Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 22STCV28729, Date: 2023-04-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV28729 Hearing Date: April 27, 2023 Dept: 72
DEMURRER
Date: 4/27/23
(9:30 AM)
Case: Maria Estela Carreno v. Maria
Guadalupe Lopez et al. (22STCV28729)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Defendant Maria Espinoza’s Demurrer to Complaint is OVERRULED.
As a preliminary matter, defendant Maria Espinoza did not
file any declaration with the demurrer indicating an attempt to meet and confer
with plaintiff Maria Estela Carreno before filing the demurrer, as required by
CCP § 430.41(a)(3). Defendant Espinoza is admonished to comply with the meet
and confer requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court, however,
recognizes that Espinoza filed a declaration with her Reply indicating that a telephonic
meet and confer regarding the basis for demurrer took place on October 20,
2022. (Apollo Decl. ¶ 3.) The Court rules on the merits of the demurrer.
With respect to the second cause of action for cancellation
of deed and quiet title, defendant Maria Espinoza is alleged to be a lender who
has no title interest in the subject property. (Compl. ¶ 23.) According to
Espinoza, regardless of whether defendant Maria Guadalupe Lopez justifiably
recorded a quitclaim deed, there is no allegation indicating that the deed of
trust recorded in favor of defendant Espinoza was improperly recorded.
However, in a quiet title cause of action, plaintiff Maria
Estela Carreno is required to name all persons having adverse claims to title
of the subject property. (CCP §§ 762.010 [“The plaintiff shall name as
defendants in the action the persons having adverse claims to the title of the
plaintiff against which a determination is sought.”]; 762.060(b) [“In an action
under this section, the plaintiff shall name as defendants the persons having
adverse claims that are of record or known to the plaintiff or reasonably
apparent from an inspection of the property”].) This includes Espinoza, the
alleged lender and beneficiary on a deed of trust recorded against the subject
property. (Paterra v. Hansen (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 507, 538 [beneficiary
with “authority to enforce rights under a deed of trust” must be named a
defendant in quiet title action to resolve enforceability of deed of trust].)
Espinoza concedes that she is an indispensable party. (Reply
at 3:10-11.) Nevertheless, Espinoza maintains that she should only be a nominal
party and that plaintiff improperly prayed for monetary damages in the second
cause of action against Espinoza. However, a demurrer only lies as to an entire
cause of action. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 97, 119.) Because Espinoza allegedly holds a deed of trust
encumbering the subject property, she is properly named as a defendant.
The demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.
With respect to the third cause of action for declaratory
relief, a general demurrer to a cause of action for declaratory relief must be
overruled as long as an actual controversy is alleged; the pleader need not
establish any entitlement to a favorable judgment. (Ludgate Ins. Co. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 606.) Here, plaintiff
alleges that, because defendant Lopez improperly recorded the quitclaim deed,
Lopez’s subsequent taking of loans from Espinoza and resulting deed of trust
are void. (Compl. ¶ 27.) Because the deed of trust is currently encumbering the
property that plaintiff allegedly owns, plaintiff sufficiently alleges the
existence of an actual controversy regarding her ownership rights in the
subject property. As Espinoza may seek to foreclose on the deed of trust, the
third cause of action “operates to declare future rights, not to address past
wrongs.” (Monterey Coastkeeper v. Central Coast Regional Water Quality
Control Board (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.)
The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.
Ten (10) days to answer.