Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case Number: 22STCP01498, Date: 2024-05-07 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Parents United for Public School Choice petitions for a writ of mandate directing respondents Los Angeles Unified School District, Board of Education of the Los Angeles Unified School District, and Alberto Carvalho, in his capacity as Superintendent to set aside the “LAUSD Policy and Procedures for Charter Schools” and the “New Independent Charter School Petition Application Guide for 2023-2024.”

Petitioner also petitions for a writ of mandate directing respondents to produce records related to the submission, acceptance, and processing of charter petitions.

This petition concerns the requirements for charter school petitions submitted to the Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD” or “District”) and LAUSD’s review of such petitions. In enacting the Charter Schools Act of 1992 (Ed. Code § 47600, et seq.) (“CSA”),[1] the Legislature intended “to provide opportunities for teachers, parents, pupils, and community members to establish and maintain schools that operate independently from the existing school district structure.” (§ 47601.) “Charter schools are public schools ‘“free from most state laws pertaining uniquely to school districts.”’ [Citation.] The freedom granted to charter schools is intended to promote choice and innovation, and to stimulate ‘competition within the public school system.’ [Citation.]” (California Charter Schools Assn. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1221, 1228.) As stated by the CSA:

In reviewing petitions for the establishment of charter schools pursuant to this section, the chartering authority shall be guided by the intent of the Legislature that charter schools are and should become an integral part of the California educational system and that the establishment of charter schools should be encouraged. The governing board of the school district shall grant a charter for the operation of a school under this part if it is satisfied that granting the charter is consistent with sound educational practice and with the interests of the community in which the school is proposing to locate. The governing board of the school district shall consider the academic needs of the pupils the school proposes to serve.

The CSA further provides that school districts shall not deny charter petitions “unless it makes written factual findings, specific to the particular petition, setting forth specific facts to support one or more of” eight enumerated findings, including that the “charter school presents an unsound educational program for the pupils to be enrolled in the charter school,” that the “petitioners are demonstrably unlikely to successfully implement the program set forth in the petition,” and that the “petition does not contain reasonably comprehensive descriptions of all of the” topics set forth in subdivision (c)(5). (§ 47605(c)(1-8).)

On August 11, 2020, LAUSD’s Board of Education (“Board”) adopted the “Policy and Procedures for Charter Schools” (“Policy”), which was further amended on January 25, 2022. (AR 1, 81.) The Policy imposed a requirement to “submit a Letter of Intent prior to submitting their petition” that addressed 12 different topics (AR 90-91.) “If the petition is deemed complete at the intake appointment” by Charter Schools Division (“CSD”) staff, “the CSD will commence its review and analysis of the petition.” (AR 91.)

On June 20, 2023, the Board adopted a second amended Policy (“Amended Policy”) in response to the ruling of the Court (Hon. Mary H. Strobel) in Equitas Academy Charter School v. LAUSD, LASC Case No. 22STCP01617 (“Equitas”). (Cole-Gutiérrez Decl. ¶ 9; RJN ¶ 2; AR 216-315, 13926-29.) In Equitas, the Court held that the District’s refusal to accept a charter petition on the basis of a staff member’s objection to the completeness of the submitted petition during an “intake meeting” was unlawful and in conflict with the CSA. (AR 13919-24.)

The Amended Policy eliminated authority previously vested in CSD staff to refuse to “receive” a charter petition not in compliance with the Policy at the point of intake. (AR 309-14 [table prepared by LAUSD setting forth changes in redline].) Even though the Amended Policy requires the CSD to receive a charter petition, it still imposes requirements for the petition to be deemed complete and eligible for approval.

