Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 22STCP04060, Date: 2023-08-24 Tentative Ruling
Hon. Mary H. Strobel The clerk for Department 82 may be reached at (213) 893-0530.
Case Number: 22STCP04060 Hearing Date: August 24, 2023 Dept: 82
Petitioner
Knock LA petitions for writ of mandate directing respondent County of Los
Angeles to provide records related to the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department’s investigation of Deputy Wyatt Waldron’s shooting his gun at the
ankle of another deputy.
I. Factual Background
On April 29, 2022, Cerise Castle, a
reporter for petitioner Knock LA, sent a request to the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) pursuant to Senate Bill 1421 for records of an
“internal investigation into an off-duty deputy involved shooting in Dove
Springs, Kern County in October 2015.” (PA 21, 23.)
On May 2, 2022, Castle wrote an
article titled “LASD Deputy Shot Off Another Deputy’s Gang Tattoo, Received
Promotion.” (PA 23-27.) In the article, Castle described a 2015 incident in
Kern County in which an LASD deputy attempted to burn off a deputy gang tattoo off
of another deputy with the hot barrel of a gun. (PA 23-24.) After having been
unsuccessful in burning off the tattoo, the deputy purportedly fired the gun
directly at the other deputy’s tattoo. (PA 24.) A source reportedly told Castle
that Deputy Wyatt Waldron was the deputy who fired the gun. (PA 25.)
On
September 21, 2022, Castle followed up on her records request. (PA 21.)
On
September 28, 2022, LASD denied Cerise’s request. (PA 30.)
On
September 29, 2022, petitioner emailed LASD to object to the denial of Cerise’s
request. (PA 32-33.) Pursuant to Penl Code § 832.7(b)(1)(A)(i), petitioner requested
the production of copies of “all records related to Deputy Waldron’s ‘discharge
of a firearm at a person.’” (PA 33.)
On
October 6, 2022, LASD responded to petitioner, maintaining that the requested
records are confidential and not subject to disclosure under the Public Records
Act. (PA 36-37.) LASD maintained that the
incident at issue in the records request does not fall under Penal Code §
832.7(b)(1)(A)(i) because it was classified as an accidental discharge. (PA
36.)
II. Procedural History
On November 14, 2022, petitioner
Knock LA filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate.
On June 1, 2023, petitioner filed an opening brief.
On July 5, 2023, respondent filed an opposition and objections to evidence. On
July 17, 2023, petitioner filed a reply.
The
Court has received a hard copy of the record lodged by petitioner.
III. Standard
of Review
Pursuant to the
California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) (Gov. Code § 7921.000, et seq.),[1]
individual citizens have a right to access government records. In enacting the
CPRA, the California Legislature declared that “access to information
concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary
right of every person in this state.” (Gov. Code, § 7921.000; see also Cal.
Const. Art. I, Sec. 3(b); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 57, 63.)
“[E]very person has a
right to inspect any public record” of a state or local agency subject to
statutory exemptions. (Gov. Code § 7922.530(a); see also Gov. Code §
7920.510(h) [definition of “local agency” includes agent of a city].) The California
Constitution mandates that the CPRA be “broadly construed,” while any statute
“that limits the right of access” must be “narrowly construed.” (See Cal.
Const. Art. I, Sec. 3(b)(2); see also Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. City of Hayward
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 488, 507.) The CPRA “does not allow limitations on access
to a public record based upon the purpose for which the record is being
requested, if the record is otherwise subject to disclosure.” (Gov. Code §
7921.300.)
Petitioner bears the
burden of proof and persuasion in a mandate proceeding brought under CCP § 1085.
(California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995)
10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.) “To establish an agency has a duty to disclose under
[the CPRA], the petitioner must show that: (1) the record ‘qualif[ies] as [a]
‘public record[ ]’ …; and (2) the record is ‘in the possession of the agency.’”
(Anderson-Barker v Sup.Ct. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 528, 538.) “Whether a
record falls within the statutory definition of a ‘public record’ involves a
‘distinct inquiry’ from whether the agency is in possession of that record….
The duty to disclose applies only when the petitioner has satisfied both
elements.” (Id. at 539.)
CPRA exemptions must be
narrowly construed, and the agency bears the burden of showing that a specific
exemption applies. (Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement System v.
