Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 22STCP03993, Date: 2024-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCP03993    Hearing Date: May 21, 2024    Dept: 86

 

TIMOTHY MOEN,  

 

 

 

 

Petitioner,

 

 

 

 

 

 

Case No.

 

 

 

 

 

22STCP03993

vs.

 

 

CITY OF LOS ANGELES BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONERS, et al.,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Respondents.

 

 

 

[TENTATIVE] RULING ON FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS

 

Dept. 86 (Hon. Curtis A. Kin)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Petitioner Timothy Moen petitions for a writ of mandate directing respondents City of Los Angeles Board of Civil Service Commissioners and City of Los Angeles (collectively, “City”) to set aside the 30-day suspension of petitioner and restore all loss of pay and benefits arising from the suspension.

 

I.       Factual Background

 

Petitioner is employed as a Refuse Collection Truck Operator II (“RCTO”) with the Department of Public Works, Bureau of Sanitation and Environment (“Bureau”). (AR 551.) On May 3, 2018, petitioner was driving a City-owned refuse truck northbound on White Oak Avenue in the number two lane, i.e., the lane closest to the curb, when he saw a street sweeper ahead of him that was sticking out three to three and a half feet in his lane. (AR 242-43 [HT 125:3-126:9].) To go around the sweeper, petitioner changed lanes into the number one lane on his left. (AR 244 [HT 127:10-13].)

 

Petitioner subsequently collided into a Mercedes-Benz passenger vehicle. The parties differ on how the collision occurred.

 

A.           Petitioner’s Description of the Cause of Collision

 

Petitioner signaled to change lanes to move into the number one lane, checked his mirrors, and then changed lanes. (AR 244 [HT 127:10-13].) The Mercedes was not in the number one lane; otherwise, petitioner would have hit the Mercedes upon changing lanes. (AR 244-45 [HT 127:14-22, 128:9:17].) Approximately 10-15 feet past the street sweeper, petitioner again signaled to return to the number two lane. (AR 245 [HT 128:18-129:25].)

 

When petitioner was “halfway or maybe a little more” in the number two lane, while his wheels were turned to the right, petitioner felt a vehicle hit his bumper and tire, and pulled over the truck. A man rolled up on the side of petitioner’s truck and said, “You hit me.” (AR 246, 258, 268 [HT 129:2-8, 141:3-13, 151:6-12].) At no time prior to the collision did petitioner see the Mercedes, despite signaling and constantly checking his mirrors. (AR 244-245; AR 269 [HT 127:14-22, 128:9:17, 152:9-18,])

 

            Petitioner contends that the Mercedes was behind him in the number one lane, crossed double yellow lanes to pass petitioner, and then collided into petitioner when returning to the number one lane. (AR 244 [HT 127:17-18; Opening Br. 3:18-20, 4:3-5.) Petitioner describes portions of the record that he believes supports his theory.

 

The refuse truck suffered minimal damage to the middle interior of its front left tire and to its front left bumper. (AR 314, 253-55 [Traffic Collision Report at 1; HT 136:17-138:23].) The initial point of impact appears to have been the front left point of the truck’s bumper, the top of which dented the Mercedes’s front right door a foot long and scraped off paint from the Mercedes door. (AR 139, 249 [HT at 22:4-9, 132:4-6]; compare AR 320-22.) Petitioner contends that the patrol officers who arrived at the scene of the accident found and ultimately brushed off the truck’s bumper prior to the arrival of the investigating Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) officer, Officer John Stafford, and before petitioner had a chance to photograph it. (AR 198, 248-49 [HT 81:5-7, 131:15-18, 132:4-12].) The Mercedes continued to turn and scrape against the truck’s inner front left tire that left black paint as purportedly shown in petitioner’s photographs. (AR 248-51 [HT 131:8-134:21].)

 

Petitioner’s refuse truck was carrying a full load at the time, which was approximately 9.5 tons. (AR 242-43 [HT 125:13-126:2].) Petitioner posits that, if his truck had collided into the Mercedes while changing from the number two to number one lane, the weight of the refuse truck would have pushed the Mercedes over and caused major damage to both vehicles and the Mercedes’s occupants, as well as leaving skid marks on the ground. There were none. (AR 150-55, 255, 258 [HT 33:3-6, 34:23-35:2, 36:22-38:5, 138:9-23, 141:4-13].)