In particular, LAUSD requires charter petitions to contain a “Community Impact Assessment” (“CIA”) “[t]o assist in the determination whether the proposed new charter school is demonstrably likely or unlikely to serve the interests of the entire community in which the school proposed to locate.” (AR 239.) The CIA instructions and template requires charter applicants to engage in a study encompassing all existing District and charter schools operating within the “Community of Schools” identified by LAUSD, “and neighborhoods within a three-mile radius from the location identified by the petitioners of the proposed new charter school,” i.e., encompassing potentially hundreds of schools over more than 28 square miles. (AR 454-73, 477-80.) Among other requirements, the Amended Policy requires that, with respect to the CIA:

• “Petitioners must provide documented evidence of transparent, inclusive, and active community engagement activities…within the targeted community ….” (AR 239.)

• “The [CIA] is to be complete at the time of submission…. Petitioners are to include publicly disclosable information/documentation of the stakeholders’ responses ….” (AR 239.)

• “[T]he petitioner must include a specific description, with supporting documentation, of each identified site’s ability to accommodate the petitioner’s enrollment projection in its first year of operation and each subsequent year until reaching full enrollment capacity. The petitioner shall provide written evidence of its facilities research in the target community ….” (AR 240.)

• “The petitioner must also describe how its facilities plan serves the interests of the entire community.” (AR 240.)

• “The petitioner shall assess the duplication of existing programs currently offered by existing District schools and charter schools in LAUSD as a whole.” (AR 241.)

The Board tasks CSD staff to “examine the reasonableness and comprehensiveness of the petitioner’s Community Impact Assessment.” (AR 242.) Per the Amended Policy, a petitioner “must” provide a CIA. The requirement for the CIA is set forth in the section of the Amended Policy titled “Criteria for Evaluating New Petitions,” which are described as “factors staff will consider in determining whether to make an approval or denial recommendation to the LAUSD Board.” (AR 225-26, 229, 237.) The Amended Policy provides that “Staff will assess whether the charter school is demonstrably likely or unlikely to serve the interests of the entire community.” (AR 265.)

CSD staff also publishes a “New Independent Charter School Petition Application Guide,” last updated on July 12, 2023 (the “Staff Guide”). (AR 316.) The Staff Guide states that it “provides specific information regarding LAUSD charter school petition application requirements.” (AR 317.)

In addition to specific implementation of the policy discussed above, the Staff Guide “provides information regarding both the content and format of the required documents that are expected to be submitted as part of an LAUSD new independent charter school petition application.” (AR 321.) Those requirements include that “[t]he petition and any supporting documents are expected to be consistent with the FSDRL [Federal, State, and District Required Language]” (AR 322) and that, for a charter to be considered “reasonably comprehensive” by LAUSD, it must address fifteen elements specified by LAUSD, including the educational program, measures by which pupil progress toward outcomes will be assessed, and employee qualifications. (AR 321-54.) The Staff Guide also requires submission of teacher resumes for all teachers signing the petition (AR 349-50), the board resolution of the proposed charter school that authorizes submission of the charter school petition application (AR350), and a completed Due Diligence Questionnaire and Acknowledgement Form. (AR 352; see also AR474 [resume requirements.]) It also requires charter school petitioners to identify their enrollment capacity (AR 324-25), which LAUSD enforces as an enrollment cap (see, e.g., AR 13901-07).

The District also publishes a “PETITION APPLICATION INTAKE CHECKLIST” (“Checklist”) setting forth “expected application components” identified in the Policy and Staff Guide, e.g., letter of intent, bank account statements, lottery form, due diligence questionnaires, and Community Impact Assessment. (AR 355-57; see also AR 322 [Staff Guide refers to “New Independent Charter School Petition Application Intake Checklist”].) On the District’s website, such documents are described as “required documents.” (AR 475.)

The District sets forth its so-called Federal, State, and District Language (“FSDRL”) in a separated Board-adopted document, as last revised on August 11, 2020. (AR 358-401.) The document includes more than forty pages of content and terms that “must be included in a comprehensive independent charter school petition” and instructs that charter school petitioners may not “add, delete, or change any provision of the FSDRL.” (AR 360.) The FSDRL provides that petitioners must include assurances that disputes between the charter school and LAUSD shall be subject to binding private arbitration before the AAA. (AR 386.) If the charter school is a high school, the FSDRL provides that “before Charter School graduates its first class of students,” it shall obtain and maintain accreditation from the Western Association of Schools and Colleges. (AR 363.)

