Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 22STCV07700, Date: 2022-10-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV07700    Hearing Date: October 4, 2022    Dept: 72

DEMURRER

Date:        10/4/22 (9:30 AM)                 

Case:         Debraha Williams et al. Eva E Moreno Trust et al. (22STCV07700)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Eva E Moreno and Eva E Moreno Trust’s Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED IN PART.

Defendants’ objection to the declaration of Jacob Partiyelli is SUSTAINED. In a demurrer, the Court considers only the four corners of the complaint, as well as matters that may be judicially noticed, and assumes the truth of the allegations in the pleading. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Counsel for plaintiffs’ declaration constitutes extrinsic evidence that is not considered on demurrer.

I.                   FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION – BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOYMENT

Defendants Eva E Moreno and Eva E Moreno Trust argue that plaintiffs Debraha Williams, Jazaha Williams, and Josiah Williams were not legally entitled to quiet enjoyment of the subject property because plaintiffs are minors. (FAC ¶¶ 10-12, 20.)

“In the absence of language to the contrary, every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, whereby the landlord impliedly covenants that the tenant shall have quiet enjoyment and possession of the premises.” (Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 588.) “The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment implies a term in a contract, and a breach of the covenant gives rise to an action in contract.” (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 896.) Civil Code § 1927, which states “[a]n agreement to let upon hire binds the letter to secure to the hirer the quiet possession of the thing hired during the term of the hiring, against all persons lawfully claiming the same,” also reflects a partial codification of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. (Andrews, 125 Cal.App.4th at 588.)

Accordingly, the landlord’s agreement for the tenant to have quiet enjoyment of the subject property is derived from the lease agreement. However, minors cannot “[m]ake a contract relating to real property or any interest therein.” (Fam. Code § 6701(b).) Therefore, as a matter of law, minors, like plaintiffs, cannot enter into agreements to lease real property. Plaintiffs may have a right to occupy the subject property, but this would only be derivative of the rights of their parents who entered into the lease agreement. (FAC ¶ 20; Danger Panda, LLC v. Launiu (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 502, 514.) As a result, plaintiffs do not have any legal right to quiet enjoyment.

Plaintiffs allege that they are tenants by the consent of the defendant landlords. (FAC ¶ 38.) The characterization of plaintiffs as tenants is a legal conclusion that is disregarded on demurrer. (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1336.) Further, with respect to Civil Code § 1927, although Civil Code § 1940(a) includes “lodgers” in the definition of persons who hire dwelling units, “[h]iring is a contract by which one gives to another the temporary possession and use of property, other than money, for reward, and the latter agrees to return the same to the former at a future time.” (Civ. Code § 1925.) As stated above, under Family Code § 6701(b), minors cannot enter into contracts to lease real property.

Because plaintiffs cannot enter into lease agreements from which the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment arises, the demurrer to the first cause of action is SUSTAINED.

II.                SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION – BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

A warranty of habitability is implied in all residential leases. (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 629.) For the reasons stated above with respect to the first cause of action, plaintiffs, as minors, cannot enter into residential leases. Accordingly, plaintiffs may not assert a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of habitability.

The demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED.

III.             THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION – COLLECTION OF RENT ON SUBSTANDARD DWELLING (CIVIL CODE § 1942.4)

Under Civil Code § 1942.4(a), “[a]A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit” if all the conditions specified in the statute, including substandard conditions in the property, exist. However, defendants’ right to demand rent is derived from the rental agreement into which the parents of plaintiffs, not plaintiffs themselves, entered. (FAC ¶ 54.) Moreover, Civil Code § 1942.4 is part of “Chapter 2. Hiring of Real Property,” which is applicable to “all persons who hire dwelling units located within this state including tenants, lessees, boarders, lodgers, and others, however denominated.” (Civ. Code § 1940(a).) For the reasons stated above with respect to the first cause of action, plaintiffs, as minors, cannot “hire” real property or enter into leases. Accordingly, plaintiffs may not assert a cause of action based on the collection of rent. (FAC ¶ 62 [defining plaintiffs’ damages as the amount of rents due and paid by plaintiffs].)

The demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED.

IV.             FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION – INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

“In order to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.”  (Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883.)

Defendants argue that plaintiffs do not describe the conduct of each defendant, how each plaintiff was injured, or how plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by each defendant. Defendants also argue that the conduct alleged in the First Amended Complaint was directed at plaintiffs’ guardian ad litem, not plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs allege that their guardian ad litem, their mother, Roshon Woods, complained about the dangerous conditions at the subject property where they lived, including an infestation of roaches, mold, and a wet carpet with a bad odor. (FAC ¶¶ 20, 21, 24.) Woods complained to defendants’ management and office multiple times about the conditions, but the complaints were either ignored or inadequately addressed. (FAC ¶¶ 22-27.) In particular, Woods notified defendants of the abnormal levels of mold found through a professional inspection. (FAC ¶ 31.) Moreover, a healthcare provider notified “Defendant” (albeit unclear as to which defendant) that plaintiffs had allergies due to the mold and recommended that the carpet be removed. (FAC ¶ 32.) “Defendant,” ignored the recommendation. (FAC ¶ 32.) As a result of defendants’ failure to remedy the dangerous conditions, plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress. (FAC ¶¶ 70, 71.)

The allegations described above are sufficient to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants were notified by plaintiffs’ guardian ad litem and a healthcare provider of the substandard conditions, as well as the negative health effects to plaintiffs arising from such conditions. Defendants ignored or failed to adequately make repairs, thereby forcing plaintiffs to live in substandard and uninhabitable conditions and causing plaintiffs to suffer severe emotional distress. As a matter of pleading, this is sufficient.  Defendants may ascertain plaintiffs’ more specific contentions regarding each defendant’s conduct and each plaintiff’s injury in discovery.

 The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

V.                FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION – NEGLIGENCE

With respect to the fifth cause of action for negligence, the notice of demurrer indicates that defendants are demurring based on failure to state a cause of action and standing. However, defendants do not specifically address the fifth cause of action in the memorandum of points and authorities. Insofar as defendants are arguing that plaintiffs do not have standing to assert negligence because they are minors, defendants do not cite any authority indicating that any duty defendants may owe the minor plaintiffs arises out of a contract into which plaintiffs cannot enter. Arguments without any legal authority are without merit. (Kensington University v. Council for Private Postsecondary etc. Education (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 27, 42-43.)

Because defendants do not address the fifth cause of action in the demurrer, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED. 

VI.             SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION – NUISANCE

Defendants contend that the sixth cause of action is duplicative of the fifth cause of action for negligence.

“Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.” (El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) A “merely duplicative pleading which adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory” is not sufficient to survive demurrer. (Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135.)

However, the nuisance cause of action is also based on intentional conduct, i.e. the failure to attempt repairs at all, as opposed to negligent conduct, i.e. the failure to perform repairs adequately. (Cf. FAC ¶ 24 [defendants never responded to complaints about roach infestation] and ¶¶ 29, 32 [refusal to change carpet] with 23 [repairs that were performed were inadequate and untimely]; see also FAC ¶ 81 [incorporating previous allegations into nuisance cause of action].) Because the nuisance cause of action is also based on intentional conduct, it is not wholly duplicative of the fifth cause of action for negligence.

The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Before deciding whether to grant leave to amend with respect to the first through third causes of action, the Court shall hear from plaintiffs as to how these causes of action can be amended to address the defect set forth above.