Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 22STCP04241, Date: 2024-06-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCP04241 Hearing Date: June 18, 2024 Dept: 86
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Date: 6/18/24
(1:30 PM)
Case: Jimmi Lewis v. VOI
Insurance Solutions, LLC et al. (22STCP04241)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Respondent VOI Insurance Solutions, LLC’s Motion for
Attorney Fees is GRANTED.
Pursuant to Civil Code § 1717, respondent VOI Insurance
Solutions, LLC (“VOI”) moves for an award of attorney fees in the amount of $73,323.50
under section 18.21 of VOI’s Operating Agreement. (See Akerley Decl. ¶ 2
& Ex. B [“Operating Agreement”].)
Petitioner Jimmi Lewis contended in his Petition for Writ of
Mandate that he was entitled to inspect VOI’s records as a member of VOI under
the Operating Agreement. (Pet. ¶ 8, citing Operating Agreement § 5.3; Pet. ¶ 14)
In his petition, petitioner sought attorney fees incurred in enforcing his
purported inspection rights under the Operating Agreement. (Pet. ¶ 17, citing
Operating Agreement § 18.21.) On March 19, 2024, the Petition for Writ of
Mandate was denied. (Wolff Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. D.)
Civil Code § 1717(a) states: “In any action on a contract,
where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which
are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the
parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the
party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in
the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in
addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code § 1717(a).)
In the Award Agreement through which petitioner obtained an
ownership interest in VOI, petitioner agreed to be bound by the Operating
Agreement. (Akerley Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. B to Ex. A at Recital A, § 1.a.) Section
18.21 of the Operating Agreement states, “In the event of any litigation or
arbitration regarding the rights and obligations under this Agreement, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and
court costs in addition to any other relief which may be granted.” VOI prevailed
in arguing that petitioner had no right to inspect VOI’s records because
petitioner was not a member under the Operating Agreement. (Wolff Decl. ¶ 3
& Ex. D at 10-14 of 20.) Accordingly, VOI is entitled to recover attorney
fees from petitioner under Civil Code § 1717(a).
Petitioner contends that the motion for fees is premature
because the merits of VOI’s Cross Petition and petitioner’s Cross-Cross
Petition remain to be resolved and are pending in Department 24 of this Court.
(See Wolff Supp. Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. G [independent calendar court
issued Order to Show Cause why cross-petitions should not be dismissed].) “[C]ourts
have awarded attorney fees to a party obtaining an appealable order or judgment
in a discrete legal proceeding even though the underlying litigation on the merits
was not final.” (Otay River Constructors v. San Diego Expressway (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 796, 807; see also Turner v. Schultz (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 974, 983-84 [finding that party could recover fees under Civil Code
§ 1717 in “discrete legal proceeding” concerning whether arbitration should be
allowed to proceed, even though arbitration of merits had not yet occurred].) “A
judgment in a special proceeding is the final determination of the rights of
the parties therein.” (CCP § 1064.) Writs of mandate are part of Part 3 of the
Code of Civil Procedure governing special proceedings of a civil nature. (CCP §
1085.) Judgment has been entered with respect to the Petition for Writ of
Mandate. (Wolff Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. E.) Judgment having been entered in a
discrete legal proceeding, VOI may move for attorney fees, even though the
cross petitions remain to be resolved.
Petitioner’s citations to Moore v. Liu (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 745, Urbaniak v. Newton (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1837, and Presley
of Southern California v. Whelan (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 959 are unavailing,
as those cases involved reversals of summary judgment on appeal where the merits
of the underlying litigation had not been resolved. (Moore, 69
Cal.App.4th at 754-55; Urbaniak, 19 Cal.App.4th at 1844; Presley,
at 146 Cal.App.3d 959 [196 Cal.Rptr. 1, 2].) Here, the merits of the writ
petition, a discrete legal proceeding, have been reduced to judgment.
As for the amount of VOI’s fee request, petitioner does not
address or challenge the amount requested. Accordingly, arguments that the fee
request is excessive are waived. (Premier Medical Management. Systems, Inc.
v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550,
564.) In any event, the Court having reviewed counsel for VOI’s billing
records, VOI’s fee request is reasonable on its face. (Wolff Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex.
F.)
The motion is GRANTED. Using the appropriate lodestar
approach, and based on the foregoing findings and in view of the totality of
the circumstances, the total and reasonable amount of attorney fees incurred is
$73,323.50. Such fees are awarded to respondent VOI Insurance Solutions, LLC
and against petitioner Jimmi Lewis.