Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case Number: 22STCP03770, Date: 2024-01-16 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Salvador Velasquez petitions for a writ of mandate directing respondents California Public Employees’ Retirement System and Board of Administration of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System to void the decision finding that petitioner’s post-retirement work from January 1, 2003 to June 2014 violated the Public Employees’ Retirement Law.

Respondent California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) “is a unit of the Government Operations Agency responsible for administering the retirement systems for the State of California and ‘contracting agencies’—local public agencies that have ‘elected to have all or part of [their] employees become members of this system and that ha[ve] contracted with [CalPERS] for that purpose.’” (Marzec v. California Public Employees Retirement System (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 889, 896, citing Gov. Code §§ 20001, 20002, 20004, 20022, 20028.)[1]

Pursuant to the Public Employees’ Retirement Law (“PERL”), respondent Board of Administration of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“Board”) manages and controls pensions for public employees. (Gov. Code § 20120-20122.) “The board shall determine who are employees and is the sole judge of the conditions under which persons may be admitted to and continue to receive benefits under this system.” (§ 20125.) Subject to the PERL, “the board shall determine and may modify benefits for service and disability.” (§ 20123.)

The Board has “plenary authority and fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and administration” of CalPERS. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 17.) Such authority and responsibility encompass the protection of public pension monies from misappropriation. (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police & Fire Retirement System (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 711.)

“A person who has been retired under this system…may not be employed in any capacity thereafter by the state…or a contracting agency…unless the employment, without reinstatement, is authorized by this article.” (§ 21220.) Retirees who work in violation of section 21220 “may be reinstated to membership in the category in which, and on the date on which, the unlawful employment occurred.” (§ 21202.) “When any person is reinstated from retirement…his or her retirement allowance shall be canceled immediately….” (§ 21200.) “A person employed in violation of Section 21220 may be reinstated to membership in the category in which, and on the date on which, the unlawful employment occurred.” (§ 21202.)

“Any retired member employed in violation of this article…shall…[¶] (1) Reimburse this system for any retirement allowance received during the period or periods of employment that are in violation of law. [¶] (2) Only if reinstated pursuant to Section 21202, pay to this system an amount of money equal to the employee contributions that would otherwise have been paid during the period or periods of unlawful employment, plus interest thereon. [¶] (3) Contribute toward reimbursement of this system for administrative expenses incurred in responding to this situation, to the extent the member is determined by the executive officer to be at fault.” (§ 21220.)

Retirees may serve without being reinstated from retirement “upon appointment by the appointing power of a state agency or public agency employer” if they “perform[] work of limited duration.” (§ 21224(a).) “The compensation for the appointment shall not exceed the maximum monthly base salary paid to other employees performing comparable duties as listed on a publicly available pay schedule divided by 173.333 to equal an hourly rate.” (Ibid.) Retirees “shall not receive any benefit, incentive, compensation in lieu of benefits, or other form of compensation in addition to the hourly pay rate.” (Ibid.)

Retirees may also serve without being reinstated from retirement “[u]pon interim appointment by the governing body of a contracting agency to a vacant position during recruitment for a permanent appointment….” (§ 21221(h).) “A retired person shall only be appointed once to this vacant position.” (Ibid.) “The compensation for the interim appointment shall not exceed the maximum monthly base salary paid to other employees performing comparable duties as listed on a publicly available pay schedule for the vacant position divided by 173.333 to equal an hourly rate.” (Ibid.) Retirees appointed to a vacant position “shall not receive any benefits, incentives, compensation in lieu of benefits, or any other forms of compensation in addition to the hourly rate.” (Ibid.)

From December 1, 1979 through December 1, 2002, petitioner was employed by LA Works as a Director, Executive Director, and eventually its Chief Executive Officer. (AR 16-17, 807, 1583-85, 1598, 1799.) LA Works contracted with CalPERS at all relevant times to have LA Works’ employees receive retirement benefits under CalPERS. (AR 17.)

Petitioner submitted his application for retirement to CalPERS effective December 31, 2002. (AR 47-50, 1584-85.) On November 18, 2002, petitioner wrote a memorandum to LA Works’ Board of Directors wherein he proposed “a method for redesigning [his] current employment relationship” with LA Works. (AR 201.) Petitioner stated in the memorandum: “In summary, I propose to ‘retire’ under PERS effective January 1, 2003, while simultaneously continuing to lead LA Works as Chief Executive Officer (CEO).” (AR 201.) Petitioner proposed to work up to 960 hours and be compensated at $88.42 per hour. (AR 201-02.) Petitioner’s plan was approved, and it governed his post-retirement employment as LA Works’ CEO from January 1, 2003 through June 10, 2014. (AR 193-95, 321-23.)

