Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 23STCP01687, Date: 2024-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP01687    Hearing Date: September 19, 2024    Dept: 86

MOTIONS (2) TO COMPEL

COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENA

Date:               9/19/24 (1:30 PM)

Case:                           Mark Williams v. Noreen McClendon (23STCP01687)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Petitioner Mark Williams’ Motion to Compel Nonparty FirstLegal to Comply with Plaintiff Subpoena is DENIED.

Petitioner Mark Williams’ Motion to Compel Nonparty Los Angeles Unified School District to Comply with Plaintiff Subpoena is DENIED.

I.                   MOTION TO COMPEL NONPARTY FIRSTLEGAL TO COMPLY WITH SUBPOENA

Petitioner Mark Williams moves to compel compliance with a subpoena duces tecum directed to FirstLegal, wherein petitioner requested the deposition transcript of Robin Cannon, former president of Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles, taken in a separate action.

The motion reflects that plaintiff did not serve the subpoena personally. Code of Civil Procedure § 1987 states, in relevant part: “[T]he service of a subpoena is made by delivering a copy, or a ticket containing its substance, to the witness personally, giving or offering to the witness at the same time, if demanded by him or her, the fees to which he or she is entitled for travel to and from the place designated, and one day’s attendance there.” (CCP § 1987(a).)

The proof of service attached to the motion states that the subpoena was served electronically to FirstLegal’s Custodian of Records. The subpoena was not served “to the witness personally,” as is required by CCP § 1987(a). (See also CCP § 2020.220(c) [providing for personal service to render deposition subpoena effective].) FirstLegal thus was under no obligation to comply with the subpoena.

The motion is DENIED.

II.                MOTION TO COMPEL NONPARTY LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT TO COMPLY WITH SUBPOENA

Petitioner Mark Williams moves to compel compliance with a subpoena duces tecum directed to Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”), wherein petitioner requested the technical evaluation of the Carver Middle School Artificial Turf Soccer Field Joint Use Agreement between the Los Angeles School District and Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles.  

As a preliminary matter, LAUSD’s request for judicial notice is DENIED as “unnecessary to the resolution” of the issues before the Court. (Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1075.)

The motion reflects that plaintiff did not serve the subpoena personally. Code of Civil Procedure § 1987 states, in relevant part: “[T]he service of a subpoena is made by delivering a copy, or a ticket containing its substance, to the witness personally, giving or offering to the witness at the same time, if demanded by him or her, the fees to which he or she is entitled for travel to and from the place designated, and one day’s attendance there.” (CCP § 1987(a).)

The proof of service attached to the motion states that the subpoena was served electronically to LAUSD’s counsel. The subpoena was not served “to the witness personally,” as is required by CCP § 1987(a). (See also CCP § 2020.220(c) [providing for personal service to render deposition subpoena effective].) LAUSD thus was under no obligation to comply with the subpoena. 

Moreover, petitioner does not dispute LAUSD’s assertion that the requested technical evaluation is the result of an investigation by the Inspector General. Education Code § 35401(c) provides: “Every investigation, including, but not limited to, all investigative files and work-product, shall be kept confidential, except that the inspector general may issue any report of an investigation that has been substantiated, keeping confidential the identity of the individual or individuals involved, or release any findings resulting from an investigation conducted pursuant to this article that is deemed necessary to serve the interests of the district.” The statute expressly provides that every investigation, including the underlying investigative files, are confidential. Therefore, plaintiff does not have a right to discover the report. (See Office of Inspector General v. Superior Court (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 695, 705 [report held as confidential under statute is not subject to disclosure under California Public Records Act].) While the statute provides that the Inspector General may issue and release any report of an investigation, the statute does not require the Inspector General to do so. LAUSD cannot produce any investigative report that is within the discretion of the Inspector General to produce.

The motion is DENIED.