On June 21, 2023, petitioner requested seven categories of records from the District. (AR 687-88.) LAUSD’s search for, and rolling disclosure of, records responsive to petitioner’s CPRA request, remains ongoing. (Luther Decl. ¶ 14; Martinez Decl. ¶ 14.) LAUSD has disclosed over 35,000 pages of records to date, as follows:

(Martinez Decl. ¶ 15.) LAUSD’s CPRA Response remains pending and in-progress, with records being disclosed on or about every 30 days; LAUSD contends the next batch of records will be disclosed on or before June 6, 2024. (Hamor Supp. Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. A.)

On April 25, 2022, petitioner Parents United for Public School Choice filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate. On August 2, 2022, during a trial setting conference, the Court (Hon. Mary H. Strobel) stayed the third cause of action for “Permanent Injunction – Code Civ. Proc. § 526a” and the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief.

On September 19, 2023, the Court granted petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Amend Petition. On September 20, 2023, petitioner filed a First Amended Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate.

On March 4, 2024, petitioner filed an opening brief. On April 2, 2024, respondents filed an opposition. On April 18, 2024, petitioner filed a reply. The Court has received an electronic copy of the administrative record and a hard copy of the joint appendix.

CCP § 1085(a) provides: “A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.”

“There are two essential requirements to the issuance of a traditional writ of mandate: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty.” (California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “An action in ordinary mandamus is proper where…the claim is that an agency has failed to act as required by law.” (Id. at 705.)

“When a party seeks review of an administrative decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, judicial review is limited to examining the agency proceedings to ascertain whether the agency's action has been arbitrary, capricious or lacking entirely in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the proper procedure and give notices required by law. And, where the case involves the interpretation of a statute or ordinance, our review of the trial court’s decision is de novo.” (Ideal Boat & Camper Storage v. County of Alameda (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 301, 311, citing Pomona Police Officers' Assn. v. City of Pomona (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 584.) In independently reviewing legal questions, “[a]n administrative agency’s interpretation does not bind judicial review but it is entitled to consideration and respect.” (Housing Partners I, Inc. v. Duncan (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1343.)

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) In a CCP § 1085 writ petition, the petitioner generally bears the burden of proof. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.)

Pursuant to the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) (Gov. Code § 7921.000, et seq.),[2] individual citizens have a right to access government records. In enacting the CPRA, the California Legislature declared that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.” (Gov. Code, § 7921.000; see also Cal. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3(b); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 57, 63.)

“[E]very person has a right to inspect any public record” of a state or local agency subject to statutory exemptions. (Gov. Code § 7922.530(a); see also Gov. Code § 7920.510(h) [definition of “local agency” includes agent of a city].) The California Constitution mandates that the CPRA be “broadly construed,” while any statute “that limits the right of access” must be “narrowly construed.” (See Cal. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3(b)(2); see also Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward (2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 507.) The CPRA “does not allow limitations on access to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.” (Gov. Code § 7921.300.)

Petitioner bears the burden of proof and persuasion in a mandate proceeding brought under CCP § 1085. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.) “To establish an agency has a duty to disclose under [the CPRA], the petitioner must show that: (1) the record ‘qualif[ies] as [a] ‘public record[ ]’ …; and (2) the record is ‘in the possession of the agency.’” (Anderson-Barker v Sup.Ct. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 528, 538.) “Whether a record falls within the statutory definition of a ‘public record’ involves a ‘distinct inquiry’ from whether the agency is in possession of that record…. The duty to disclose applies only when the petitioner has satisfied both elements.” (Id. at 539.)