 

According to petitioner, if his truck drifted into the Mercedes while the Mercedes was going straight, the Mercedes would have suffered damage to the side mirror, which the photographs demonstrate was untouched by the refuse truck. (Opening Br. at 4:15-17; AR 388-392.) The refuse truck purportedly would have had damage down the side of it. (Opening Br. at 4:17; AR 249 [HT 132:1-18]; AR 393-95 [photographs].)

 

B.           City’s Description of the Cause of Collision

 

On May 2, 2018, at 10:35 a.m., petitioner and the Mercedes driver were both driving northbound on White Oak Avenue. Petitioner was in the number two lane, i.e., right lane, and the Mercedes was operating in the number one lane, i.e., center lane. A street sweeper was stopped ahead of the petitioner’s refuse truck in the right lane. According to the City, petitioner moved to the left toward the center lane to go around the sweeper. As petitioner moved to the left, the left front side of his truck made contact with the right, front side of the Mercedes, causing damage to the front and rear passenger doors. (AR 139 [HT 22:1-20].) The Mercedes driver said to petitioner “you hit me,” and petitioner pulled over to the right after that. (AR 243, 268 [HT 126: 9-22; 151:9-12].) Petitioner testified that he did not see the Mercedes at all right before the collision or at the point of impact. (AR 269 [HT 152:9-11].)

 

Refuse Collection Supervisor Allen Stogner (“Stogner”) responded to the scene of accident on May 3, 2018, to investigate the accident on behalf of the Bureau. Stogner took photos of the vehicle and street and completed an Accident Initiation Worksheet. (AR 386-97.) Stogner later completed an Automobile Accident Report (Form 88), which petitioner also signed. (AR 341-42.) The Worksheet listed the front street side tire as the City vehicle point of impact, indicating no damage to the City vehicle. (AR 386.) It listed the damage to the Mercedes as curb side door front and back and rear quarter panel. (AR 386.) In the Driver Statement section of the Worksheet, there was a handwritten statement by petitioner stating: “I was traveling North on White Oak Ave. and Calvert St and had already passed the street sweeper on White Oak Ave sticking out in inside lane and turning right back into inside lane when black Mercedes turned into the right front tire of truck.” (AR 387.) When questioned about the statement, petitioner testified he meant the left front tire of the truck, not the right. (AR 271 [HT 154:10-19].)

 

After the accident, Officer Stafford responded to the scene to investigate the traffic accident. Officer Stafford is a 28-year veteran of the LAPD who had been assigned to Valley Traffic Division for 11 years. He was previously assigned to West Traffic Division for 14 years. (AR 129-30 [HT 12:14-13:15].) Officer Stafford is a trained traffic collision investigator who has prepared at least 6,000 traffic collision reports and has responded to approximately 200 to 300 traffic collisions involving City refuse trucks. (AR 131 [HT 14:16-23].)

 

When Officer Stafford arrived at the scene, two LAPD patrol officers were already present. (AR 148-50 [HT 31:18-33:6], 318.) Prior to Officer Stafford’s arrival, the patrol officers took statements from both the petitioner and the Mercedes driver. The patrol officers’ activities at the scene were recorded via body worn video. When speaking with the petitioner, one of the officers stated: “We can't determine who was at fault.... It’s up to the detectives to follow up….” Each party to the collision had a different story. (See Patrol Officer Body Worn Camera Video [X81052974] at 19:35-19:52.)

 

Officer Stafford’s activities at the accident scene were also recorded. Officer Stafford took statements from both petitioner and the Mercedes driver. While Officer Stafford was seated in the police vehicle, petitioner told Officer Stafford that he had moved left to go around the street sweeper and had already passed the street sweeper when contact with the Mercedes was made. (Officer Stafford Body Worn Camera Video [X81091121] 2:00-2:45; AR 561.) The Mercedes driver told Officer Stafford that he was driving straight in the center lane when the truck moved left and made contact with his vehicle. (Officer Stafford Body Worn Camera Video [X81091121] 8:09-8:53; AR, 561; AR, 137-38 [HT 20:22-21:1].) Officer Stafford took digital photos of the vehicles and completed a five-page report. (AR 133 [HT 16:14-24], 314-26.)

 

In the Traffic Collision Report, Officer Stafford identified petitioner as the “Primary Collision Factor” of the May 3, 2018 accident. (AR 315.) The damage to the Mercedes was consistent with the movement suggested by petitioner, namely, petitioner’s indication that he moved to the left and that both vehicles were going in the same direction. (AR 155 [HT 38:3-11].). At the time of the collision, both vehicles were moving. (AR 156 [HT 39:19-20].) Petitioner admitted to having moved left, and the Mercedes driver stated he was driving north in his lane. (AR 164 [HT 47:5-16].)

