Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 22STCP03993, Date: 2024-05-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCP03993 Hearing Date: May 21, 2024 Dept: 86
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TIMOTHY MOEN, |
Petitioner, |
Case No. |
22STCP03993 |
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vs. CITY OF LOS ANGELES BOARD OF CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSIONERS, et al., |
Respondents. |
[TENTATIVE] RULING ON FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR
WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS Dept. 86 (Hon. Curtis A. Kin) |
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Petitioner
Timothy Moen petitions for a writ of mandate directing respondents City of Los
Angeles Board of Civil Service Commissioners and City of Los Angeles (collectively,
“City”) to set aside the 30-day suspension of petitioner and restore all loss
of pay and benefits arising from the suspension.
I. Factual Background
Petitioner
is employed as a Refuse Collection Truck Operator II (“RCTO”) with the Department
of Public Works, Bureau of Sanitation and Environment (“Bureau”). (AR 551.) On May
3, 2018, petitioner was driving a City-owned refuse truck northbound on White
Oak Avenue in the number two lane, i.e., the lane closest to the curb,
when he saw a street
sweeper ahead of him that was sticking out three to three and a half feet in
his lane. (AR 242-43 [HT 125:3-126:9].) To go around the sweeper, petitioner changed
lanes into the number one lane on his left. (AR 244 [HT 127:10-13].)
Petitioner
subsequently collided into a Mercedes-Benz passenger vehicle. The parties
differ on how the collision occurred.
A.
Petitioner’s
Description of the Cause of Collision
Petitioner
signaled to change lanes to move into the number one lane, checked his mirrors,
and then changed lanes. (AR 244 [HT 127:10-13].) The Mercedes was not in the
number one lane; otherwise, petitioner would have hit the Mercedes upon
changing lanes. (AR 244-45 [HT 127:14-22, 128:9:17].) Approximately 10-15 feet
past the street sweeper, petitioner again signaled to return to the number two
lane. (AR 245 [HT 128:18-129:25].)
When
petitioner was “halfway or maybe a little more” in the number two lane, while
his wheels were turned to the right, petitioner felt a vehicle hit his bumper
and tire, and pulled over the truck. A man rolled up on the side of petitioner’s
truck and said, “You hit me.” (AR 246, 258, 268 [HT 129:2-8, 141:3-13,
151:6-12].) At no time prior to the collision did petitioner see the Mercedes, despite
signaling and constantly checking his mirrors. (AR 244-245; AR 269 [HT
127:14-22, 128:9:17, 152:9-18,])
Petitioner contends that the
Mercedes was behind him in the number one lane, crossed double yellow lanes to
pass petitioner, and then collided into petitioner when returning to the number
one lane. (AR 244 [HT 127:17-18; Opening Br. 3:18-20, 4:3-5.) Petitioner
describes portions of the record that he believes supports his theory.
The
refuse truck suffered minimal damage to the middle interior of its front left
tire and to its front left bumper. (AR 314, 253-55 [Traffic Collision Report at
1; HT 136:17-138:23].) The initial point of impact appears to have been the
front left point of the truck’s bumper, the top of which dented the Mercedes’s front
right door a foot long and scraped off paint from the Mercedes door. (AR 139,
249 [HT at 22:4-9, 132:4-6]; compare AR 320-22.) Petitioner contends
that the patrol officers who arrived at the scene of the accident found and
ultimately brushed off the truck’s bumper prior to the arrival of the
investigating Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) officer, Officer John Stafford,
and before petitioner had a chance to photograph it. (AR 198, 248-49 [HT
81:5-7, 131:15-18, 132:4-12].) The Mercedes continued to turn and scrape against
the truck’s inner front left tire that left black paint as purportedly shown in
petitioner’s photographs. (AR 248-51 [HT 131:8-134:21].)
Petitioner’s
refuse truck was carrying a full load at the time, which was approximately 9.5 tons.
