses. If this is the case, then Gray is
obligated to state in a verified response that she does not have sufficient
personal knowledge to fully respond to No. 12.1, as required by CCP §
2030.220(c). A further response is required.
With respect to No. 15.1, which asks for the identification
of facts, witnesses, and documents supporting each denial of a material
allegation and each affirmative defense in Gray’s answer to the
Cross-Complaint, Easton contends that, due to the general denial, Gray is
required to address the Cross-Complaint paragraph by paragraph and identify
each material allegation that it denies. However, No. 15.1 requires Gray to
identify “each denial of a material allegation,” not each denial of each
material allegation. There is only one general denial. A paragraph-by-paragraph
denial is not required under No. 15.1.
However, with respect to first, seventh, and eighteenth
affirmative defenses, Gray did not answer subparts (a)-(c) of No. 15.1, which
require Gray to identify facts, witnesses, and documents supporting the
affirmative defenses. For the responses where caregivers are identified as
witnesses, Gray did not provide the addresses and telephone numbers of the
witnesses, as required by subpart (b). With respect to the thirteenth
affirmative defense, Gray did not identify any supporting documents, or the
lack thereof, for subpart (c). Gray only states that “[i]nvestigation and
discovery are continuing.” For responses where Gray identified the contract and
checks, Easton’s assertion that the responses are incomplete based on responses
to other interrogatories is unavailing, as Gray is entitled to assert which
documents support her affirmative defenses. Easton does not directly address
any other response contained within the response to No. 15.1. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the response to No. 15.1 is otherwise sufficient. A further
response is required.
With respect to No. 16.10, this interrogatory was not set
forth in the separate statement, as required by Rule of Court 3.1345(c). No
further response is required for No. 16.10.
With respect to Nos. 50.1(a) and 50.1(d), which seek the
identification of the agreement and modification of the agreement alleged in
the pleadings, Gray did not identify the name, address, and telephone number of
each person who has the Agency/Client Service Agreement and any modifications
thereto. Further responses are required.
With respect to No. 50.2, with asks Gray to describe of each
breach of the agreement alleged in the pleadings and the date of every act or
omission for each breach, on January 11, 2023, Gray described the breach as
decedent Marilyn Ashby’s delay of payment. On February 15, 2023, Gray set forth
the date of each breach. The responses in their totality are sufficient. With
respect to breaches purportedly committed by Gray, as asserted by Easton, Gray
is not required to comport with Easton’s view of the case in discovery. No
further response is required.
The motion is GRANTED IN PART. No later than fifteen (15)
days hereof, cross-defendant Shellydale Princess Gray is ordered to serve
further verified responses, without objection, to Form Interrogatories, Set
One, No. 1.1, 2.5, 2.6, 2.9-2.11, 4.1, 9.1, 9.2, 12.1, 15.1, 16.1, 16.2,
50.1(a), and 50.1(d).
Defendant/cross-complainant Kamerron Easton’s request for
sanctions is GRANTED IN PART. The Court shall impose a monetary sanction
against any party that has unsuccessfully opposed a motion to compel further
responses to interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.300(d).) However, even though
defendant is an attorney, defendant is self-represented and accordingly cannot
recover attorney’s fees as a monetary sanction for the discovery violation. (Argaman
v. Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1180 [“If an attorney pro se litigant's
time is compensated by a discovery sanction, the time of other nonattorney pro
se litigants . . . should also be compensated. Clearly, there is no support for
such a broad construction of the statute in case authority”].) Defendant is
appearing in pro per and not as an attorney of record. Accordingly, defendant’s
recovery of monetary sanctions is limited to the $61.65 in costs to file the
instant motion. (Easton Decl. ¶ 9.) Such monetary sanctions shall be paid by
cross-defendant Shellydale Princess Gray
within thirty (30) days hereof.