 

Officer Stafford found that petitioner violated Vehicle Code § 21658(a) for having made an unsafe lane change based on the parties’ statements and the damage to the vehicles. (AR 142 [HT 25:3-24], 318.) He testified that based on his training, this was sufficient information to conclude who was at fault. (AR 142 [HT 25:5:10].)

 

C.           Imposition of Discipline

 

On July 2, 2018, the Bureau issued a formal Notice of Intent to impose discipline against petitioner for “Causing or contributing to an accident, by operating City equipment in an unsafe manner on or about May 4, 2018.” The Department recommended a thirty-day suspension. (AR 328, 479.)

 

On December 5, 2018, an investigative meeting was held between the parties. Petitioner denied that he was the cause of the accident and provided both his oral statement and photographic evidence he had taken at the scene of the accident to prove his contentions and innocence of the charge. (AR 339-40.) In the Bureau’s conclusion of this meeting, the Bureau stated, in pertinent part: “Mr. Moen’s explanation of the events of the collision do not absolve him from the finding of the LAPD Report, which found him as the “primary collision factor of the accident.” (AR 340.) The Bureau explained: “Mr. Moen admitted that he moved his vehicle into the next lane to pass the street sweeper…. [T]he fact that Mr. Moen maneuvered out of his lane and into the lane to his left, is what ultimately initiated the collision. There is no evidence to support that the other party initiated the collision.” (AR 340.)

 

Following the findings of the investigation, a formal Skelly hearing was held on July 10, 2019.[1] (AR 399.) A second Skelly hearing was held on November 13, 2019, following the Bureau having produced copies of the body camera videos worn from the day of the accident, in response to petitioner’s written request. (AR 400.) On March 5, 2020, the Bureau, in conjunction with the Personnel Department, issued a recommendation for the imposition of a 30-working day suspension.[2] (AR 398, 402.)

 

On April 5, 2020, petitioner appealed the suspension decision. (AR 618-21, 623.)

 

D.           Administrative Hearing

 

A formal administrative hearing was held on September 2, 2021 before Hearing Officer Patricia Sellers, during which the Hearing Officer heard the testimony of several witnesses, including petitioner and the investigating LAPD officer, but not any testimony from the other driver involved in the accident. (AR 118-308.)

 

During the hearing, the Bureau introduced witness testimony from Officer Stafford; James Moore, Acting Division Manager of the Bureau; and Jose Del Rio, Senior Personnel Analyst. (AR 310.) Petitioner introduced witness testimony from Cash Russell, union steward, and petitioner. (AR 311.) The Bureau and petitioner also introduced photographs of the vehicles, video/audio from the patrol officers’ brief questioning of petitioner and the other driver, as well as other documentary and photographic evidence. (AR 314-472.)

 

The only witness to the accident that testified at the hearing before the Hearing Officer was petitioner; the Bureau did not call either the driver of the Mercedes or the driver’s wife, who was a passenger at the time. (See AR 527.) As discussed in Section I.E and I.F, infra, the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Board of Civil Service Commissioners relied on the testimonies of Officer Stafford and Moore, whose testimonies are recounted below.

 

1.            Officer John Stafford

 

Officer Stafford prepared the Traffic Collision Report for this accident. (AR 314-18.) Although he had interviewed petitioner and the other driver, he did not review his own audio or video recordings before writing his report. (AR 163-64 [HT 46:4-11, 47:5-20].) Officer Stafford explained: “I had the basic gist of what happened. I had one party, Mr. Moen, indicating he’s driving and he moved to the left. And I had the party in the lane to the left saying he was driving straight. In my mind, this was a—it was a no-brainer. Very simple. Very easy. Nothing complicated. So I didn't see the need to go back and get a verbatim statement when anyone, at a later date, as we are here, could go back and review that and get a more detailed statement if they’d like.” (AR 164 [HT 47:7-16].)

 

Officer Stafford did not make notes of what the other two police officers who arrived on the scene before him had represented to him. (AR 149 [HT 32:18-21].) He did not know if the police officers had their audio or video cameras on. (AR 149 [HT 32:22-24].) He did not attempt to interview the street sweeper who may have witnessed the accident. (AR 157 [HT 40:21-24].) Officer Stafford did not look at or request pictures that petitioner’s supervisor took at the scene of the accident. (AR 164-65 [HT 47:23-48:2].)