On April 27, 2015, CalPERS’ Office of Audit Services (“OFAS”) began a review of LA Works’ compliance with the PERL. (AR 742-52, 1950.) OFAS found evidence that Velasquez’s post-retirement employment did not comply with the PERL’s working-after-retirement laws. (AR 83.) The PERL violations were reviewed and confirmed by CalPERS’ Employment Account Management Division (“EAMD”) in preliminary and final determination letters. (AR 51-62.) The final determination letter informed Velasquez that, because of his violations, he would be reinstated from retirement for the period January 1, 2003 through June 10, 2014. (AR 52.) Velasquez timely appealed the final determination. (AR 63-72.)

CalPERS filed a Statement of Issues on December 12, 2019 and Amended Statement of Issues on January 24, 2022 with the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). (AR 16-30, 805-819.) OAH held a three-day evidentiary hearing from January 24-26, 2022 and issued a proposed decision finding that petitioner violated sections 21221 and 21224 of the PERL in two primary respects. (AR 1936-82.) First, petitioner violated the PERL because his post-retirement employment with LA Works was not limited in duration. (AR 1972-73.) Second, petitioner violated the PERL by accepting a post-retirement pay rate ($88.42) that exceeded his pre-retirement pay rate in the same position ($61.67). (AR 1973.)

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) also rejected petitioner’s defenses, including the argument that the administrative process had denied him due process. (AR 1980.) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded in the proposed decision that CalPERS correctly reinstated petitioner and that petitioner must “repay certain retirement benefits paid by CalPERS” and “pay an amount equal to the employee contributions that would have been paid during the period, plus interest.” (AR 1982.) The proposed decision was adopted by the CalPERS Board. (AR 1935.)

On October 17, 2022, petitioner Salvador Velasquez filed a verified Petition for writ of administrative mandamus and other relief. On November 17, 2022, respondents California Public Employees’ Retirement System and Board of Administration of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System filed an Answer.

On August 18, 2023, petitioner filed an opening brief. On September 15, 2023, respondents filed an opposition. On October 2, 2023, petitioner filed a reply. The Court has received an electronic copy of the administrative record and a hard copy of the joint appendix.

CCP § 1085(a) provides: “A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.”

“There are two essential requirements to the issuance of a traditional writ of mandate: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty.” (California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “An action in ordinary mandamus is proper where…the claim is that an agency has failed to act as required by law.” (Id. at 705.)

“When a party seeks review of an administrative decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, judicial review is limited to examining the agency proceedings to ascertain whether the agency's action has been arbitrary, capricious or lacking entirely in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the proper procedure and give notices required by law. And, where the case involves the interpretation of a statute or ordinance, our review of the trial court's decision is de novo.” (Ideal Boat & Camper Storage v. County of Alameda (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 301, 311, citing Pomona Police Officers' Assn. v. City of Pomona (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 584.) In independently reviewing legal questions, “An administrative agency's interpretation does not bind judicial review but it is entitled to consideration and respect.” (Housing Partners I, Inc. v. Duncan (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1343.)

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) In a CCP § 1085 writ petition, the petitioner generally bears the burden of proof. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.)

Under CCP § 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (CCP § 1094.5(b).)

Because the administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the Court exercises its independent judgment on the record. (See Prentice v. Board of Admin. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 983, 988.) “Retirement benefits of the nature involved here have long been held to be a vested and fundamental right.” (Molina v. Board of Admin. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [petition concerning right to receive pension benefit “in an amount specified by law”]; O’Connor v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1610, 1620 [same].)

Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby, 4 Cal.3d at 143.) The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.)

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817, internal quotations omitted.) A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.) When an appellant challenges “‘the sufficiency of the evidence, all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely their own evidence.” (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317.)

Citing section 20163, petitioner contends that CalPERS does not have the right to seize, forfeit, or seek repayment from petitioner’s private property. (OB at 8:27-28.) Rather, petitioner contends that CalPERS is restricted to reducing his pension. Petitioner notes that he stopped receiving pension payments in May 2018. (AR 837, 1416.)

