Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 21STCV34458, Date: 2022-09-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV34458 Hearing Date: September 22, 2022 Dept: 72
MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO:
(1) FORM INTERROGATORIES-EMPLOYMENT; AND (2) FORM
INTERROGATORIES-GENERAL
Date: 9/22/22 (8:30 AM)
Case: Ai Agnes Sasaki v. AltaMed
Foundation et al. (21STCV34458)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant WFS HTS, Inc.’s Motion to
Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatory-Employment, Set One is GRANTED.
Defendant WFS HTS, Inc.’s Motion to
Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatory-General, Set One is GRANTED.
I.
MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM
INTERROGATORIES-EMPLOYMENT, SET ONE
Defendant WFS HTS, Inc. (“HTS”) moves to compel further
responses from plaintiff Ai Agnes Sasaki to Form Interrogatory-Employment, Set
One, Nos. 200.1, 200.4, 201.1-201.7, 202.1, 203.1, 205.1, 207.1, 207.2, 208.1,
210.1-210.3, 210.5, 210.6, 212.1-212.7, 213.1, 213.2, 215.1, and 215.2.
As preliminary matter, the fact that HTS may have asserted
certain objections in response to plaintiff’s discovery does not constitute a meaningful
basis for plaintiff to refuse to HTS’s discovery based on the same objections.
If HTS refused to answer discovery based on specified objections and such
objections were without merit, plaintiff’s remedy was to move to compel a
further response. (CCP § 2030.300(a)(3) [grounds for motion to compel further
response include objections that are “without merit or too general].)
Plaintiff’s remedy does not lie in using HTS’s same objections as grounds for
not providing substantive responses to HTS’s discovery.
Plaintiff’s objection that certain discovery “seeks
documents or information already in Talent Strategies’ possession” is without
merit. For interrogatories regarding plaintiff’s contentions, HTS is entitled
to discover plaintiff’s contentions and what facts support the contentions. (Burke v. Sup. Ct.
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 276, 281, citing Singer
v. Sup. Ct. (1960) 54
Cal.2d 318, 323-25 [“Discovery necessarily serves the function of ‘testing the
pleadings,’ i.e., enabling a party to determine what his opponent's contentions
are and what facts he relies upon to support his contentions”].) To the extent
that responsive information may be found in other documents, such as the
transcript of plaintiff’s deposition or the Verified Second Amended Complaint,
plaintiff may reference the other documents only to the extent that “the burden
or expense of preparing or making” a compilation, abstract, audit, or summary
of documents to answer the interrogatory “would be substantially the same for
the party propounding the interrogatory [i.e., plaintiff] as for the responding
party [i.e., HTS].” (CCP § 2030.230.) Here, as contention interrogatories, the
interrogatories are more easily answered by plaintiff. HTS is not obligated to
engage in guesswork to glean from deposition testimony or a pleading which were
not necessarily prepared based on the information sought in the interrogatories.
Moreover, even if HTS previously deposed plaintiff, HTS is
not barred from propounding interrogatories. “A party is permitted to use
multiple methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was
disclosed under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing
to provide discovery under another method.” (Irvington-Moore, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 739.) To the extent that
plaintiff maintains the interrogatories subject plaintiff to “unwarranted
annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense,” the
burden was on plaintiff to move for a protective order and demonstrate good
cause why certain interrogatories “need not be answered.” (CCP §
2030.090(b)(1).) Plaintiff did not file any motion for protective order or
otherwise sufficiently demonstrate that responding to the requested discovery
would be burdensome and oppressive.
Plaintiff contends that HTS’s memorandum is deficient
because HTS did not include a statement of facts, as required by Rule of Court
3.1113(b). HTS provided a statement of facts regarding the propounding of the
interrogatories at issue and the meet and confer process. (Motion re:
Employment Interrogatories at 4:3-24.) HTS also set forth the interrogatories
at issue and the reasons why further responses should be compelled. The purpose
of Rule 3.1113(b) is to set forth the specific basis for the motion for the
benefit of the opposing party and the Court. (People v. Williams (1999)
20 Cal.4th 119, 129.) The moving memorandum satisfies this purpose.
With respect to No. 200.1, which asks whether plaintiff
contends the employment relationship was at will, plaintiff responded “Yes.”