 

Officer Stafford admitted that he did not determine the point of impact between the two vehicles and that he made no attempt to make such determination. (AR 136 [HT 19:22-23].) He explained that it is “nearly impossible to have an exact point at which the collision occurred.” (AR 136-37 [HT 19:25-20:4].) Rather, Officer Stafford briefly spoke with petitioner and the other driver and did not provide any statement from the other driver’s wife who was in the vehicle. (AR 135-36 [HT 18:25-19:10].)

 

Officer Stafford testified that he reviewed the report after petitioner had requested it be amended and found no reason to amend it. (AR 143-44 [HT 26:17-27:14].) He conceded that the report contained several errors, including the measurement of the street width and the location of the accident. (AR 144-46, 164-65 [HT 27:24-29:12].) However, Officer Stafford stated that errors in the measurements or in the diagram of the Traffic Collision Report would not change his opinion on the cause of the accident. (AR 146, 161 [HT 29:22-30:2, 44:14-20].)

 

Officer Stafford testified that, if petitioner’s vehicle, full or empty, had hit the Mercedes, the damage to the Mercedes would be consistent with the movement suggested by petitioner. (AR 153-55 [HT 36:22-38:5].) When asked what movement petitioner suggested, Officer Stafford responded: “That he moved to the left and they’re both going the same direction.” (AR 155 [HT 38:6-11].) Officer Stafford testified that upon impact, both vehicles moved 200 to 300 feet before they pulled over. (AR 155-57 [HT 38:12-40:2].) However, because Officer Stafford did not witness the collision, he relied on estimation. (AR 155 [HT 38:12-21].) Officer Stafford did not know whether, after the impact, the vehicles moved together or whether they were not touching. (AR 157 [HT 40:3-12].)

 

2.            James Moore

 

James Moore, Acting Division Manager for the Bureau, testified regarding the Bureau’s vehicle accident investigation procedures. (AR 168-70 [HT 51:2-53:11].) Upon being notified of an accident having occurred, the supervisor goes to the scene to collect whatever information and evidence he can find regarding the accident, by taking pictures and asking the City driver what happened. The information collected by the supervisor is documented on an accident worksheet. (AR 171-74 [HT 54:21-55:4, 55:21-56:2], 386-387). Moore testified that the Bureau’s procedures do not include taking statements from the other party unless the statements are volunteered. (AR 172 [HR 55:5-9].) Moore explained that taking statements from the other driver is left to the LAPD or other responsible law enforcement agencies because they “are foremost trained in accident investigation.” (AR 172 [HT 55:10-20].)

 

Moore relied on the LAPD’s Traffic Collision Report in concluding that petitioner was at fault for the accident. (AR 185-86 [HT 68:24-69:5].) Moore stated that “LAPD is the foremost authority as far as operation on the streets and on the highways, so we take them as the highest authority.” (AR 186 [HT 69:3-5].) Moore did not speak with Officer Stafford at any time. (AR 162, 187-88 [HT 45:19-24, 70:24-71:1].) Moore assumed everything in the Traffic Collision Report was correct, even though petitioner argued that, there should have been more damage to the other vehicle if he were at fault. (AR 178-79, 184-85, 188 [HT 61:22-62:5, 67:25-68:3, 71:2-8].) Despite petitioner having asserted various errors in the Traffic Collision Report, Moore claimed he was unaware that the report contained errors in the speed, measurements, statements, and locations of the vehicles involved in the collision. (AR 188-89 [HT 71:9-17, 72:9-20].) He never listened to or watched the audio or video of Officer Stafford’s recorded investigation at the scene. (AR 191 [HT 74:5-10].) He did no independent investigation but relied entirely on Officer Stafford’s report. (AR 531.)

 

E.           Hearing Officer’s Report

 

Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer issued a Report to the Board of Civil Service Commissioners (“Board”). The Hearing Officer found that the City failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner caused or contributed to an accident by operating City equipment in an unsafe manner on May 3, 2018. (AR 532; see generally AR 522-32.) The Report further recommended that the penalty of a 30-day suspension be denied and all loss of pay and benefits be restored to petitioner. (AR 532.) In reaching her conclusions, the Hearing Officer explained:

 

There were no independent witnesses and no clear physical evidence to support a finding of who was at fault. The parties each strongly maintained that the other caused the accident. I concur with the statement from the patrol officer that he could not determine who was at fault. I find the investigation by Officer Stafford to have been sloppy at best. His testimony that the accident was “a no brainer, nothing complicated” shows he put very little effort into his investigation before drawing his conclusion as to fault. He did not bother to get any details from the patrol officers or look at their videos. His interviews with the parties were perfunctory.