(AR 242-43 [HT 125:13-126:2].) Petitioner posits that, if his truck had collided
into the Mercedes while changing from the number two to number one lane, the
weight of the refuse truck would have pushed the Mercedes over and caused major
damage to both vehicles and the Mercedes’s occupants, as well as leaving skid
marks on the ground. There were none. (AR 150-55, 255, 258 [HT 33:3-6,
34:23-35:2, 36:22-38:5, 138:9-23, 141:4-13].)
According
to petitioner, if his truck drifted into the Mercedes while the Mercedes was
going straight, the Mercedes would have suffered damage to the side mirror,
which the photographs demonstrate was untouched by the refuse truck. (Opening
Br. at 4:15-17; AR 388-392.) The refuse truck purportedly would have had damage
down the side of it. (Opening Br. at 4:17; AR 249 [HT 132:1-18]; AR 393-95
[photographs].)
B.
City’s
Description of the Cause of Collision
On
May 2, 2018, at 10:35 a.m., petitioner and the Mercedes driver were both
driving northbound on White Oak Avenue. Petitioner was in the number two lane, i.e.,
right lane, and the Mercedes was operating in the number one lane, i.e., center
lane. A street sweeper was stopped ahead of the petitioner’s refuse truck in the
right lane. According to the City, petitioner moved to the left toward the
center lane to go around the sweeper. As petitioner moved to the left, the left
front side of his truck made contact with the right, front side of the Mercedes,
causing damage to the front and rear passenger doors. (AR 139 [HT 22:1-20].) The
Mercedes driver said to petitioner “you hit me,” and petitioner pulled over to
the right after that. (AR 243, 268 [HT 126: 9-22; 151:9-12].) Petitioner testified
that he did not see the Mercedes at all right before the collision or at the point
of impact. (AR 269 [HT 152:9-11].)
Refuse
Collection Supervisor Allen Stogner (“Stogner”) responded to the scene of accident
on May 3, 2018, to investigate the accident on behalf of the Bureau. Stogner
took photos of the vehicle and street and completed an Accident Initiation
Worksheet. (AR 386-97.) Stogner later completed an Automobile Accident Report
(Form 88), which petitioner also signed. (AR 341-42.) The Worksheet listed the front
street side tire as the City vehicle point of impact, indicating no damage to
the City vehicle. (AR 386.) It listed the damage to the Mercedes as curb side door
front and back and rear quarter panel. (AR 386.) In the Driver Statement
section of the Worksheet, there was a handwritten statement by petitioner stating:
“I was traveling North on White Oak Ave. and Calvert St and had already passed
the street sweeper on White Oak Ave sticking out in inside lane and turning
right back into inside lane when black Mercedes turned into the right front
tire of truck.” (AR 387.) When questioned about the statement, petitioner
testified he meant the left front tire of the truck, not the right. (AR 271 [HT
154:10-19].)
After
the accident, Officer Stafford responded to the scene to investigate the
traffic accident. Officer Stafford is a 28-year veteran of the LAPD who had
been assigned to Valley Traffic Division for 11 years. He was previously
assigned to West Traffic Division for 14 years. (AR 129-30 [HT 12:14-13:15].)
Officer Stafford is a trained traffic collision investigator who has prepared
at least 6,000 traffic collision reports and has responded to approximately 200
to 300 traffic collisions involving City refuse trucks. (AR 131 [HT 14:16-23].)
When
Officer Stafford arrived at the scene, two LAPD patrol officers were already
present. (AR 148-50 [HT 31:18-33:6], 318.) Prior to Officer Stafford’s arrival,
the patrol officers took statements from both the petitioner and the Mercedes
driver. The patrol officers’ activities at the scene were recorded via body
worn video. When speaking with the petitioner, one of the officers stated: “We
can't determine who was at fault.... It’s up to the detectives to follow up….” Each
party to the collision had a different story. (See Patrol Officer Body
Worn Camera Video [X81052974] at 19:35-19:52.)
