Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 22STCP02336, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCP02336 Hearing Date: March 14, 2024 Dept: 82
DEMURRER TO AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION
Date: 3/14/24
(1:30 PM)
Case: Gail Wiggan v. Los Angeles County
Office of Education et al. (22STCP02336)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Respondents Los Angeles County Office of Education and Los
Angeles County Office of Education’s Personnel Commission’s UNOPPOSED Demurrer
to Amended Verified Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate, filed on March 3,
2023 (“Third Amended Petition” or “TAP”), is SUSTAINED.
“‘A demurrer on the ground of the bar of the statute of
limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily[,]
barred.’ [Citations.] It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the
face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred.” (Lockley
v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 875, 881.)
Petitioner Gail Wiggan brings this case under Code of Civil
Procedure (“CCP”) section 1094.5 to obtain review of the Los Angeles County
Office of Education Personnel Commission’s (“Personnel Commission”) decision to
accepting Hearing Officer Walter F. Daugherty’s recommendation to dismiss
petitioner. (TAP at p. 4, ¶¶ 9, 10, Exs. D, E; Prayer for Relief at p. 5, ¶ 1.) CCP section 1094.6(a) provides that “[j]udicial
review of any decision of a local agency…as the term local agency is defined in
Section 54951 of the Government Code… may be had pursuant to Section 1094.5 of
this code only if the petition for writ of mandate…is filed within the time
limits specified in this section.” Government Code § 54951 defines “local
agency” to include any board, commission, or agency of a county. As agencies or
commissions of the County of Los Angeles, respondents Los Angeles County Office
of Education and Personnel Commission qualify as local agencies under CCP
section 1094.6(a).
Under CCP section 1094.6(b): “Any such petition [seeking
judicial review of any decision of a local agency] shall be filed not later
than the 90th day following the date on which the decision becomes final.” “Section
1094.6, subdivision (b), provides that where, as here, the agency decision is
in writing, any petition challenging the agency decision must be filed within
90 days of the decision becoming final. The decision becomes final on the date
the decision is served by first class mail, postage prepaid, including a copy
of the affidavit of mailing.” (Alford v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 742, 745.) Service by mail does not extend the 90-day period for
filing a petition for writ of mandate under CCP section 1094.6. (Tielsch v.
City of Anaheim (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 576, 578-80.)
If the petitioner files a request for the administrative
record with 10 days after the date the decision becomes final, the time to file
a petition pursuant to CCP section 1094.5 is extended by 30 days of personal
delivery or mailing of the administrative record. (CCP § 1094.6(d).)
Here, the Personnel Commission mailed the final decision
accepting the Hearing Officer’s recommendation to affirm petitioner’s dismissal
on June 24, 2019. (TAP at Ex. E, p. 140.) The petition does not contain any filed
request for administrative record. Accordingly, petitioner had 90 days from
June 24, 2019, i.e., until September 22, 2019, to file the writ
petition. Petitioner filed the initial petition on June 21, 2022, almost three
years later. Accordingly, as alleged, the Third Amended Petition filed on March
3, 2023 is time-barred.
Petitioner has not opposed the demurrer and has not raised
any exception to the 90-day limitations period in CCP section 1094.6(b) or
asserted any reason why the deadline to have filed her writ petition was not September
22, 2019. Under a section labeled “Statute of Limitations” in the Third Amended
Petition, petitioner alleges that she would like the Court to “consider several
items,” including “Verification filed in September2019 by lawyers assistant,”
“Denied submission by court on June 20,2019 (4 year Statute of Limitations),”
“Tolling statute of limitations due to illness,” and “Court holds that statute
of limitations can not deprive a person of property.” (TAP at 2:22-3:2.) On
their face, these quoted allegations do not provide any authority as to how the
90-day limitations period is exempted or extended.
The demurrer to the Third Amended Petition is SUSTAINED.
Before granting leave to amend, the Court will hear from petitioner as to how
the Third Amended Petition can be amended to address the defect set forth
above.