CPRA exemptions must be narrowly construed, and the agency bears the burden of showing that a specific exemption applies. (Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement System v. Superior Court (2013) 195 Cal.App.4th 440, 453.) A public agency also has the burden to demonstrate that it properly withheld records on the grounds they are non-responsive to a CPRA request or do not constitute public records. (ACLU of Northern Cal. v. Sup. Ct. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 83-86.) ““Because the agency has full knowledge of the contents of the withheld records and the requester has only the agency's affidavits and descriptions of the documents, its affidavits must be specific enough to give the requester ‘a meaningful opportunity to contest’ the withholding of the documents.” (Id. at 83.)

All requests for judicial notice are GRANTED. All of respondents’ evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.

V. Writ of Mandate Pursuant to CCP § 1085 (First, Second, and Fifth Causes of Action)

A. The District is Not Allowed to Reject a Petition as Incomplete for Any Reason

Petitioner contends that the District cannot reject a charter petition as incomplete due to: (1) lack of a Community Impact Assessment, as required by the operative Policy, as amended on June 20, 2023; (2) lack of documents and information set forth in the Staff Guide and Checklist; or (3) lack of district-required language (“DRL”).

As acknowledged by petitioner, however, the District amended its Policy to require the District to receive a charter petition that contains a certification of completeness, as required by section 47605(b). (AR 245, 310.) The District, therefore, no longer has a policy to reject petitions for lack of the documents and information required under the Policy, Staff Guide, Checklist, and DRL. Notwithstanding petitioner’s contention to the contrary (Opening Br. at 14:4-10), the District is not imposing additional requirements at intake.[3]

B. The District is Not Preempted from Imposing Certain Requirements for Charter Approval

Petitioner contends that the Policy, Staff Guide, DRL, and Checklist are preempted by the Charter Schools Act.[4] In particular, petitioner objects to the requirement of a Community Impact Assessment. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the District’s requirements during review of charter petitions are not preempted by the CSA.

“‘Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, ‘[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.’ If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void. A conflict exists if the local legislation duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication. Local legislation is ‘duplicative’ of general law when it is coextensive therewith. Similarly, local legislation is ‘contradictory’ to general law when it is inimical thereto. Finally, local legislation enters an area that is ‘fully occupied’ by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to ‘fully occupy’ the area, or when it has impliedly done so in light of one of the following indicia of intent:’….” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Carlsbad (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 785, 792-793, quoting Sherwin–Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897–98.)

Here, the District’s requirements neither duplicate nor contradict the CSA. Nor has the Legislature expressly manifested its intent to fully occupy the review of charter petitions.

The Legislature is charged with determining and forming policy and fixing a primary standard. (Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1146.) Afterward, the Legislature may “confer upon executive or administrative officers the ‘power to fill up the details’ by prescribing administrative rules and regulations to promote the purposes of the legislation and to carry it into effect.” (Ibid., quoting State Bd. of Education v. Honig (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 720, 750 [Honig].) “In the educational setting, legislatures rarely control public school operations directly, but delegate authority which permits state, regional, and local education agencies to establish school policies and practices.” (Honig, 13 Cal.App.4th at 750.)

The Legislature has declared a policy of encouraging the establishment of charter schools, which are and should be an “integral part of the California educational system.” (§ 47605(c).) The Legislature also “fixed standards for charter schools, as detailed in the numerous petition and operational requirements set forth in section 47605.” (Wilson, 75 Cal.App.4th at 1147.)

Having determined and formed its policy regarding charter schools and fixed a primary standard, the Legislature permissibly delegated the establishment of policies and practices regarding the review of charter petitions to the District. Section 35160 states: “[T]he governing board of any school district may initiate and carry on any program, activity, or may otherwise act in any manner which is not in conflict with or inconsistent with, or preempted by, any law and which is not in conflict with the purposes for which school districts are established.” The Legislature clarified section 35160 by stating that school districts “should have the flexibility to create their own unique solutions,” as they “have diverse needs unique to their individual communities and programs.” (§ 35160.1(a), (c).)