Officer
Stafford’s activities at the accident scene were also recorded. Officer
Stafford took statements from both petitioner and the Mercedes driver. While
Officer Stafford was seated in the police vehicle, petitioner told Officer
Stafford that he had moved left to go around the street sweeper and had already
passed the street sweeper when contact with the Mercedes was made. (Officer
Stafford Body Worn Camera Video [X81091121] 2:00-2:45; AR 561.) The Mercedes
driver told Officer Stafford that he was driving straight in the center lane
when the truck moved left and made contact with his vehicle. (Officer Stafford Body
Worn Camera Video [X81091121] 8:09-8:53; AR, 561; AR, 137-38 [HT 20:22-21:1].)
Officer Stafford took digital photos of the vehicles and completed a five-page
report. (AR 133 [HT 16:14-24], 314-26.)
In
the Traffic Collision Report, Officer Stafford identified petitioner as the “Primary
Collision Factor” of the May 3, 2018 accident. (AR 315.) The damage to the
Mercedes was consistent with the movement suggested by petitioner, namely,
petitioner’s indication that he moved to the left and that both vehicles were
going in the same direction. (AR 155 [HT 38:3-11].). At the time of the
collision, both vehicles were moving. (AR 156 [HT 39:19-20].) Petitioner
admitted to having moved left, and the Mercedes driver stated he was driving north
in his lane. (AR 164 [HT 47:5-16].)
Officer
Stafford found that petitioner violated Vehicle Code § 21658(a) for having made
an unsafe lane change based on the parties’ statements and the damage to the
vehicles. (AR 142 [HT 25:3-24], 318.) He testified that based on his training,
this was sufficient information to conclude who was at fault. (AR 142 [HT 25:5:10].)
C.
Imposition
of Discipline
On
July 2, 2018, the Bureau issued a formal Notice of Intent to impose discipline
against petitioner for “Causing or contributing to an accident, by operating
City equipment in an unsafe manner on or about May 4, 2018.” The Department
recommended a thirty-day suspension. (AR 328, 479.)
On
December 5, 2018, an investigative meeting was held between the parties.
Petitioner denied that he was the cause of the accident and provided both his
oral statement and photographic evidence he had taken at the scene of the accident
to prove his contentions and innocence of the charge. (AR 339-40.) In the
Bureau’s conclusion of this meeting, the Bureau stated, in pertinent part: “Mr.
Moen’s explanation of the events of the collision do not absolve him from the
finding of the LAPD Report, which found him as the “primary collision factor of
the accident.” (AR 340.) The Bureau explained: “Mr. Moen admitted that he moved
his vehicle into the next lane to pass the street sweeper…. [T]he fact that Mr.
Moen maneuvered out of his lane and into the lane to his left, is what
ultimately initiated the collision. There is no evidence to support that the
other party initiated the collision.” (AR 340.)
Following
the findings of the investigation, a formal Skelly hearing was held on
July 10, 2019.[1]
(AR 399.) A second Skelly hearing was held on November 13, 2019,
following the Bureau having produced copies of the body camera videos worn from
the day of the accident, in response to petitioner’s written request. (AR 400.)
On March 5, 2020, the Bureau, in conjunction with the Personnel Department, issued
a recommendation for the imposition of a 30-working day suspension.[2]
(AR 398, 402.)
On
April 5, 2020, petitioner appealed the suspension decision. (AR 618-21, 623.)
D.
Administrative
Hearing
A
formal administrative hearing was held on September 2, 2021 before Hearing
Officer Patricia Sellers, during which the Hearing Officer heard the testimony
of several witnesses, including petitioner and the investigating LAPD officer,
but not any testimony from the other driver involved in the accident. (AR
118-308.)
During
the hearing, the Bureau introduced witness testimony from Officer Stafford; James
Moore, Acting Division Manager of the Bureau; and Jose Del Rio, Senior
Personnel Analyst. (AR 310.) Petitioner introduced witness testimony from Cash
Russell, union steward, and petitioner. (AR 311.) The Bureau and petitioner
also introduced photographs of the vehicles, video/audio from the patrol officers’
brief questioning of petitioner and the other driver, as well as other
documentary and photographic evidence. (AR 314-472.)