 

Moore did no independent investigation, but relied entirely on Stafford’s report. When the Appellant objected to some of the information in the LAPD report no one took a second look.

 

(AR 531.)

 

F.           Board’s Rejection of Findings

 

On or about March 24, 2022, the Board rejected the findings and conclusions of the Hearing Officer. (AR 558.) The Board voted to sustain a 30-working day suspension against petitioner for having caused or contributed to an accident by operating City equipment in an unsafe manner. (AR 558.) The matter was continued to permit the drafting of a Findings of Fact and Law Report for the Board to consider. (AR 558.)

 

The proposed findings were submitted to the Board by Nancy McClelland on April 18, 2022. (AR 550-57.) On April 28, 2022, the Board voted to adopt as its own the Findings of Fact and Law Report submitted by a Commission in consultation with the Board’s Counsel. (AR 558-67.)

 

The City issued petitioner notice pursuant to City Charter section 1017 on May 2, 2022. (AR 558-59.) On July 11, 2022, petitioner submitted a demand pursuant to City Charter section 1017 for the reinstatement and restoration to duty for the period of his suspension, April 6, 2020 to June 30, 2020. (AR 568.) The Board denied petitioner’s demand on August 8, 2022. (AR 569.)

 

II.      Procedural History

 

            On November 7, 2022, petitioner Timothy Moen filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus. On March 24, 2023, petitioner filed a First Amended Verified Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus. On April 24, 2023, respondents City of Los Angeles Board of Civil Service Commissioners and City of Los Angeles filed an Answer to the First Amended Petition.

 

            On March 8, 2024, petitioner filed an opening brief. On April 8, 2024, respondents filed an opposition. On April 24, 2024, petitioner filed a reply. The Court has received an electronic copy of the administrative record and a hard copy of the joint appendix.

 

III.     Standard of Review

 

          Under CCP § 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (CCP § 1094.5(b).)

 

Because the suspension of petitioner from his position as Refuse Collection Truck Operator II concerns a fundamental vested right, the court exercises its independent judgment on the administrative findings. (See Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby, 4 Cal.3d at 143.) The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) 

 

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.”  (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817, internal quotations omitted.) A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.) When an appellant challenges “‘the sufficiency of the evidence, all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely their own evidence.” (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317.) 

 

IV.     Analysis

 

In this petition, the Court is charged with determining which version of causation of the collision is most credible. Petitioner would have the Court find that he safely changed lanes from the number two to the number one lane only for the Mercedes behind him to cross double yellow lines and collide into the front left bumper of the refuse truck. The City would have the Court find that petitioner failed to notice the Mercedes in the number one lane before moving from the number two lane to the number one lane and colliding into the Mercedes.

 

There is no available video footage of the collision to corroborate either party’s version of what happened. (See AR 265-66 [HT 148:9-149:11].) The Court has reviewed the testimony from the administrative hearing and the photographs contained in the administrative record. The Court acknowledges that petitioner’s version of events is plausible. Assuming the other driver had crossed double-yellow lines attempting to pass the refuse truck in the number one lane and was attempting to return to the northbound lanes, the Mercedes might have collided into the front left bumper of petitioner’s refuse truck while petitioner was returning from the number one lane to the number two lane. (AR 248-51 [HT 131:8-134:21].)

 

            However, under the preponderance of the evidence standard applied here (AR 90 [HT 36:18-19], 127 [HT 10:19-21], 531-32), the Court finds that, based on the evidence presented during the administrative hearing, the City’s version of the collision is more likely than not correct. Preponderance of the evidence means “more likely than not” that the existence of a fact is true. (Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 362, 369 [preponderance of the evidence is such evidence “as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force, and from which it results that the greater probability is in favor of the party upon whom the burden rests”].)

 

            The Board decision to discipline petitioner was based on the Traffic Collision Report completed by Officer Stafford. (AR 565.) Officer Stafford has worked in the Traffic Division for 25 years. (AR 130 [HT 13:3-8].) He has completed basic, intermediate, and advanced collision investigation courses. (AR 131 [HT 14:1-8.) He has prepared 6,000 traffic collision reports and responded to at least 200 to 300 collisions involving city refuse collection trucks. (AR 131 [HT 14:16-23].)