The administrative decision discusses petitioner’s liability for violating the post-retirement employment laws set forth in section 21221 and 21224. (AR 1894-95.) Petitioner was ordered to “repay certain retirement benefits paid by CalPERS during that period of time” and “pay an amount equal to the employee contributions that would have been paid during the period, plus interest.” (AR 1904.)

Section 20163(a) states, in relevant part: “Adjustments to correct overpayment of a retirement allowance may also be made by adjusting the allowance so that the retired person…will receive the actuarial equivalent of the allowance to which the member is entitled.” Petitioner appears to argue that, by stopping his pension payments in May 2018, CalPERS no longer has jurisdiction or authority to order petitioner to make any further payments. While section 20163 provides for one option to recoup the amount of overpayment through administrative adjustment, the statute does state administrative adjustment is the only method of recoupment. Importantly, section 21220 allows CalPERS to seek reimbursement of retirement allowances received while unlawfully employed post-retirement without any reference to section 20163. (§ 21220 [“Any retired member employed in violation of this article . . . shall . . . [r]eimburse this system for any retirement allowance received during the period or period of employment that are in violation of law”].)

CalPERS had jurisdiction to consider the conditions under which petitioner may continue to receive retirement benefits. (See § 20125 [“The board shall determine…is the sole judge of the conditions under which persons may be admitted to and continue to receive benefits under this system”].) Whether petitioner was unlawfully employed after his retirement and whether he is obligated to make payments to CalPERS pursuant to section 21220(b) is part of that jurisdiction.

Petitioner’s contention that CalPERS exceeded its jurisdiction is without merit.

Petitioner contends that CalPERS violated due process by not specifying the facts and law that petitioner violated from 2003 to 2014. (OB at 2:12-15; see also OB 10:19-21, quoting Barber v. State Personnel Bd. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 500, 505-06 [“The SOI did not provide Velasquez with sufficient notice of the rules he allegedly violated or the specific manner in which the violation occurred, thus ‘he was deprived of his due process right to prepare an effective defense against the charge and to argue the appropriate punishment’.”].)

In the Statement of Issues dated December 12, 2019, the CalPERS Board notified petitioner that his appeal was “limited to the issue of whether respondent Velasquez’s post retirement employment as a Chief Executive Officer from January 1, 2003 through May 28, 2014, and Management Consultant from May 29, 2014 through June 10, 2014, for LA Works violated the PERL’s post-retirement employment restrictions, making respondent Velasquez subject to mandatory reinstatement for the period of January 1, 2003 through June 10, 2014, and subject to repayment to CalPERS of retirement benefits paid during that period.” (AR 30.) As the basis for liability, the CalPERS Board stated: “Government Code Section 21221(h), in effect as of January 1, 2003, stated that a retired annuitant appointed to work under this subdivision could not exceed a total of one year. However, the retired annuitant worked as the CEO for eleven and a half years.” (AR 20.) Based on the foregoing, petitioner was sufficiently notified that he had to defend against allegations that his employment at LA Works from January 1, 2003 to June 10, 2014 violated section 21221(h). CalPERS thus provided sufficient notice of how the duration of petitioner’s post-retirement employment violated 21221(h).

Petitioner accordingly was provided adequate notice and opportunity to defend against CalPERS’s allegations with respect to duration of his employment.

Petitioner contends that the ALJ improperly applied a preponderance of the evidence standard. Petitioner maintains that the ALJ should have applied a clear and convincing standard because the claims against him were originally raised in a criminal complaint. (OB at 2:10-11.)

“[T]he party asserting the affirmative at an administrative hearing has the burden of proof, including both the initial burden of going forward and the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence.” (McCoy v. Board of Retirement (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1044, 1051, fn. 5.) Based on McCoy, the ALJ correctly found that “CalPERS has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent's post-retirement employment violated the PERL, and that Respondent should be retroactively reinstated from retirement for the period of January 1, 2003, through June 10, 2014, as a consequence of violating the PERL.” (AR 1886.)

Petitioner relies on Cornell v. Reilly (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 178 to support the application of a clear and convincing evidence standard. “[I]n disciplinary administrative proceedings the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the affirmative, and that guilt must be established to a reasonable certainty, and cannot be based on surmise or conjecture, suspicion or theoretical conclusions, or uncorroborated hearsay.” (Cornell, 127 Cal.App.2d at 183-84; see also Johnstone v. Daly City (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 506, 515-16, quoting Cornell v. Reilly (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d at 183.) However, Cornell and Johnstone are license revocation or employment disciplinary actions. (See Kapelus v. State Bar (1987) 44 Cal.3d 179, 184, fn. 1 [license revocation proceedings subject to “clear and convincing evidence” standard].)