The
only witness to the accident that testified at the hearing before the Hearing Officer
was petitioner; the Bureau did not call either the driver of the Mercedes or
the driver’s wife, who was a passenger at the time. (See AR 527.) As
discussed in Section I.E and I.F, infra, the decisions of the Hearing
Officer and the Board of Civil Service Commissioners relied on the testimonies
of Officer Stafford and Moore, whose testimonies are recounted below.
1.
Officer
John Stafford
Officer
Stafford prepared the Traffic Collision Report for this accident. (AR 314-18.)
Although he had interviewed petitioner and the other driver, he did not review
his own audio or video recordings before writing his report. (AR 163-64 [HT 46:4-11,
47:5-20].) Officer Stafford explained: “I had the basic gist of what happened.
I had one party, Mr. Moen, indicating he’s driving and he moved to the left.
And I had the party in the lane to the left saying he was driving straight. In
my mind, this was a—it was a no-brainer. Very simple. Very easy. Nothing complicated.
So I didn't see the need to go back and get a verbatim statement when anyone,
at a later date, as we are here, could go back and review that and get a more detailed
statement if they’d like.” (AR 164 [HT 47:7-16].)
Officer
Stafford did not make notes of what the other two police officers who arrived
on the scene before him had represented to him. (AR 149 [HT 32:18-21].) He did
not know if the police officers had their audio or video cameras on. (AR 149
[HT 32:22-24].) He did not attempt to interview the street sweeper who may have
witnessed the accident. (AR 157 [HT 40:21-24].) Officer Stafford did not look
at or request pictures that petitioner’s supervisor took at the scene of the
accident. (AR 164-65 [HT 47:23-48:2].)
Officer
Stafford admitted that he did not determine the point of impact between the two
vehicles and that he made no attempt to make such determination. (AR 136 [HT
19:22-23].) He explained that it is “nearly impossible to have an exact point
at which the collision occurred.” (AR 136-37 [HT 19:25-20:4].) Rather, Officer
Stafford briefly spoke with petitioner and the other driver and did not provide
any statement from the other driver’s wife who was in the vehicle. (AR 135-36
[HT 18:25-19:10].)
Officer
Stafford testified that he reviewed the report after petitioner had requested
it be amended and found no reason to amend it. (AR 143-44 [HT 26:17-27:14].) He
conceded that the report contained several errors, including the measurement of
the street width and the location of the accident. (AR 144-46, 164-65 [HT
27:24-29:12].) However, Officer Stafford stated that errors in the measurements
or in the diagram of the Traffic Collision Report would not change his opinion
on the cause of the accident. (AR 146, 161 [HT 29:22-30:2, 44:14-20].)
Officer
Stafford testified that, if petitioner’s vehicle, full or empty, had hit the
Mercedes, the damage to the Mercedes would be consistent with the movement
suggested by petitioner. (AR 153-55 [HT 36:22-38:5].) When asked what movement
petitioner suggested, Officer Stafford responded: “That he moved to the left
and they’re both going the same direction.” (AR 155 [HT 38:6-11].) Officer
Stafford testified that upon impact, both vehicles moved 200 to 300 feet before
they pulled over. (AR 155-57 [HT 38:12-40:2].) However, because Officer
Stafford did not witness the collision, he relied on estimation. (AR 155 [HT
38:12-21].) Officer Stafford did not know whether, after the impact, the
vehicles moved together or whether they were not touching. (AR 157 [HT
40:3-12].)
2.
James
Moore
James
Moore, Acting Division Manager for the Bureau, testified regarding the Bureau’s
vehicle accident investigation procedures. (AR 168-70 [HT 51:2-53:11].) Upon
being notified of an accident having occurred, the supervisor goes to the scene
to collect whatever information and evidence he can find regarding the
accident, by taking pictures and asking the City driver what happened. The
information collected by the supervisor is documented on an accident worksheet.
