Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 23STCP03749, Date: 2024-08-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP03749    Hearing Date: August 15, 2024    Dept: 86

PETITION FOR RELIEF

FROM GOVERNMENT CODE § 945.4

 

Date:               8/13/24 (1:30 PM)

Case:               Bridget Blaney v. County of Los Angeles et al. (23STCP03749)

 

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Petitioner Bridget Blaney’s Petition for Relief from Government Code § 945.4 is DENIED.

 

On November 26, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. in Covina, petitioner Bridget Blaney suffered injuries when shot by a deputy sheriff employed by the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. (McMurray Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 1.) A claim relating to a cause of action for personal injury must be presented to the public entity no later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.¿ (Gov. Code § 911.2; Munoz v. State of California¿(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776.)¿Accordingly, petitioner had until May 27, 2023 to present a claim to respondent County of Los Angeles (“County”). (See Jiminez v. Chavez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 50, 58 [six-month limitations period is the longer of six calendar months or 182 days].)

 

It is undisputed that petitioner did not file a claim with or seek permission to file a late claim from respondents until June 12, 2023, that petitioner presented an application to file a late claim to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors on August 3, 2023, and that the application was purportedly denied on August 4, 2023. (Pet. at 2:25-3:2, 5:3-9; Opp. at 3:12-15.)

 

Petitioner files this petition seeking relief under Government Code § 946.6 to present a late claim. The instant petition was filed on October 11, 2023, within six months of August 4, 2023, pursuant to Government Code § 946.6(b).

 

Petitioner is required to demonstrate that the failure to present a claim under Government Code § 945.4 was “through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect….” (Gov. Code § 946.6(c)(1).) “The mere recital of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is not sufficient to warrant relief…. There must be more than the mere failure to discover a fact; the party seeking relief must establish the failure to discover the fact in the exercise of reasonable diligence.” (Department of Water & Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) “The party seeking relief based on a claim of mistake must establish he was diligent in investigating and pursuing the claim [citation] and must establish the necessary elements justifying relief by the preponderance of the evidence.” (Ibid.)

 

Petitioner contends that her counsel’s paralegal and associate failed to calendar the 6-month due date to serve the government claim. (McMurray Decl. ¶¶ 35, 36, 45, 46.)  Counsel provides no further detail or explanation for the purported mis-calendaring.  As or his own role, counsel avers that he “accidentally, inadvertently, and mistakenly neglected to ensure that the matter was calendared, and the Government Claim was timely served.” (McMurray Decl. ¶ 47.)

 

“In deciding whether counsel's error is excusable, the reviewing court looks to the nature of the mistake or neglect and whether counsel was otherwise diligent in investigating and pursuing the claim. When examining the mistake or neglect, the court inquires whether a reasonably prudent person might have made the same error under the same or similar circumstances.” (Munoz, 33 Cal.App.4th at 1782-83.)  Counsel’s averments are insufficient to establish reasonable diligence.  Other than a conclusory assertion of purported mis-calendaring by a paralegal and associate, counsel provides an inadequate basis for this Court to conclude any reasonable diligence was exercised with regard to meeting the deadline for making a claim.  Indeed, counsel provides no explanation regarding what efforts he made to ensure that the paralegal and associate calendared the 6-month deadline or how he otherwise diligently acted with respect to ensure a claim was timely made. Counsel merely avers that he assumed the paralegal “had filed the previously drafted Claim for damages or had at least calendared with [sic] the deadline to serve” (McMurray Decl. ¶ 35) without providing any basis to conclude such an assumption was reasonable or prudent.

 

Counsel also avers that he has been attempting to obtain information regarding the subject shooting since December 5, 2022, pursuant to a California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) request but that no documents or information have been produced in response. (McMurray Decl. ¶¶ 21, 38.) On March 1, 2023, petitioner filed a separate petition for writ of mandate to obtain the requested information. (McMurray Decl. ¶ 33.) Given that petitioner seeks leave to file a late claim without ever having received the requested information, it is not clear why petitioner could not have timely filed a claim in the first instance without the information petitioner still seeks.  More to the point, while counsel may not have all the information he would like to fully prosecute his claim, it is hard to see how petitioner lacked sufficient information to make a timely claim as required.  Notably, counsel admits at the very least that he has known the information about the November 26, 2022 shooting posted on the Sheriff’s website and attaches what appears to be a copy of that posting, which is dated November 26, 2022. (McMurray Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. 6.)  That posting includes ample details about the shooting, including, among other things: (1) the date [November 26, 2022]; (2) the time [10:03 AM]; (3) the location [North Vincent Avenue and East Edna Place]; (4) the involvement of county employees [deputies assigned to San Dimas Sheriff’s Station]; (5) petitioner’s identity [25-year-old Bridget Blaney]; (6) what happened [a deputy-involved shooting[; (7) resulting injury to petitioner [Blaney sustained gunshot wounds to her torso]; and (8) the name of the deputy who fired [Ernesto Valencia].  ((McMurray Decl. ¶¶ 11-16 & Ex. 6.)

 

Petitioner also contends that Government Code § 945.3 prevented her from bringing a claim because she currently has criminal charges pending arising from the subject incident where she was shot. (McMurray Decl. ¶ 52.) However, Government Code § 945.3 pertains to the filing of civil actions, not presentation of claims under Government Code § 945.4.

 

Lastly, petitioner argues that she was physically incapacitated after the subject shooting and was unable to communicate. (McMurray Decl. ¶ 50.) While relief from Government Code § 945.4 could be obtained if the claim was not timely filed due to physical incapacity (see Gov. Code § 946.6(c)(5)), petitioner fails to demonstrate entitlement to such relief.  Petitioner’s counsel contacted respondent County on December 5, 2022, less than 10 days after the shooting, to inform the County that his firm represented petitioner and to demand the preservation of evidence. (McMurray Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 1.) Petitioner does not explain how her inability to communicate prevented her counsel from timely filing a government claim as well.  Indeed, petitioner’s ability to retain counsel shortly in the heels of the shooting suggests that physical incapacity was not an impediment to making a timely government claim. 

 

In sum, there is insufficient explanation why petitioner delayed in presenting her claim until after the presentation period set forth in Government Code § 911.2. Petitioner consequently does not demonstrate the diligence necessary to obtain relief under Government Code § 946.6. While there is a “general policy favoring trial on the merits,” it “cannot be applied indiscriminately so as to render ineffective the statutory time limits.” (Department of Water, 82 Cal.App.4th at 1293.)

 

The petition is DENIED.