Superior Court (2013) 195 Cal.App.4th 440, 453.) A public agency also has
the burden to demonstrate that it properly withheld records on the grounds they
are non-responsive to a CPRA request or do not constitute public records. (ACLU
of Northern Cal. v. Sup.Ct. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 55, 83-86.) ““Because
the agency has full knowledge of the contents of the withheld records and the
requester has only the agency's affidavits and descriptions of the documents,
its affidavits must be specific enough to give the requester ‘a meaningful
opportunity to contest’ the withholding of the documents.” (Id. at 83.)
IV. Evidentiary Objections
Respondent’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.
V. Analysis
In 2018, the California Legislature enacted SB 1421,
which amended the CPRA to require disclosure of records related to the
investigation of police uses of force and misconduct. (Becerra v. Superior
Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 897, 916.) After the enactment of SB 1421,
Penal Code § 832.7(b)(1) provides in relevant part:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), subdivision
(f) of Section 6254 of the Government Code, or any other law, the following
peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by
a state or local agency shall not be confidential and shall be made available
for public inspection pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Chapter
3.5 (commencing with Section 6250) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government
Code):
(A) A record relating to the report, investigation,
or findings of any of the following:
(i) An
incident involving the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or
custodial officer.
Petitioner
requests copies of the “internal
investigation into an off-duty deputy involved shooting in Dove Springs, Kern
County in October 2015.” (PA 21.) Petitioner later clarified that the requested
records relate to Deputy Wyatt Waldron’s shooting of another deputy in the side
of the ankle. (PA 32-33.)
Petitioner meets its initial burden on a CPRA
petition. Petitioner demonstrates that the requested records qualify as a
public record under the CPRA. In the subject records request, petitioner
identified the peace officer, Deputy Wyatt Waldron, who purportedly discharged
a firearm at another deputy. Records related to the investigation of any shooting
by Deputy Waldron in Dove Springs, Kern County are available for public
inspection under Penal Code § 832.7(b)(1)(A)(i).
Respondent maintains that petitioner “fails to offer
any competent evidence from a witness with personal knowledge that the subject
incident involves the ‘discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace officer.’”
(Opp. at 8:24-26.) Respondent contends that petitioner bases its assertion that
the subject incident involved the discharge of a firearm at a person by a peace
officer on inadmissible hearsay, including statements from confidential sources
and statements in a report by the Los Angeles County Office of Inspector
General. (PA 4 at ¶ 2, PA 5 at ¶¶ 6, 7.) However, petitioner does not have any
burden to offer admissible evidence demonstrating personal knowledge that the requested
records qualify for public inspection under Penal Code § 832.7.
In the request, petitioner had the duty to describe
the requested records clearly enough to permit LASD to “determine whether
writings of the type described in the request are under its control.” (California
First Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 159, 165;
see also Gov. Code § 7922.530(a) [unless exempt from disclosure, “each
state or local agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably
describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly
available to any person”].) After petitioner made the request, LASC was “obliged
to search for records based on criteria set forth in the search request” and “determine
whether it has such writings under its control and the applicability of any
exemption.” (California First Amendment Coalition, 67 Cal.App.4th at 166.)
Accordingly, for the purpose of the instant petition, petitioner is under no
obligation to demonstrate that the request was based on personal knowledge,
only that the records described in its request qualifies for disclosure under
Penal Code § 832.7(b).
Respondent also contends that the requested records
are not subject to disclosure because the subject incident was classified as an
“accidental discharge.” (PA 36.) Exemptions to the CPRA must be narrowly
construed. (Iloh v. Regents of University of California (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 513, 524.) “If the language [of a statute] is clear, courts must
generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result
in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.” (Becerra, 44
Cal.App.5th at 917, quoting Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 844, 856-57.) The statute provides that a “record relating to
the report, investigation, or findings of” an “incident involving the discharge
of a firearm at a person by a peace officer or custodial officer” shall be made
available for public inspection. The statute makes no distinction between accidental
and intentional discharges of firearms.
Respondent contends that the use of the word “at” in
the phrase “discharge of a firearm at a person” demonstrates that the discharge
must be intentional. (Opp. at 12:26-13:8.) That is not so. It is true that “at”
is “used as a function word to indicate the goal of an indicated or implied
action or motion,” such as in the phrase “aim at the target.” (See Merriam-Webster,
definition of “at,” located at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/at?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld.)
But it is also true that “at” may “used as a function word to indicate presence
or occurrence in, on, or near.” (Ibid.) Under this latter definition
taken from the same dictionary source as the former, a discharge that happens
to strike another person, even if the discharge were unintentional, is “at”
that person.