(AR 171-74 [HT 54:21-55:4, 55:21-56:2], 386-387). Moore testified that the
Bureau’s procedures do not include taking statements from the other party
unless the statements are volunteered. (AR 172 [HR 55:5-9].) Moore explained
that taking statements from the other driver is left to the LAPD or other
responsible law enforcement agencies because they “are foremost trained in
accident investigation.” (AR 172 [HT 55:10-20].)
Moore
relied on the LAPD’s Traffic Collision Report in concluding that petitioner was
at fault for the accident. (AR 185-86 [HT 68:24-69:5].) Moore stated that “LAPD
is the foremost authority as far as operation on the streets and on the
highways, so we take them as the highest authority.” (AR 186 [HT 69:3-5].) Moore
did not speak with Officer Stafford at any time. (AR 162, 187-88 [HT 45:19-24, 70:24-71:1].)
Moore assumed everything in the Traffic Collision Report was correct, even though
petitioner argued that, there should have been more damage to the other vehicle
if he were at fault. (AR 178-79, 184-85, 188 [HT 61:22-62:5, 67:25-68:3,
71:2-8].) Despite petitioner having asserted various errors in the Traffic
Collision Report, Moore claimed he was unaware that the report contained errors
in the speed, measurements, statements, and locations of the vehicles involved
in the collision. (AR 188-89 [HT 71:9-17, 72:9-20].) He never listened to or
watched the audio or video of Officer Stafford’s recorded investigation at the
scene. (AR 191 [HT 74:5-10].) He did no independent investigation but relied
entirely on Officer Stafford’s report. (AR 531.)
E.
Hearing
Officer’s Report
Following
the hearing, the Hearing Officer issued a Report to the Board of Civil Service
Commissioners (“Board”). The Hearing Officer found that the City failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner caused or contributed
to an accident by operating City equipment in an unsafe manner on May 3, 2018.
(AR 532; see generally AR 522-32.) The Report further recommended that the
penalty of a 30-day suspension be denied and all loss of pay and benefits be
restored to petitioner. (AR 532.) In reaching her conclusions, the Hearing
Officer explained:
There
were no independent witnesses and no clear physical evidence to support a finding
of who was at fault. The parties each strongly maintained that the other caused
the accident. I concur with the statement from the patrol officer that he could
not determine who was at fault. I find the investigation by Officer Stafford to
have been sloppy at best. His testimony that the accident was “a no brainer,
nothing complicated” shows he put very little effort into his investigation
before drawing his conclusion as to fault. He did not bother to get any details
from the patrol officers or look at their videos. His interviews with the parties
were perfunctory.
Moore
did no independent investigation, but relied entirely on Stafford’s report.
When the Appellant objected to some of the information in the LAPD report no
one took a second look.
(AR
531.)
F.
Board’s
Rejection of Findings
On
or about March 24, 2022, the Board rejected the findings and conclusions of the
Hearing Officer. (AR 558.) The Board voted to sustain a 30-working day
suspension against petitioner for having caused or contributed to an accident
by operating City equipment in an unsafe manner. (AR 558.) The matter was
continued to permit the drafting of a Findings of Fact and Law Report for the
Board to consider. (AR 558.)
The
proposed findings were submitted to the Board by Nancy McClelland on April 18,
2022. (AR 550-57.) On April 28, 2022, the Board voted to adopt as its own the
Findings of Fact and Law Report submitted by a Commission in consultation with
the Board’s Counsel. (AR 558-67.)
The
City issued petitioner notice pursuant to City Charter section 1017 on May 2, 2022.
(AR 558-59.) On July 11, 2022, petitioner submitted a demand pursuant to City
Charter section 1017 for the reinstatement and restoration to duty for the
period of his suspension, April 6, 2020 to June 30, 2020. (AR 568.) The Board
denied petitioner’s demand on August 8, 2022. (AR 569.)