 

Officer Stafford testified to the damage to both the refuse truck and the Mercedes depicted in the photographs that he took. (AR 139-40 [HT 22:1-23:11], 319-26.) Based on his training, the damage from the vehicles, and the statements from petitioner and the other driver, Officer Stafford determined that petitioner was primarily at fault. (AR 134, 141-42 [HT 17:21-24, 24:25-25:10].) Officer Stafford testified that the damage to the Mercedes was consistent with the movement suggested by petitioner, i.e., that he moved to the left and that both he and the other driver were moving in the same direction. (AR 155 [HT 38:3-11].) Indeed, petitioner admitted to having moved left, and the Mercedes driver stated he was driving north in the number one lane. (AR 164 [HT 47:5-16].)

 

The Court finds such evidence sufficiently demonstrates that petitioner was the cause of the collision. In so finding, the Court acknowledges that Officer Stafford did not attempt to identify the street sweeper who may have witnessed the accident. (AR 157 [HT 40:21-24].) He also did not review audio and video recordings, take notes of what the patrol officers told him from the scene, or request the pictures that petitioner’s supervisor took. (AR 149, 163-65 [HT 32:18-21, 46:4-11, 47:23-48:2].) Nevertheless, based on Officer Stafford’s training, statements from the parties, and observation of the damage to the vehicles, he could have properly determined that such review and follow-up was unnecessary. Further, even if Officer Stafford was not an expert in accident reconstruction, his experience in investigating of traffic collisions, including 200 to 300 refuse trucks, is sufficient for him to opine on the cause of the subject collision based on the damage to the vehicles.

 

Lastly, although the Traffic Collision Report may have contained certain errors, the Court agrees with Officer Stafford’s view that any such errors do not alter his ultimate conclusion that petitioner was at fault. (AR 143-44 [HT 26:17-27:14].)   Errors regarding measurements do not necessarily mean that his finding that petitioner was primarily at fault was incorrect. (AR 146, 161 [HT 29:22-30:2, 44:14-20].)  To the contrary, Officer Stafford’s acknowledge of such errors in the Traffic Collision Report (AR 144-46, 164-65 [HT 27:24-29:12]) evince a lack of bias and an additional consideration of his conclusion upon further reflection.

 

            In contrast, petitioner relies on a theory of causation that is not supported by any expert opinion. (Box v. California Date Growers Assn. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 266, 274 [“The object of accident reconstruction is to reach satisfactory—not infallible—conclusions as to the operational factors and dynamic situation contributing to the collision…. [E]xpert reconstruction often is more accurate than statements of witnesses”].) It is not all clear that there should have been more damage to the Mercedes or that there would have been skid marks on the road if petitioner collided into the Mercedes while changing from the number two to the number one lane.

 

            Equally speculative, petitioner also contends: “Had Petitioner hit the Mercedes while entering the Number 1 lane, the street sweeper would have been to the right side of Petitioner’s truck, and the Mercedes to his left; the street was insufficiently wide to allow for the three vehicles all moving forward the same direction; Petitioner would not have been able to fit between the Mercedes and the street sweeper.” (Reply at 3:8-11.) This version of what happened ignores the possibility petitioner and the Mercedes driver collided before both of them reached the street sweeper.

 

For the foregoing reasons, based on the weight of Officer Stafford’s report and evidence upon which he relied, as compared to petitioner’s speculative theories, the Court agrees with the Board’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner collided into the Mercedes by unsafely changing lanes.

 


V.      Conclusion

 

The petition is DENIED. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.231(n), respondents shall prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed judgment.



[1]           In Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, the California Supreme Court established certain procedural rights for public employees facing disciplinary action.

 

[2]           The Bureau noted that the subject incident was petitioner’s fourth offense. (AR 402.) In 2004, petitioner served a 10-working-day suspension for an incident at a refuse yard and for having caused an accident by unsafely operating City equipment. (AR 399.) In 2008, petitioner served a five-working-day suspension for causing or contributing to an accident by unsafely operating City equipment. (AR 399.) In 2018, petitioner served a 20-working-day suspension for causing or contributing to an accident by unsafely operating City equipment. (AR 398.) Based on petitioner’s prior disciplinary history, the Bureau recommended a 30-working-day suspension. (AR 402.)