Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 23STCP02588, Date: 2024-02-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCP02588 Hearing Date: February 8, 2024 Dept: 82
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Date: 2/8/24
(1:30 PM)
Case: Jesus Cerda v. County of Los
Angeles (23STCP02588)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Respondent County of Los Angeles’ Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings is GRANTED.
As a preliminary matter, petitioner Jesus Cerda served and
filed an opposition on February 1, 2024. Based on the hearing date of February
8, 2024, the deadline to file an opposition was January 26, 2024. Despite the
untimely filing of the opposition, the Court exercises its discretion and
considers the opposition. (Rule of Court 3.1300(d) [“No paper may be rejected
for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing. If the
court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes
or order must so indicate”].)
Respondent County of Los Angeles’ request for judicial
notice of Exhibit 1, the Felony Complaint filed by the State of California
against petitioner Jesus Cerda on June 26, 2023, Los Angeles Superior Court
Case No. VA160933, is GRANTED, but only
the existence of the documents, not the truth of the matters asserted therein.
(See Evid. Code § 452(d); Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th
1548, 1564-69.)
Respondent’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit 2, a
June 26, 2023 minute order in Case No. VA160933, setting bail at $1,000,000, is
GRANTED, pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d).
Respondent’s request for judicial notice of Exhibit 3, the
Case Information for Case No. DOWVA160933, The People of the State of
California vs. Cerda, Jesus Silva, obtained on January 9, 2023, is GRANTED,
pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d).
Respondent moves for judgment on the pleadings with respect
to the entire Petition. Respondent contends that, based on the criminal charges
filed against petitioner, it is entitled to delay disclosure of the records
sought by petitioner in his Public Records Act request pursuant to Penal Code §
832.7(b)(8)(B). (RJN Exs. 1-3.)
Penal Code section 832.7(b)(8)(B) provides that an agency
may withhold records relating to an incident involving discharge of a firearm
at a person by a peace officer “that is the subject of an active criminal or
administrative investigation…[i]f criminal charges are filed related to the
incident in which misconduct occurred or force was used.” The statute further
provides that the agency “may delay the disclosure of records or information
until a verdict on those charges is returned at trial or, if a plea of guilty
or no contest is entered, the time to withdraw the plea pursuant to Section
1018.”
With respect to the June 22, 2023 encounter between
petitioner and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) deputy
alleged in the Petition, petitioner has been charged with attempted murder of a
peace officer and assault on a peace officer. (Compare Pet. ¶¶ 7, 8 with
RJN Ex. 1 [incident between petitioner and peace officer occurred on 6/22/23].)
Petitioner does not deny that criminal charges have been filed against him
related to the June 22, 2023 incident alleged in the Petition.
Rather, petitioner argues that section 832.7(b)(8)(B) only
applies when criminal charges are filed against a peace officer. The Court
disagrees. Section 832.7(b)(8)(B) does not state against whom criminal charges
must be filed. The statute only requires the criminal charges to be “related to
the incident in which misconduct occurred or force was used.” By alleging that
shots were discharged at petitioner during his encounter with the LASD deputy,
petitioner alleges that force was used during the incident. (Pet. ¶ 8.) The
Court may not read into the statute the subject against whom criminal charges
are filed. (City and County of San Francisco v. International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 39 (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 938, 945 [“We may not
add language to a statute that is not otherwise present”].)
To the extent that section 832.7(b)(8)(B) is ambiguous,
petitioner argues that section 832.7 references “administrative
investigations,” to which only peace officers are subject. (See Pen.
Code §§ 832.7(b)(8), 832.7(b)(8)(C).) (See Davis v. Fresno Unified School
Dist. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 671, 687 [to interpret statute, courts consider
“portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory
scheme of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase,
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose”].) Petitioner
also invokes the legislative intent of section 832.7(b)(8)(B) to promote
transparency relating to harmful or unlawful conduct by peace officers. (First
Amendment Coalition v. Superior Court (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 593, 316
Cal.Rptr.3d 675, 677].)
Petitioner is correct that section 832.7 contemplates delays
of disclosure during criminal enforcement proceedings against officers who
engaged in misconduct or use of force. (Pen. Code § 832.7(b)(8)(A)(ii).)
However, section 832.7 also contemplates delays of disclosure when “the
disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with a criminal
enforcement proceeding against someone other than the officer who engaged in
the misconduct or used the force.” (Pen. Code § 832.7(b)(8)(A)(iii).) Subsections
(b)(8)(A)(ii) and (b)(8)(A)(iii), which immediately precede subsection (b)(8)(B)
at issue here, clearly demonstrate the Legislature knew how to differentiate
between criminal proceedings against an officer and someone other than the
officer. That the Legislature did not do so in subsection (b)(8)(B) clearly
demonstrates the Legislature meant for (b)(8)(B) to apply when criminal charges
are filed against either an officer or someone other than the officer. Put another way, the Legislature did not provide
for delays of disclosure solely in instances where a peace officer is subject
to an active criminal or administrative investigation or criminal charges.
With respect to the criminal case against petitioner, it
appears that there has not been a verdict. (RJN Ex. 3.) It also appears that
petitioner has not entered a plea of guilty or no contest. (Ibid.) Accordingly, pursuant to Penal Code section
832.7(b)(8)(B), respondent is entitled to delay disclosure of the records which
petitioner seeks through the Petition.
The motion is GRANTED. Unless petitioner can in good faith
allege that there are no longer any filed criminal charges relating to the
incident or that there has been a verdict at trial of guilty/no-contest plea to
such criminal charges, it would appear the pleading defect cannot reasonably be
cured such that leave to amend should be denied. In the untimely opposition, petitioner asks
for leave to amend but does not proffer or explain how a cure is reasonably
possible. (Opp. at 4.) At the hearing, the Court will hear from
petitioner whether the Petition can be amended to address the defects discussed
above.