“[T]he clear and convincing evidence burden of proof has been applied where constitutional due process rights or important general public policy considerations are implicated.” (Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 365.) “Generally, a higher burden of proof applies only where particularly important individual interests or rights, which are more substantial than the loss of money, are at stake.” (Ibid.) Here, money is at stake. As respondents point out, petitioner does not cite any cases indicating that the clear and convincing standard applies in pension violation cases.

Accordingly, the ALJ correctly applied a preponderance of the evidence standard.

The ALJ found that petitioner post-retirement employment with LA Works from January 1, 2003 to June 10, 2014 violated section 21221(h) and 21224(a). (AR 1894-95.)

Upon appointment by the governing body of a contracting agency to a position deemed by the governing body to be of a limited duration and requiring specialized skills or during an emergency to prevent stoppage of public business. These appointments, in addition to any made pursuant to Section 21224, shall not exceed a total for all employers of 960-hours in any calendar year. When an appointment is expected to, or will, exceed 960-hours in any calendar year, the governing body shall request approval from the board to extend the temporary employment. The governing body shall present a resolution to the board requesting action to allow or disallow the employment extension. The resolution shall be presented prior to the expiration of the 960-hour maximum for the calendar year. The appointment shall continue until notification of the board's decision is received by the governing body. The appointment shall be deemed approved if the board fails to take action within 60 days of receiving the request. Appointments under this subdivision may not exceed a total of one year.

Upon interim appointment by the governing body of a contracting agency to a vacant position during recruitment for a permanent appointment and deemed by the governing body to require specialized skills or during an emergency to prevent stoppage of public business. A retired person shall only be appointed once to this vacant position. These appointments, including any made concurrently pursuant to Section 21224 or 21229, shall not exceed a combined total of 960 hours for all employers each fiscal year. The compensation for the interim appointment shall not exceed the maximum monthly base salary paid to other employees performing comparable duties as listed on a publicly available pay schedule for the vacant position divided by 173.333 to equal an hourly rate. A retired person appointed to a vacant position pursuant to this subdivision shall not receive any benefits, incentives, compensation in lieu of benefits, or any other forms of compensation in addition to the hourly rate. A retired annuitant appointed pursuant to this subdivision shall not work more than 960 hours each fiscal year regardless of whether he or she works for one or more employers.

With respect to the current version of 21221(h), the statute now reads to provide that the appointment is “interim” and “to a vacant position during recruitment for a permanent appointment.” The current version now states that a “retired person shall only be appointed once to this vacant position.” These amendments became effective in 2012. (AR 1973.)

“Generally, statutes do not apply retroactively unless the Legislature clearly indicated otherwise.” (Phillips v. St. Mary Regional Medical Center (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 218, 229.) However, a “statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law does not operate retrospectively even if applied to transactions predating its enactment” “because the true meaning of the statute remains the same.” (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243.) “[I]n determining the retroactivity of a statutory amendment, an amendment that adopts a reasonable interpretation of a previously ambiguous statute is regarded as clarifying, rather than changing.” (Alameda County Deputy Sheriff's Association v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032, 1085, fn. 24, citing In re J.C. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1479-80.)

Arguably, the 2012 amendments are not clarifying because the Legislature added an additional requirement of the existence of recruitment for a permanent appointment. Former 21221(h) in existence in 2003 made no reference to the need to fill a permanent appointment. Moreover, the interim appointment appears to allow for a duration of more than one year, so long as the retiree does not work for more than 960 hours “each fiscal year” and so long as recruitment takes place for a permanent appointment. This is inconsistent with former 21221(h), which only stated that “[a]ppointments…may not exceed a total of one year.”

Nevertheless, petitioner’s post-retirement employment violated former 21221(h), at the very least. It is undisputed that petitioner worked for LA Works from January 1, 2003 to June 10, 2014. Petitioner was Chief Executive Officer of LA Works from January 1, 2003 to March 2013. (AR 1947-48, 1972.) From March 2013 to June 10, 2014, petitioner worked for LA Works as a consultant, but the ALJ found that such classification was not persuasive, as petitioner’s paychecks still referred to him as the CEO and petitioner had testified that he was an at-will employee when he fully retired from LA Works in 2014. (AR 1972.)