II. Procedural History
On
November 7, 2022, petitioner Timothy Moen filed a Verified Petition for Writ of
Administrative Mandamus. On March 24, 2023, petitioner filed a First Amended
Verified Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus. On April 24, 2023, respondents
City of Los Angeles Board of Civil Service Commissioners and City of Los
Angeles filed an Answer to the First Amended Petition.
On
March 8, 2024, petitioner filed an opening brief. On April 8, 2024, respondents
filed an opposition. On April 24, 2024, petitioner filed a reply. The Court has
received an electronic copy of the administrative record and a hard copy of the
joint appendix.
III. Standard of Review
Under CCP § 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent
has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether
there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is
established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the
decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by
the evidence. (CCP § 1094.5(b).)
Because the suspension of
petitioner from his position as Refuse
Collection Truck Operator II concerns a fundamental
vested right, the court exercises its independent judgment on the
administrative findings. (See Wences
v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130,
143.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines
the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent
judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby, 4
Cal.3d at 143.) The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the
evidence and make its own credibility determinations. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners
(2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.)
An agency is presumed to
have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) “In
exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong
presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the
party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing
the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the
evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817, internal
quotations omitted.) A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either
party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a
search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in
the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950)
99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.) When an appellant challenges “‘the sufficiency of the
evidence, all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely
their own evidence.” (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309,
317.)
IV. Analysis
In
this petition, the Court is charged with determining which version of causation
of the collision is most credible. Petitioner would have the Court find that he
safely changed lanes from the number two to the number one lane only for the
Mercedes behind him to cross double yellow lines and collide into the front
left bumper of the refuse truck. The City would have the Court find that petitioner
failed to notice the Mercedes in the number one lane before moving from the
number two lane to the number one lane and colliding into the Mercedes.
There
is no available video footage of the collision to corroborate either party’s
version of what happened. (See AR 265-66 [HT 148:9-149:11].) The Court
has reviewed the testimony from the administrative hearing and the photographs
contained in the administrative record. The Court acknowledges that
petitioner’s version of events is plausible. Assuming the other driver had
crossed double-yellow lines attempting to pass the refuse truck in the number
one lane and was attempting to return to the northbound lanes, the Mercedes might
have collided into the front left bumper of petitioner’s refuse truck while
petitioner was returning from the number one lane to the number two lane. (AR
248-51 [HT 131:8-134:21].)
However, under the preponderance of
the evidence standard applied here (AR 90 [HT 36:18-19], 127 [HT 10:19-21],
531-32), the Court finds that, based on the evidence presented during the
administrative hearing, the City’s version of the collision is more likely than
not correct. Preponderance of the evidence means “more likely than not” that
the existence of a fact is true. (Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil
Service Com. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 362, 369 [preponderance of the evidence is
such evidence “as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing
force, and from which it results that the greater probability is in favor of
the party upon whom the burden rests”].)
The Board decision to discipline
petitioner was based on the Traffic Collision Report completed by Officer
Stafford. (AR 565.) Officer Stafford has worked in the Traffic Division for 25
years. (AR 130 [HT 13:3-8].) He has completed basic, intermediate, and advanced
collision investigation courses. (AR 131 [HT 14:1-8.) He has prepared 6,000
traffic collision reports and responded to at least 200 to 300 collisions
involving city refuse collection trucks. (AR 131 [HT 14:16-23].)
Officer
Stafford testified to the damage to both the refuse truck and the Mercedes
depicted in the photographs that he took. (AR 139-40 [HT 22:1-23:11], 319-26.)
Based on his training, the damage from the vehicles, and the statements from
petitioner and the other driver, Officer Stafford determined that petitioner
was primarily at fault. (AR 134, 141-42 [HT 17:21-24, 24:25-25:10].) Officer
Stafford testified that the damage to the Mercedes was consistent with the
movement suggested by petitioner, i.e., that he moved to the left and
that both he and the other driver were moving in the same direction. (AR 155
[HT 38:3-11].) Indeed, petitioner admitted to having moved left, and the
Mercedes driver stated he was driving north in the number one lane. (AR 164 [HT
47:5-16].)
