Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 23STCP00106, Date: 2024-01-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP00106    Hearing Date: January 18, 2024    Dept: 82

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE

Date:               1/18/24 (1:30 PM)

Case:                           National Association of Royalty Owners-California et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al. (23STCP00106)

TENTATIVE RULING:

The UNOPPOSED Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Proposed Intervenors Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, Center for Biological Diversity, Communities for a Better Environment, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles is DENIED.

I.                   BACKGROUND

This proceeding concerns the adoption of the Oil and Gas Drilling Ordinance (“Oil Ordinance”) by the City of Los Angeles (“City”). Under the Oil Ordinance, new or expanded oil and gas extraction is prohibited as a nonconforming use in all zones within the City. With respect to existing oil and gas extraction, such extraction shall be phased out during a twenty-year amortization period.

Petitioners National Association of Royalty Owners-California, Inc., Mekusukey Oil Company, LLC, NJB Wolf Family LLC, and The Termo Company challenge the Oil Ordinance.

Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, Center for Biological Diversity, Communities for a Better Environment, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles (collectively, “Proposed Intervenors”) seek leave to intervene in the instant writ proceeding.

Curiously, petitioners filed in this case a “Joinder to Opposition to Motion for Leave to Intervene” with respect to the oppositions filed by petitioners in the related cases 23STCP00060, 23STCP00070, and 23STCP00085.  It is hard to see how, as a non-party to those related actions, petitioners in this case have a right to join in any opposition to the motions to intervene filed in those cases.  More curious is that petitioners have failed to properly assert a position regarding the motion to intervene in their own case.  Nonetheless, for the reasons that follow, the Court does not find that Proposed Intervenors have made the requisite showing for mandatory intervention, and the Court in its discretion declines to allow permissive intervention.

II.                MANDATORY INTERVENTION

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 387(b), a nonparty may intervene as a matter of right if the nonparty demonstrates: (1) it has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (2) it is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (3) its interests are not adequately represented by existing parties. (Siena Court Homeowners Ass'n v. Green Valley Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1423-1424.)

Proposed Intervenors fail to demonstrate that their interests are not adequately represented by the City. “In the absence of a ‘very compelling showing to the contrary,’ it will be presumed that a state adequately represents its citizens when the [proposed intervenor] shares the same interest.” (Arakaki v. Cayetano (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3d 1078, 1086; see Edwards v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 725, 732 [in assessing requirements for mandatory intervention, courts look to federal law for guidance].) Here, Proposed Intervenors and the City share the same interest in defending against challenges to the Oil Ordinance and the implementing ZA Documents. Moreover, as admitted to by Proposed Intervenors, the City asserted that the Oil Ordinance “advances the basic core principle of zoning in Los Angeles to protect citizens’ health, safety, and welfare.” (Los Angeles City Department of City Planning, Department of City Planning Recommendation Report at A-2 (Sep. 22, 2022) (Department of City Planning Report) <https://planning.lacity.org/plndoc/Staff_Reports/2022/09-13-2022/CPC_2022_4864.pdf>.) Proposed Intervenors similarly seek to protect the health, safety, and welfare of communities impacted by urban drilling. (Cantor Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7-13; Clay Decl. ¶¶ 7-9, 11; Hernandez Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, 14-16, 20, 21, 23-27; Nagami Decl. ¶¶ 6-8, 10, 19, 22; Kakoussian Decl. ¶¶ 9-11, 13, 22-24; Puvvula Decl. ¶¶ 4, 6, 7-14, 16; Robertson Decl. ¶¶ 4, 7, 14-21; Siegel Decl. ¶¶ 10, 13, 14, 15; Uriarte Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10, 14, 18, 20, 23.)

Proposed Intervenors argue that the City’s representation may be inadequate because the City’s primary interest is in defending its jurisdiction and authority, and the City must balance policy goals, including resource constraints and expeditious resolution of litigation. Proposed Intervenors also argue that because claims attacking the Oil Ordinance have statewide implications, they have an interest in resolving such claims in a manner that does not discourage other municipalities from enacting similar ordinances. Proposed Intervenors maintain the City does not share that interest.

Proposed Intervenors’ concerns are too speculative to constitute a very compelling showing. Proposed Intervenors’ arguments suggest that their litigation strategy may differ from the City because the City may be more agreeable to settling or accepting an adverse decision because of resource constraints or because the City is not concerned with how other municipalities handling oil drilling concerns. “When a proposed intervenor has not alleged any substantive disagreement between it and the existing parties to the suit, and instead has vested its claim for intervention entirely upon a disagreement over litigation strategy or legal tactics, courts have been hesitant to accord the applicant full-party status.” (League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson (9th Cir. 1997) 131 F.3d 1297, 1306.) How the City elects to resolve the underlying litigation does not change the fact that the City shares Proposed Intervenors’ interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of communities impacted by oil drilling through enactment of the Oil Ordinance. Proposed Intervenors’ showing is insufficient to demonstrate that the City may somehow compromise this interest in its defense of the Oil Ordinance.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Proposed Intervenors do not have a mandatory right to intervene in the instant proceeding. 

III.             PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION

A trial court has broad discretion to permit or deny intervention. (Lippman v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1630, 1633, fn. 2.)  The Court considers whether the applicant’s interests are already adequately represented in the action, or whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the original parties.  (Hausmann v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 611, 616.)  When “[p]resented with a motion for intervention, the court must determine whether the intervenor has established (1) it has a direct interest in the lawsuit; (2) intervention would not enlarge the issues raised by the original parties; and (3) the intervenor would not ‘tread on the rights of the original parties to conduct their own lawsuit.’” (Bame v. City of Del Mar (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1364.)  “The ‘interest,’ it has been said, must be of such direct or immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.” (Hausmann, 213 Cal.App.2d at 614.)

For the reasons stated above, Proposed Intervenors fail to demonstrate that they would not interfere in the City’s right to conduct its own lawsuit. Proposed Intervenors demonstrate that they are not hesitant to disagree with the City’s litigation strategy or legal tactics, even when such strategy or tactics reasonably advance the interests that they share with the City. The City is situated to assert the same interests as Proposed Intervenors in this proceeding. Consequently, the Court exercises its discretion to deny intervention.

IV.             CONCLUSION

The UNOPPOSED Motion is DENIED.