In section 47605(c), the Legislature set forth grounds on which the District may deny a charter school petition. The statute, however, does not prohibit requirements that the District may impose for charter petitions. With respect to the requirement to include a CIA in a charter petition, the District may deny a petition if it sets forth facts specific to the petition supporting a finding that the “charter school is demonstrably unlikely to serve the interests of the entire community in which the school is proposing to locate.” (§ 47605(c)(7).) “Analysis of this finding shall include consideration of the fiscal impact of the proposed charter school. A written factual finding under this paragraph shall detail specific facts and circumstances that analyze and consider the following factors: [¶] (A) The extent to which the proposed charter school would substantially undermine existing services, academic offerings, or programmatic offerings. [¶] (B) Whether the proposed charter school would duplicate a program currently offered within the school district and the existing program has sufficient capacity for the pupils proposed to be served within reasonable proximity to where the charter school intends to locate.” (§ 47605(c)(7)(A-B).) The District shall grant a charter petition “if it is satisfied that granting the charter is consistent with sound educational practice and with the interests of the community in which the school is proposing to locate.” (§ 47605(c).)

Nothing in section 47605 preempts the District from imposing requirements for charter petitions with respect to the review of the petitions. More to the point, the District is not prohibited from requiring charter applicants to provide information relevant to whether the proposed charter school would serve the interests of the community in which the school is proposing to locate, as contemplated in section 47605(c)(7). The District is also not prohibited from requiring charter applicants to address fifteen elements specified by LAUSD, including the educational program, measure by which pupil progress toward outcomes will be measured, and employee qualifications. (AR 321-54; see § 47065(c)(5) [school district may deny petition due to lack of “reasonably comprehensive descriptions” with respect to specified topics, including educational program, method by which pupil progress toward outcomes will be measured, and qualifications to be met by individuals to be employed by charter school.)

The Court’s conclusion that there is no preemption does not conflict with Judge Strobel’s prior ruling in Equitas. Equitas “concern[ed] the statutory process by which the governing board of a school district ‘receives’ and acts upon a petition for establishment of a charter school within the school district.” (AR 13914.) The referenced statutory process is governed by section 47605(b), which explicitly provides a ministerial duty for the district to “receive” a petition upon certain conditions being met, stating: “A petition is deemed received by the governing board of the school district for purposes of commencing the timelines described in this subdivision on the day the petitioner submits a petition to the district office, along with a signed certification that the petitioner deems the petition to be complete.” (AR 13914.) In Equitas, even though the petitioner submitted a signed certification of completeness stating that it deemed the charter petition to be complete, the District had rejected the petition for review because the petitioner did not include all necessary components of a CIA, including evidence of community engagement with all required stakeholder groups. (AR 13915, 13917.)

Judge Strobel found that the plain language of section 47605(b) mandated just two requirements for a charter petition to be deemed received: (1) submission of the petition to the district office and (2) submission of a signed certification that the petitioner deems the petition to be complete. (AR 13921.) In light of section 47605(b)’s clear requirements, Judge Strobel concluded that it preempted the District’s policy that permitted Charter Schools Division staff to deem a petition not complete even if the two requirements of section 47605(b) were met. (AR 13923-24.)

Contrary to Equitas, the instant First Amended Petition concerns section 47605(c). Subdivision (c) does not prohibit the District from imposing certain requirements for its review of charter petitions. This contrasts with subdivision (b), which sets forth express requirements for a petition to be deemed received. Accordingly, there is no contradiction between what the Policy requires in terms of a CIA and the requirements of subdivision (c), which contains no express manifestation of intent by the Legislature to limit what a school district may require to assist in its review of charter petitions for purposes of subdivision (c).