The
Court finds such evidence sufficiently demonstrates that petitioner was the
cause of the collision. In so finding, the Court acknowledges that Officer
Stafford did not attempt to identify the street sweeper who may have witnessed
the accident. (AR 157 [HT 40:21-24].) He also did not review audio and video
recordings, take notes of what the patrol officers told him from the scene, or
request the pictures that petitioner’s supervisor took. (AR 149, 163-65 [HT 32:18-21,
46:4-11, 47:23-48:2].) Nevertheless, based on Officer Stafford’s training,
statements from the parties, and observation of the damage to the vehicles, he
could have properly determined that such review and follow-up was unnecessary.
Further, even if Officer Stafford was not an expert in accident reconstruction,
his experience in investigating of traffic collisions, including 200 to 300
refuse trucks, is sufficient for him to opine on the cause of the subject
collision based on the damage to the vehicles.
Lastly,
although the Traffic Collision Report may have contained certain errors, the
Court agrees with Officer Stafford’s view that any such errors do not alter his
ultimate conclusion that petitioner was at fault. (AR 143-44 [HT 26:17-27:14].) Errors
regarding measurements do not necessarily mean that his finding that petitioner
was primarily at fault was incorrect. (AR 146, 161 [HT 29:22-30:2, 44:14-20].) To the contrary, Officer Stafford’s acknowledge
of such errors in the Traffic Collision Report (AR 144-46, 164-65 [HT 27:24-29:12])
evince a lack of bias and an additional consideration of his conclusion upon
further reflection.
In contrast, petitioner relies on a
theory of causation that is not supported by any expert opinion. (Box v.
California Date Growers Assn. (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 266, 274 [“The object of
accident reconstruction is to reach satisfactory—not infallible—conclusions as
to the operational factors and dynamic situation contributing to the collision….
[E]xpert reconstruction often is more accurate than statements of witnesses”].)
It is not all clear that there should have been more damage to the Mercedes or
that there would have been skid marks on the road if petitioner collided into the
Mercedes while changing from the number two to the number one lane.
Equally speculative, petitioner also
contends: “Had Petitioner hit the Mercedes while entering the Number 1 lane, the
street sweeper would have been to the right side of Petitioner’s truck, and the
Mercedes to his left; the street was insufficiently wide to allow for the three
vehicles all moving forward the same direction; Petitioner would not have been
able to fit between the Mercedes and the street sweeper.” (Reply at 3:8-11.) This
version of what happened ignores the possibility petitioner and the Mercedes
driver collided before both of them reached the street sweeper.
For
the foregoing reasons, based on the weight of Officer Stafford’s report and
evidence upon which he relied, as compared to petitioner’s speculative theories,
the Court agrees with the Board’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that petitioner collided into the Mercedes by unsafely changing lanes.
V. Conclusion
The petition is DENIED. Pursuant to Local Rule
3.231(n), respondents shall prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed
judgment.
[1] In Skelly v. State Personnel Bd.
(1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, the California Supreme Court established certain
procedural rights for public employees facing disciplinary action.
[2] The Bureau noted that the subject
incident was petitioner’s fourth offense. (AR 402.) In 2004, petitioner
served a 10-working-day suspension for an incident at a refuse yard and for
having caused an accident by unsafely operating City equipment. (AR 399.) In
2008, petitioner served a five-working-day suspension for causing or
contributing to an accident by unsafely operating City equipment. (AR 399.)
In 2018, petitioner served a 20-working-day suspension for causing or
contributing to an accident by unsafely operating City equipment. (AR 398.)
Based on petitioner’s prior disciplinary history, the Bureau recommended a
30-working-day suspension. (AR 402.)