Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 23STCO04543, Date: 2024-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCO04543    Hearing Date: October 10, 2024    Dept: 86

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Date:               10/10/24 (1:30 PM)

Case:                           Community Coalition et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al. (23STCP04543)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Respondents City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Police Department and Dominic Choi move for judgment on the pleadings as to all three causes of action in Verified First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate on the ground that the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2024) 113 F.4th 888 requires judgment to be entered in respondents’ favor.

In Opposition, petitioners Community Coalition, Black Lives Matter-Los Angeles, and Sheilanee Sen refer to a memorandum dated August 16, 2024 issued by the Office of the Chief of Police (“OCOP Notice”). (RJN Ex. A.) Pursuant to petitioners’ request, the Court takes judicial notice of the OCOP Notice. (Evid. Code § 452(c), (h).)

The OCOP Notice states that Chinaryan “eliminates an officer’s qualified immunity when stopping a vehicle using high-risk tactics based on nothing more than a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is stolen.” (RJN Ex. A at 1.) Notably, the OCOP Notice goes on to say:

“As a reminder, officers shall not conduct high risk vehicle stops based solely on a suspicion that a vehicle is stolen or cold-plated. High risk stops shall not routinely be used for every stop of a suspected stolen or cold-plated vehicle. Instead, officers need specific articulation of the occupants posing an immediate threat or risk to officer safety to justify the need for high-risk tactics (e.g., yelling threats of violence, stop conducted after a vehicle pursuit, visible weapons, refusing to follow commands, etc.). The generic dangers posed by stopping a suspected stolen or cold-plated vehicle are insufficient to justify the use of high-risk tactics.”

(RJN Ex. A at 1, emphasis in original.)

With respect to the first two causes of action in the operative First Amended Petition, petitioners seek a peremptory writ of mandate pursuant to CCP § 1085 directing respondent to “cease to enforce the policy, practice, custom, and/or training of conducting high-risk traffic stops without probable cause and where the only basis of reasonable suspicion is that the vehicle may be stolen [ ], and without any of the special circumstances required by the Ninth Circuit in [Green v. City and County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3d 1039, 1047], such as: 1) the suspect is uncooperative or takes action at the scene that raises a reasonable possibility of danger or flight; 2) the police have information that the suspect is currently armed; 3) the stop closely follows a violent crime; or 4) the police have information that a crime that may involve violence is about to occur.” (FAP ¶ 55.) With respect to the third cause of action, petitioners Community Coalition and Sen seek to enjoin the enforcement of the subject policy as an illegal expenditure of public funds. (FAP ¶¶ 7, 9, 50, 53.)

It appears that the judicially noticed OCOP Notice constitutes the very same relief petitioners seek in their three causes of action. The Chief of Police has explicitly and in no uncertain terms declared the department’s policy that police officers may not conduct high risk traffic stops based only on a suspicion that a vehicle is stolen and where the occupants do not pose an immediate threat or risk to officer safety. Indeed, in the opposition, petitioners state: “These instructions to LAPD officers [set forth in the OPOC Notice] essentially acknowledge that the policy alleged in the FAP is unconstitutional and provide the exact type of prospective relief Petitioners are seeking in this lawsuit.” (Opp. at 2:13-20, emphasis added.) Petitioners state that the OCOP Notice constitutes LAPD’s “abandonment of its policy” and a “recent change in its policy.” (Opp. at 2:20-22.)  

Thus, as suggested by respondents in Reply, it appears that this case may be moot and should be dismissed. (Reply at 8, fn. 2.) Notwithstanding petitioners’ contention that a “question remains whether Respondents will commit to stand by this recent change in its policy on high-risk traffic stops for the foreseeable future” (Opp. at 2:20-22), petitioners would have the Court render an advisory opinion on whether LAPD may subsequently institute some policy other than the OCOP Notice that is in effect. “The ripeness requirement, a branch of the doctrine of justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170.) Generally, in writ proceedings, the Court applies the law currently in effect. (See Flores v. Dept. of Transportation (2023) 76 Cal.App.5th 678, 682; Estes v. City of Grover City (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 509, 516 [“A statutory change occurring during the course of judicial review of an administrative adjudicatory determination which removes the substantive basis for discipline imposed by the administrative agency precludes affirmance of the agency’s action unless the statute contains a savings clause”].)

Accordingly, the Court issues an Order to Show Cause regarding why the instant case should not be dismissed. Order to Show Cause is scheduled for ___________ at 1:30 PM in Department 86 at Stanley Mosk Courthouse.

Petitioners may submit a filing, no more than 5 pages long, setting forth why the case should not be dismissed by no later than ___________. Respondents may file a response, limited to five pages, by no later than ___________. Petitioners may file a reply to respondents’ filing, limited to 3 pages, by no later than ___________.

In the interim, the instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is taken OFF CALENDAR.