Plaintiff did not respond to subparts (a), (b), and (c), which ask for the
identification of facts, witnesses, and documents supporting the contention.
With respect to Nos. 200.4 and 207.1, which asks whether the
parties’ employment relationship was governed by written rules, guidelines,
policies, or procedures established by the employer, plaintiff referenced the
employee handbook from Talent Strategies. Plaintiff did not answer the subparts
to these interrogatories. (See Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d
771, 783-84 [“[I]t is not proper to answer by stating, ‘See my deposition’, ‘See
my pleading’, or ‘See the financial statement’. Indeed, if a question does
require the responding party to make reference to a pleading or document, the
pleading or document should be identified and summarized so the answer is fully
responsive to the question”].)
With respect to Nos. 201.1, 201.2, 201.4, 201.5, 201.6, and
201.7, plaintiff’s objection based on ambiguity of the term “TERMINATION” is
without merit. Plaintiff states in the response that she was not “terminated”
and that she asserted two causes of action for “constructive wrongful
termination.” “TERMINATION” as defined in the Employment Form Interrogatories
includes “the actual or constructive termination of employment and includes a
discharge . . . .” (Cinar Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. 1 at 2.) Accordingly, “TERMINATION”
includes the constructive wrongful termination, the existence of which
plaintiff asserts. “A party may not deliberately misconstrue a question for the
purpose of supplying an evasive answer.” (Deyo, 84 Cal.App.3d at 783.)
Plaintiff’s effort to exclude her alleged “constructive wrongful termination”
out of the definition of “TERMINATION” does not excuse her failure to respond
to the subparts contained in the interrogatories.
With respect to Nos. 201.3, 202.1, 203.1, 205.1, 207.1, and
207.2, which ask plaintiff to identify facts, witnesses, and documents
supporting plaintiff’s assertion of adverse employment actions, including
harassment, that took place, plaintiff’s reference to the First Amended
Complaint is not sufficient for the reasons stated above. Plaintiff is required
to respond to all the subparts contained in these interrogatories.
With respect to Nos. 201.4, 201.7, 202.1, 205.1,
210.1-210.3, 210.5, 210.6, 212.1-212.7, 213.1, 213.2, 215.1, and 215.2,
plaintiff objected based on the purported ambiguity of the term “ADVERSE
EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS,” stating that the “definition of ‘Adverse Employment
Action’ does not include sexual harassment, failure to prevent sexual
harassment, constructive wrongful termination, discrimination (race and/or
national origin) or any of Respondent’s claims.” Plaintiff is incorrect. The
definition of “ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION” includes “other action or failure to
act that adversely affects the EMPLOYEE’S rights or interests and which is
alleged in the PLEADINGS.” (Cinar Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. 1 at 2.) Moreover, even
if the interrogatories were “somewhat ambiguous, but the nature of the information
sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.”
(Deyo, 84 Cal.App.3d at 783.)
With respect to No. 208.1, regarding complaints plaintiff
filed with any government agency regarding the material allegations of the
pleadings, plaintiff did not answer subparts (d), (e), (f), (g) (when the right
to sue notice was issued), and (h).
The motion is GRANTED. Within fifteen (15) days hereof,
plaintiff Ai Agnes Sasaki is ordered to serve further verified responses,
without objection, to Form Interrogatory-Employment, Set One, Nos. 200.1,
200.4, 201.1-201.7, 202.1, 203.1, 205.1, 207.1, 207.2, 208.1, 210.1-210.3,
210.5, 210.6, 212.1-212.7, 213.1, 213.2, 215.1, and 215.2, including all
subparts.
For failing to
comply with discovery obligations and thereby forcing defendant WFS
HTS, Inc. to file this motion,
the Court imposes the reasonable amount of $1,500.00 in monetary sanctions on
plaintiff Ai Agnes Sasaki and counsel of record, jointly and severally, as
requested. Monetary sanctions shall be paid to counsel for defendant WFS
HTS, Inc. within 30 days hereof.
II.
MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM
INTERROGATORIES-GENERAL, SET ONE
Defendant WFS HTS, Inc. (“HTS”) moves to compel further
responses from plaintiff Ai Agnes Sasaki to Form Interrogatory-General, Set One
Nos. 2.3-2.7, 2.11-2.13, 8.1-8.8, 9.1, 9.2, 11.1, 11.2, 12.1-12.7, 14.1, 14.2,
and 50.1.
Plaintiff contends that HTS’s memorandum is deficient
because HTS did not include a statement of facts, as required by Rule of Court
3.1113(b). HTS provided a statement of facts regarding the propounding of the
interrogatories at issue and the meet and confer process. (Motion re: General
Interrogatories at 4:3-24.) HTS also set forth the interrogatories at issue and
the reasons why further responses should be compelled. The purpose of Rule
3.1113(b) is to set forth the specific basis for the motion for the benefit of
the opposing party and the Court. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th
119, 129.) The moving memorandum satisfies this purpose.
With respect to Nos. 2.3, 2.11, 2.12, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4,
8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.8, 9.1, 9.2, 11.1, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7,
14.1, and 14.2 plaintiff’s objections based on ambiguity of the term “INCIDENT”
are without merit. “INCIDENT” was defined in the interrogatories as “the circumstances
and events surrounding the alleged accident, injury, or other occurrence or
breach of contract giving rise to this action or proceeding.” (Cinar
Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. 1 at 1.) Even if more than one incident was alleged in the
Complaint, HTS clarified during the meet and confer process that the term
includes “the circumstances giving rise to Plaintiff’s Complaint.” (Arshad
Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1 at 4.) This definition comports with the definition in
the interrogatories. “A party may not deliberately misconstrue a question for
the purpose of supplying an evasive answer.” (Deyo, 84 Cal.App.3d at
783.)
With respect to Nos. 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.11, 2.12,
2.13, 8.1, 9.1, 9.2, 11.1, 11.2, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7,
14.1, and 14.2, at this stage of the proceedings, the information sought by
these interrogatories, including, but not limited to, plaintiff’s address,
employment, and employment information for the last five years and witness
information, may lead to information that is relevant to plaintiff’s claims or
HTS’s defenses, including the after-acquired evidence doctrine. “[I]f a
timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on responding party to
justify any objection.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255, citing Coy v.
Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-21.) Plaintiff does not
explain how each of these interrogatories are “unintelligible in the context of
employment litigation.” (See Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th
1277, 1288, fn. 9 [“These Judicial Council form interrogatories are
straightforward and clear. Form Interrogatories of the Judicial Council are
exempted from many of the restrictions to which special interrogatories are
subject”].)
With respect to Nos. 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, and 12.5, plaintiff
does not attempt to justify the objections based on the attorney work product
doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, plaintiff does not
meet her burden to justify these objections.
With respect to No. 50.1, plaintiff failed to respond to
each of the subparts. Although plaintiff described the employee handbook,
plaintiff did not state the name, address, and telephone number of each person
who has the handbook, as required by subpart (a). Plaintiff did not respond to
subparts (b) through (f).
The motion is GRANTED. Within fifteen (15) days hereof,
plaintiff Ai Agnes Sasaki is ordered to serve further verified responses,
without objection, to Form Interrogatory-General, Set One, Nos. 2.3-2.7,
2.11-2.13, 8.1-8.8, 9.1, 9.2, 11.1, 11.2, 12.1-12.7, 14.1, 14.2, and 50.1.
For failing to
comply with discovery obligations thereby forcing defendant WFS
HTS, Inc. to file this motion,
the Court imposes a total of $2,085.00 in monetary sanctions on plaintiff Ai
Agnes Sasaki and counsel of record, jointly and severally. The monetary
sanctions are based on 3 hours for preparing the motion, one hour to
prepare the reply, and 0.5 hours for attending the hearing at an hourly rate of
$450.00 (instead of the total 8.3 hours counsel claims for preparing the motion
and reply and attending the hearing), plus the motion filing fee of $60.00.
Monetary sanctions shall be paid to counsel for defendant WFS
HTS, Inc. within 30 days hereof.