Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case Number: 23STCP00380, Date: 2024-02-06 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner El Rovia Mobile Home Park, LLC petitions for a writ of prohibition and writ of mandate enjoining respondent City of El Monte from processing, scheduling, or re-adjudicating an appeal of petitioner’s fair return application for approval of a rent increase, which was granted by respondent’s City Manager for the 2019 calendar year.

Petitioner El Rovia Mobile Home Park, LLC does business as a mobilehome park named El Rovia Mobile Home Park (“Park”). Respondent City of El Monte (“City”) has a rent control ordinance, Ordinance No. 2860 (“Ordinance”), that governs rent increases for the Park. (AR 1-23.) The Ordinance provides for (1) annual rent increases and (2) other permitted rent increases (i.e., “fair return”) by application determined by the City Manager, pursuant to § 8.70.080. (AR 1-23.)

Sections 8.70.140 of the Ordinance states that the residents of each mobilehome park[1] shall elect a “resident representative” for their mobilehome park to receive all notices required under the Ordinance. (AR 20.) There was no resident representative selected by the residents of Park with respect to all times relevant to the Application for the year 2019. (See Intervenor’s Opp. at 3.)

On September 17, 2020, petitioner submitted its fair return application (“Application”) to the City for the 2019 calendar year. (AR 57-85.) On July 27, 2021, after supplemental disclosures by petitioner as requested by the City (AR 86-627), the City determined the Application was complete. (AR 628.) The residents had twenty (20) days to provide a response to the Application and the City would render its decision within sixty (60) days. (AR 628.) On July 29, 2021, the City sent each resident a notice requesting any comments on the Application. (AR 999.) On August 16, 2021, Neighborhood Legal Services (“NLS”) sent to the City Manager a letter, which stated that NLS represented Park resident Franklin Stooksberry in space No. 72 “and the El Rovia Mobilehome Park Tenants Association/Affected Tenants” and that they opposed the Application. (AR 646-833.) On August 25, 2021, another letter from NLS was sent to the City Manager opposing the Application. (AR 834-44.)

On September 23, 2021, the City Manager issued its decision on the Application. (AR 629-45.) The City Manager approved the rent adjustments requested by petitioner. (AR 629.) No resident representative was indicated as having been sent this decision. (AR 629.) The Park or the residents had twenty (20) days after September 23, 2021, to appeal the decision. (AR 629.) On October 4, 2021, NLS sent a letter indicating a majority of the affected residents (10 of 16) appealed the City Manager decision. (AR 878-79.)

On August 1, 2022, counsel for petitioner sent the City its legal arguments in support of this writ proceeding and demanded the City not allow the appeal to proceed. (AR 971-78) The City is proceeding with appellate proceedings. (AR 1000.)

On February 9, 2023, petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Mandamus, or Other Appropriate Relief and Declaratory Relief. On March 15, 2023, respondent City of El Monte filed an Answer. On December 22, 2023, as stipulated by the parties, the Court granted Franklin Stooksberry’s motion for leave to intervene. On the same date, Stooksberry filed an Answer.

On December 22, 2023, petitioner filed an opening brief. On January 12, 2024, intervenor Stooksberry filed an opposition. On January 22, 2024, petitioner filed a reply.[2]

CCP § 1085(a) provides: “A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.”

“There are two essential requirements to the issuance of a traditional writ of mandate: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty.” (California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “An action in ordinary mandamus is proper where…the claim is that an agency has failed to act as required by law.” (Id. at 705.)

“When a party seeks review of an administrative decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, judicial review is limited to examining the agency proceedings to ascertain whether the agency's action has been arbitrary, capricious or lacking entirely in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the proper procedure and give notices required by law. And, where the case involves the interpretation of a statute or ordinance, our review of the trial court's decision is de novo.” (Ideal Boat & Camper Storage v. County of Alameda (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 301, 311, citing Pomona Police Officers' Assn. v. City of Pomona (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 584.) In independently reviewing legal questions, “An administrative agency's interpretation does not bind judicial review but it is entitled to consideration and respect.” (Housing Partners I, Inc. v. Duncan (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1343.)

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) In a CCP § 1085 writ petition, the petitioner generally bears the burden of proof. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.)

Petitioner also seeks a writ of prohibition. “The writ of prohibition arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person exercising judicial functions, when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person.” (CCP § 1102.) “A writ of prohibition may be issued by any court to an inferior tribunal or to a corporation, board, or person, in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” (CCP § 1103(a).)

Petitioner contends that, because the residents of the Park had not appointed a “resident representative” in accordance with section 8.70.140 of the Ordinance for the 2019 calendar year, the residents of the Park do not have jurisdiction or standing to appeal the City Manager’s decision concerning petitioner’s 2019 fair return application. Section 8.70.140 states:

The residents of each mobilehome park in the City shall annually elect by majority vote, with one vote per space, a resident representative to receive all notices required by this Chapter. The residents shall advise the City Manager of the name, address and phone number of the elected resident representative in writing no later than January 31st of each year and shall promptly notify the City Manager of any change of representative.

Section 8.70.090 of the Ordinance sets forth the procedures governing a mobilepark owner’s petition for approval of a rent adjustment to obtain a fair return. Subdivisions (A), (B), and (C) govern the owner’s submission of a fair return application. (AR 13.) Subdivision (D)(1) requires the City Manager to decide the application within 60 days of completion of the application. (AR 14.) Subdivision (D)(1) states the decision “shall be emailed and sent by mail, with proof of mailing to the park owner, the park owner’s designated representative for the petition, and a designated representative of the residents.” (AR 14.)