Petitioner contends that the Legislature manifested its intent to fully occupy the field for the petitioning process, citing the portion of Wilson which states: “[C]harter schools are strictly creatures of statute. From how charter schools come into being, to who attends and who can teach, to how they are governed and structured, to funding, accountability and evaluation—the Legislature has plotted all aspects of their existence.” (Wilson, 75 Cal.App.4th at 1135.) Petitioner takes this statement out of context. The Court of Appeal made that pronouncement in response to the appellants’ argument that an assembly bill which modified the CSA “amount[ed] to abdication of any state control over essential educational functions, e.g., control over curriculum, textbooks, educational focus, teaching methods and operations of charter schools.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the Legislature is ultimately responsible for all aspects of education, including charter schools, even though it delegates the local operations to school districts. (Ibid.) Notably, the Wilson court acknowledged that school districts can promulgate policies and practices to effectuate the CSA. (Id. at 1146.) The Wilson court did not discuss whether section 47605 preempted the ability of school districts to supplement the statute with policies and procedures that do not contradict the CSA.

Petitioner also cites United Teachers of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 54 Cal.4th 504 (UTLA) for the assertion that “section 47605 establishes a comprehensive process for approval of charter petitions, spelling out precisely what is expected of a charter applicant.” (UTLA, 54 Cal.4th at 526.) UTLA is inapposite. UTLA held that, in a case concerning enforcement of collective bargaining provisions pursuant to the Educational Employment Relations Act, a petition to compel arbitration should be denied when the provisions sought to be enforced directly conflict with the Education Code. (Id. at 520.) UTLA also held that “the approval or denial of a charter petition may not be controlled by a collective bargaining agreement.” (Id. at 524.) The California Supreme Court explained that then-section 47605(b) (now subdivision (c)) set forth the exclusive grounds for denying a charter school petition. (Ibid.)

When the high court stated that section 47605 “spell[ed] out precisely what is expected of a charter applicant” (ibid.), it referred to how then-subdivision (b) “prescribe[d] the manner by which a school district governing board is to approve or deny a charter petition” and the “grounds on which a governing board can deny a petition.” (Id. at 522-23.) UTLA did not discuss whether a school district can enact rules and policies in furtherance of making those determinations.

To the extent that section 47605(c) is ambiguous with respect to what school districts can require from charter applicants, legislative history supports the assertion that the District can supplement section 47065 with rules and regulations, so long as they do not conflict with the CSA. (See People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177 [“If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute’s purpose, and public policy”].)

With respect to the CIA requirement, section 47065(c)(7) was added through Assembly Bill 1505 (“AB 1505”), which “allowed school districts to deny a petition to create or expand a charter school if the charter school is demonstrably unlikely to serve the interests of the entire community in which the school is proposing to locate.” (AR 13653.) The author of AB 1505 explained that the bill “gives school districts greater authority to choose which charter schools are approved in their community.” (AR 13656.) The author also explained that AB 1505 “ensures that charter schools are authorized and overseen by school districts and county offices of education, who are the elected officials that best understand the educational needs of their local students, thus improving proper oversight.” (AR 13656.) While AB 1505 references a “state prescribed application process” that charter applicants must follow (AR 13657), the bill does not prescribe the requirements of the application. Pursuant to sections 35160 and 35160.1, the District may prescribe such requirements.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the District’s requirements are not preempted by the CSA. Accordingly, petitioner fails to demonstrate that it is entitled to mandamus relief.

“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee against vagueness requires that laws provide adequate warning to people of ordinary intelligence of the conduct that is prohibited, and standards to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (Concerned Dog Owners of California v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1231.)

Petitioner contends that the Policy is void for vagueness because the District’s requirements, including the CIA and DRL, “fail[ ] to put charter petitioners on notice of what is required of them for their charter petition to be deemed complete

and leaves it to staff to exercise discretion.” (Opening Br. at 18:18-19:1.) The Court disagrees.