Even if the somewhat different definitions of “at”
were to somehow be viewed as creating an ambiguity in the language of Penal
Code § 832.7(b)(1)(A)(i), other interpretive tools would resolve any such
purported ambiguity. “If the words in
the statute do not, by themselves, provide a reliable indicator of legislative
intent, ‘[s]tatutory ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the context
in which the language appears and adopting the construction which best serves
to harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes.’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177.) “If the statute is ambiguous, we may
consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including legislative history, the
statute's purpose, and public policy.” (Ibid.)
“[T]he legislative intent behind Senate Bill 1421
was to provide transparency regarding instances of an officer’s use of
significant force and sustained findings of officer misconduct by allowing
public access to officer-related records maintained either by law enforcement
employers or by any state or local agency with independent law enforcement
oversight authority.” (Becerra, 44 Cal.App.5th at 921.) “[I]n amending
section 832.7, the Legislature sought to afford the public ‘the right to know
all about serious police misconduct,’ to stop concealing incidents where an
officer violated civilian rights, and to ‘address and prevent abuses and to
weed out the bad actors.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Respondent contends that an accidental discharge
does not raise concerns of police misconduct, like “use of force resulting in
death or great bodily injury, sexual assault, and sustained findings of
dishonesty in the reporting, investigation or prosecution of a crime.” (Opp. at
13:12-13; see Pen. Code §§ 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C).) Under
respondent’s contention, respondent would delegate the determination of whether
Deputy Waldron’s discharging of a firearm in 2015 constitutes misconduct to
itself, rather than allowing the public to have access to documents that would
allow it to address and prevent abuses. Reading a requirement of intent into
the word “at” in “discharge of a firearm at a person” would not advance the
legislative purpose of providing transparency regarding peace officers’ use of
force.
With respect to discharge of firearms, Penal Code §
832.7 does not impart a right on respondent to determine whether the discharge
constitutes misconduct. This is in contrast to Penal Code § 832.7(b)(1)(A)(iii),
which provides for the production of records relating to the investigation of a
“sustained finding involving a complaint that alleges unreasonable or excessive
force.” With respect to incidents of sexual assault and dishonesty, the
provisions require a sustained finding of sexual assault or dishonesty. (See
Pen. Code § 832.7(b)(1)(B) [“[a]ny record relating to an incident in which a
sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight agency
that a peace officer or custodial officer engaged in sexual assault involving a
member of the public”], (b)(1)(C) [“[a]ny record relating to an incident in
which a sustained finding was made by any law enforcement agency or oversight
agency involving dishonesty by a peace officer or custodial officer].)
No sustained finding that the discharge of a firearm
at a person was intentional is required under Penal Code § 832.7(b)(1)(A)(i). If
the Legislature had intended to exempt accidental discharges from disclosure, it
could have made that exemption clear in the statute by stating that records
relating to incidents involving a peace officer’s intentional discharge of a
firearm at a person were subject to disclosure. (See Becerra, 44
Cal.App.5th at 919 [“Moreover, had the Legislature intended to limit its disclosure
amendments to records maintained by an officer's employing agency or to records
created by a public agency, it easily could have”].)
For
the foregoing reasons, petitioner meets its burden in demonstrating that the
requested records are public records subject to disclosure under the CPRA.
Petitioners also demonstrates that the requested
records are in the possession of respondent. After petitioner clarified that it
seeks records that relate
to Deputy Waldron’s shooting of another deputy in the side of the ankle, respondent stated: “After further
assessment, we maintain our position that the records sought are considered
part of a peace officer’s confidential personal records and are not subject to
disclosure under the PRA given that the incident at issue was classified as an
accidental discharge and therefore does not fall under the parameters of Penal
Code section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(i).” (PA 36.) Respondent’s words demonstrate the
existence of the records, as respondent could not have asserted its conclusion
about the records if they did not exist. Other than asserting evidentiary
objections, respondent does not dispute that it is in possession of the requested
records.
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that petitioner meets its burden on a
CPRA request and respondent has not shown that a specific exemption
applies.
VI. Conclusion
The
petition is GRANTED. Respondent is ordered to produce to petitioner records
related to the “internal
investigation into an off-duty deputy involved shooting in Dove Springs, Kern County
in October 2015,” specifically Deputy Wyatt Waldron’s shooting of another
deputy in the side of the ankle.
Pursuant to Local Rule 3.231(n), petitioner shall
prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed judgment and proposed writ of
mandate.