The decision of the City Manager may be appealed within twenty (20) calendar days to a hearing officer. An appeal by the mobilehome owner tenants must be signed by residents from a majority of the mobilehome spaces that are subject to the City Manager’s decision. The appealing party shall be required to pay for costs of the appeal process in accordance with any fees set forth by resolution of the City Council.

(AR 15.) Subdivision (D)(2) does not state that only the “resident representative” or “designated representative” can appeal the City Manager’s decision. Subdivision (D)(2) only provides that a majority of the tenants whose spaces are affected by the City Manager’s decision must sign the appeal. Here, it is undisputed that a majority—10 of 16 tenants—signed the appeal. (AR 878-79.)

Section 8.70.090(D)(2) is abundantly clear that residents of the Park who are affected by a City Manager’s decision on a fair return application have the right to appeal, so long as a majority of the affected residents sign the appeal. There is nothing about the language of section 8.70.090 to suggest that having a designated representative for the purpose of receiving notice is a necessary prerequisite for exercising the right to appeal.

Despite any logical connection between the Ordinance’s provisions for notice and the right to appeal, petitioner goes so far as to argue the residents did “forgo and waive” their right to appeal and opted to entrust the City with protecting them from unlawful rent increases when they failed to select a designated resident to receive notices. (Opening Br. at 8.) In addition to lacking any support from the language of the notice and right to appeal provisions in the Ordinance, petitioner’s contention actually contravenes an explicit provision of the Ordinance concerning the waiver of rights. Section 8.70.120 states: “Any waiver or purported waiver by a mobilehome owner or mobilehome tenant of rights granted under this Chapter shall be void as contrary to public policy.” (AR 20.)

Further, the notice provisions of the Ordinance are more logically viewed as furthering the rights of residents, not providing an illogical impediment to the exercise of those rights. Requiring residents potentially affected by adverse actions of the City provides a protection that ensures residents have information so they may decide whether to exercise their rights and take action. To the extent residents fail to select a “resident representative” (section 8.70.140) or “designated representative” (section 8.70.090(D)),[3] they may not receive the benefit of the notice provisions and, for example, cannot later be heard to complain insofar as they do not timely take action. (See Section 8.70.090(D)(2) [requiring appeal of City Manager’s decision within 20 calendar days].) But there is simply no basis to conclude that the residents’ failure to take advantage of the Ordinance notice provisions somehow divested them of unrelated rights, including the right to appeal.[4]

For the foregoing reasons, respondent may adjudicate the appeal of the residents of the City Manager’s decision on petitioner’s fair return application. The first cause of action for Writ of Prohibition or Other Appropriate Relief is DENIED. With respect to the second cause of action for declaratory relief, petitioner seeks a declaration that no appeal may be taken from the City Manager’s decision. (Pet. Prayer at 11:10-11.) For the reasons stated above, petitioner is not entitled to such a declaration. The second cause of action for Declaratory Relief is DENIED.

Accordingly, the Verified Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Mandamus, or Other Appropriate Relief and Declaratory Relief is DENIED in its entirety. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.231(n), respondent City of El Monte shall prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed judgment.

[1] The Ordinance defines “Mobilehome park” as “any area or tract of land where two or more mobilehome lots are rented or leased, or held out for rent or lease, to accommodate mobilehomes used for human habitation for permanent, as opposed to transient, occupancy.” (AR 5.) “Mobilehome” is defined as “a vehicle, designed or used for human habitation, including a camping trailer, travel trailer, motor home and slide-in camper, when used as the principal place of habitation for the occupants thereof, as well as mobilehomes as defined by Civil Code Section 798.3.” (AR 5.)

[2] Pursuant to a Stipulation and Order drafted and submitted by respondent City, the Court ordered respondent’s opposition brief to be filed by January 12, 2024. Without explanation or leave to do so, respondent City of El Monte untimely served and filed its opposition on January 31, 2024, after petitioner had filed its Reply. Because petitioner did not have the opportunity to respond to respondent’s opposition, the Court exercises its discretion to decline to consider respondent’s opposition. (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765 [“A trial court has broad discretion under rule 3.1300(d) of the Rules of Court to refuse to consider papers served and filed beyond the deadline without a prior court order finding good cause for late submission”]; see also CRC 3.1300(d) [“If the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate”].)

[3] Petitioner and Intervenor quibble over whether “designated representative” in section 8.70.090(D)(1) is the same as a “resident representative” under 8.70.140. The resolution of that dispute is immaterial to the outcome here, as the Court finds that notice to any such representative operates independent of the residents’ right to appeal a fair return decision of the City Manager.

[4] In this case, it appears the Park residents were informed of the decision on petitioner’s fair return application when the City mailed a copy to all Park residents. (AR 629.) From this, petitioner argues “the City actually violated the plain language of the Ordinance” because “the Ordinance only allows the decision to be sent to the Park and resident representative pursuant to Section 8.70.090(D)(1).” (Opening Br. at 3.) This assertion is without merit. Section 8.70.090(D)(1) does not state the decision can only be sent to the park owner, the park owner’s designated representative, or the residents’ designated representative. (AR 14.) Instead, section 8.70.090(D)(1) merely dictates the minimum amount of notice the City shall provide.