Petitioner argues that, because the District cannot refuse to deem a petition received due to lack of a CIA, the lack of a CIA cannot be the basis for denial of a petition. This argument ignores the distinction subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 47605. With respect to when a charter petition must be deemed received, subdivision (b) does not allow any discretion to reject a petition for review when the applicant submits the petition to the district office with a certification that the petitioner deems the petition to be complete. However, for the reasons stated above, subdivision (c) allows the governing board of a school district to exercise discretion to promulgate rules that aid in the staff’s review and recommendation for approval/denial of charter petitions. The Policy at issue here is likewise clear that a petition received by the District is nonetheless subject to the requirement of a CIA when the District undertakes its review of the received petition for approval. (See AR 239, 309-14.)

The sixth cause of action concerns petitioner’s request for the following categories of documents:

1. All Writings informing, training, and/or directing District employees assigned to the Charter Schools Division (“Employees”) on expectations, procedures, practices, and/or standards for accepting and processing new charter petitions, requests for material revisions of charter petitions, and/or charter renewals (“Charter Petitions”).

2. All email communications provided by Employees to any person(s), inclusive of entities (“Person”), that describe or relate to the submittal, acceptance, or processing of a Charter Petition. For clarity, this request covers email correspondence to or from Employees, to or from charter petitioners wherein Employees provide deadlines, intake schedules, or ask for clarification on any aspect of a Charter Petition.

3. All Writings that the District, Employee, or other person presented as a “Community Impact Assessment” to the District in connection with Charter Petitions.

4. All Writings to or from Employees that discuss or relate to Writings that the District, Employee, or other person presented as a “Community Impact Assessment” to the District in connection with Charter Petitions.

5. All Writings that relate to the development and/or revision of any current or prior policy adopted by the District Board regarding Charter Petitions.

6. All Writings that relate to the development and/or revision of any operative or prior staff guide regarding Charter Petitions.

7. All Writings that relate to the development and/or revision of any operative or prior Charter Petition intake checklist used by the District or Employees, including copies of any such checklists.

(AR 687-88.) In its Opposition, the District does not argue that the requested documents are not public records under the CPRA. (Opp. at 26:5 [“LAUSD does not dispute its disclosure obligations”].) Moreover, while counsel has seemingly identified exemptions (Martinez Decl. ¶ 17), the District has not specifically argued in the opposition that an exemption applies to any of the requested documents. Accordingly, the District does not meet its burden to show that a specific exemption applies. (Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement System, 195 Cal.App.4th at 453 [“Creating a general right of access subject to exemptions places the burden on the agency to show that a particular public record is exempt from disclosure”].)

Rather, respondents contend that the CPRA cause of action is premature. That contention is hard to accept, as the public record requests have been pending since June 21, 2023. (AR 687.) Respondents cite no authority allowing for delay of adjudication of a properly stated CPRA claim.

Because the District has not met its burden to demonstrate that the requests do not concern public records or that any exemption applies, the discussion below focuses on whether petitioner met its burden to demonstrate that the District is in possession of the requested documents. (Anderson-Barker, 31 Cal.App.5th at 538-39.)

With respect to Request No. 1 for “[a]ll Writings informing, training, and/or directing District employees…on expectations, procedures, practices, and/or standards for accepting and processing new charter petitions, requests for material revisions of charter petitions, and/or charter renewals,” a representative of the District testified during deposition regarding the existence of the following templates: (1) a template, called the Recommendation Meeting Protocol, that guide the CSD staff’s review and assessments of charter petitions (AR912:18-913:17), (2) a template that guides staff’s review and assessment of CIAs (AR915:22-917:15), and (3) a template that guides staff’s preparation of a board report to the District Board

regarding action on a charter petition (AR 914:7-915:11.) The templates appear to be responsive to Request No. 1 and must be produced.

With respect to Request No. 4 for writings that discuss CIAs, petitioner contends that the District is improperly withholding completed copies of the templates. However, the portion of the deposition cited by petitioner does not reference any completed templates. (AR 900:16-25.) When asked about the process of evaluating CIAs after they are received, the District’s representative stated: “There some [sic] are documents that are currently under review by our inside counsel to determine if they’re privileged.” (AR 900:21-25.) Consequently, the Court cannot specifically order the production of completed templates. However, to the extent that there are completed templates concerning the staff’s review and assessment of CIAs, they are responsive to Request No. 4 and are subject to production.