Petitioner contends that, until 2013, section 21221 allowed for multiple “limited duration” appointments. (OB at 13:5-9.) Petitioner’s employment was renewed annually. (AR 1958.)

Petitioner argues former section 21221(h)’s use of the plural “appointments” permitted “multiple appointments of ‘limited duration’ or ‘one year’ in succession.” (OB at 13:5-7.) “It is fundamental that legislation should be construed so as to harmonize its various elements without doing violence to its language or spirit.” (Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 788.) Petitioner’s interpretation does violence to the words “limited duration” in former section 21221(h). Under no reasonable interpretation can successive appointments, when considered in their aggregate, be considered “limited duration.” This is especially the case when petitioner remained CEO for more than 10 years.

To the extent that former section 21221(h) is ambiguous, “[i]f the words in the statute do not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of legislative intent, ‘[s]tatutory ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the context in which the language appears and adopting the construction which best serves to harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177.) “If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the statute's purpose, and public policy.” (Ibid.)

Senate Bill 371, which enacted provisions for repayment in the case of unlawful employment after retirement, required “retired PERS members to adhere to imposed work limits if they return to work for a PERS agency.” (AR 667-68., 674.) “The Legislature imposed this policy to preclude retirees from displacing active employees, and to preclude public employees from drawing both public salaries and a publicly-funded retirement benefit.” (AR 674.) Under petitioner’s interpretation, he could draw both a public salary and retirement benefits under CalPERS. Petitioner’s position is inconsistent with the public policy of the “working after retirement” statutes.

Moreover, CalPERS has instructed that retirees “may work for a CalPERS-covered employer without reinstatement if [their] employment is temporary in nature.” (AR 473 [April 2000 interpretation]; see also AR 481 [November 2002 interpretation], 493 [September 2004 interpretation – “If you intend to work as a permanent employee of any CalPERS employer, even if the position requires less than 960 hours of work per year, CalPERS’ law requires reinstatement into active employment”].) “[W]hile interpretation of a statute or regulation is ultimately a question of law, [courts] must also defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation involving its area of expertise, unless the interpretation flies in the face of the clear language and purpose of the interpreted provision.” (Communities for a Better Environment v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1089, 1104.) Considering the policy behind the “working after retirement” statutes, CalPERS’s guidance that retirees may work without reinstatement only if the employment is temporary is entitled to deference. Under no reasonable interpretation can petitioner’s more than 10 years of employment as CEO post-retirement be considered temporary.

With respect to section 21224, when petitioner retired as of January 1, 2003, section 21224 provided:

A retired person may serve without reinstatement from retirement or loss or interruption of benefits provided by this system upon appointment by the appointing power of a state agency or public agency employer either during an emergency to prevent stoppage of public business or because the retired person has specialized skills needed in performing work of limited duration. These appointments shall not exceed a combined total of 960 hours for all employers each fiscal year. The compensation for the appointment shall not exceed the maximum monthly base salary paid to other employees performing comparable duties as listed on a publicly available pay schedule divided by 173.333 to equal an hourly rate. A retired person appointed pursuant to this section shall not receive any benefit, incentive, compensation in lieu of benefits, or other form of compensation in addition to the hourly pay rate. A retired annuitant appointed pursuant to this section shall not work more than 960 hours each fiscal year regardless of whether he or she works for one or more employers.

Both former and current section 21224 provide that a retiree may work without reinstatement as long as the work is of “limited duration.” For the reasons stated with respect to section 21221, petitioner’s more than 10 years of employment post-retirement cannot be considered “limited duration.”

Petitioner’s post-retirement employment thus violated the “working after retirement” statutes. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to have the administrative decision against him set aside.[2]

The petition is DENIED. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.231(n), respondents shall prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed judgment.

[1] All statutory citations refer to the Government Code, unless otherwise stated.

[2] Because the Court finds petitioner’s post-retirement work from January 2003 to June 2014 violated the Public Employees’ Retirement Law on the ground that his post-retirement employment was not of “limited duration,” the Court does not reach the issue of whether petitioner’s post-retirement pay rate was excessive or whether he impermissibly received other forms of post-retirement compensation and benefits in addition to the hourly rate.