Petitioner also contends that the District did not produce non-public, internal-use-only checklists governing the intake, routing, and authorization process other than for the 2020-21 year. (See AR 980-84.) However, petitioner merely surmises that similar checklists for other academic years must exist. (Opening Br. at 23:1-2 [“Petitioner assumes that other similar checklists exist for prior and subsequent academic years and they have not been produced”].)

Petitioner also contends that the District is withholding public feedback related to the Policy, which would be responsive to Request No. 5, but petitioner does not demonstrate that such writings exist. While the Policy as amended on June 20, 2023 references “input from various stakeholders, including parents and staff from District and charter schools, community members, and representatives from Labor organizations, charter school organizations, and community organizations” (AR 217), the Policy does not state that the input was in writing or in some other record format that would be in the District’s possession.

Petitioner does not present any other argument as to specific documents that the District is purportedly withholding. Nevertheless, the District acknowledges that production is not yet complete. Accordingly, the Court will issue a writ indicating that production shall produce documents responsive to petitioner’s public records request on May 31, June 30, July 31, and August 31, 2024, with production to be completed by August 31, 2024.

For the foregoing reason, the First Amended Petition with respect to the sixth cause of action is GRANTED.

The First Amended Petition seeking a writ of mandate with respect to the first, second, and fifth causes of action is DENIED.

The petition is GRANTED with respect to the CPRA claim in the sixth cause of action. Respondent Los Angeles Unified School District shall produce the following templates: (1) the Recommendation Meeting Protocol that guides the Charter Schools Division staff’s review and assessments of charter petitions; (2) the template that guides staff’s review and assessment of Community Impact Assessments; and (3) the template that guides staff’s preparation of a board report to the District Board regarding action on a charter petition. Respondent District shall also produce documents responsive to petitioner’s June 21, 2023 public records request on May 31, June 30, July 31, and August 31 of 2024, with production to be completed by August 31, 2024.

Pursuant to Local Rule 3.231(n), petitioner shall prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed writ of mandate in accordance herewith.

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, pursuant to the local rules, which designate that Department 82 is a specialized Writs and Receivers department and not a general civil department, only a cause of action for writ of mandate is properly assigned to this department. (LASC Local Rules 2.8(d) and 2.9.) Local Rules 2.8(d) and 2.9 do not include a claim for injunctive relief or declaratory relief as a special proceeding assigned to the writs departments.

At the hearing, the parties should address whether the Court’s ruling on the first, second, and fifth causes of action resolve the third and fourth causes of action or whether this matter should be referred to Department 1 for reassignment to a direct calendar court for the remaining causes of action.

[1] Subsequent statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.

[2] The CPRA statutes were re-numbered effective January 1, 2023.

[3] Petitioner argues that, despite changes to the Policy, the District continues to improperly reject charter petitions for reasons other than lack of a certification of completeness. (Opening Br. at 15:7-15.) In furtherance of this claim, petitioner relies on a request for material revision submitted by Crete Academy, which the District refused to accept for processing due to missing information, including revised budget and cash flow projections. (AR 964.) The operative First Amended Petition, however, is a facial challenge to the District’s Policy and Staff Guide. (FAP ¶¶ 56, 63 [seeking writ ordering set aside of Policy and Staff Guide].) The question of whether the District properly applied the Policy as amended with respect to any one particular applicant is not at issue.

[4] Respondents contend the first, second, fifth, and sixth causes of action, which are at issue in this writ hearing, do not seek relief with respect to the DRL. (Opp. at 9, fn. 1.) However, the Staff Guide states that a charter petition and any supporting documents are expected to be consistent with the DRL at issue. (AR 322.) Because the Staff Guide incorporates the DRL, a challenge to the DRL is necessarily included within petitioner’s writ claims concerning the Staff Guide.