Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 23STCP03943, Date: 2024-03-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCP03943    Hearing Date: March 7, 2024    Dept: 82

MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

MOTION TO BIFURCATE

Date:               3/7/24 (1:30 PM)

Case:                           Dr. Todd Sadow et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al. (23STCP03943)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Respondents City of Los Angeles, West Los Angeles Area Planning Commission, and Vincent Bertoni in his individual capacity as Director of Planning for the City of Los Angeles’ (collectively, “City”) Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Required Exhaustion of Remedies Before the Coastal Commission is GRANTED.

Petitioners Dr. Todd Sadow and Ivo Venkov’s Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED.

Respondents’ requests for judicial notice in connection with both motions are GRANTED in their entirety. (Evid. Code § 452(b), (d).)

In this action, petitioners seek the rescission of respondent’s grant of a Zoning Administrator’s Adjustment (“ZAA”) and Coastal Development Permit (“CDP”), both of which are needed for real parties to construct infrastructure on a property neighboring petitioners’ properties. (Pet. ¶¶ 1, 2, 41; Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 2, 3.)

With respect to the CDP, petitioner is in the process of exhausting administrative remedies by appealing the City’s issuance of the CDP to the Coastal Commission. (Pet. ¶ 111.)  Respondents move to stay proceedings in the instant matter pending the Coastal Commission’s determination. While petitioners do not oppose a stay of the other causes of action (second through fifth), they move to bifurcate and press forward with their first cause of action, which seeks a writ of mandate based on the purported violation of petitioners’ due process right in connection with their appeal of the ZAA and CDP before the West Los Angeles Area Planning Commission (“APC”).

The Court elects to allow the appeal of the CDP to the Coastal Commission to proceed and be resolved first in the interests of judicial economy. If the Coastal Commission rules that the CDP was improperly issued, then petitioners will have accomplished their goal of stopping construction on the subject adjacent property and the remainder of the instant action (including due process challenges and whether the ZAA was property granted) would be moot.

If the Coastal Commission upholds the CDP on substantive grounds, petitioners contend that they will be prevented from litigating their due process claims with respect to the CDP in this Court, because the City’s decision would be nullified and only the Coastal Commission’s CDP decision would be before this Court. (See McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 274, quoting Kaczorowski v. Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 564, 569.)  Indeed, in the reply in support of their motion to bifurcate, petitioners contend their due process claim with respect to the CDP would never be heard, because they contend the Coastal Commission’s jurisdiction on appeal from the City’s decision does not extend to the purported denial of due process when petitioners attempted to present their case to the APC, as alleged in the first cause of action. (Bifurcate Reply at 6:18-8:5; Pet. ¶¶ 10, 68-71.) Even assuming petitioners are correct in this contention, their due process claims also extend to the ZAA (Pet. ¶¶ 10, 68-71), which will be heard by this Court.  Accordingly, should petitioners prevail on their due process claims with respect to the ZAA, they would still accomplish their goal of stopping construction.  Further, even if there was a denial of due process with respect to the City’s CDP decision, it would seem such violation potentially might be cured or rendered harmless if the Coastal Commission were to afford petitioners a full opportunity to present evidence and be heard when evaluating the substance of whether the CDP was properly issued. (See El-Attar v. Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center (2013) 56 Cal.4th 976, 990 [“[D]epartures from an organization’s procedural rules will be disregarded unless they have produced some injustice”].)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the interests of judicial economy would be promoted by allowing the appeal to the Coastal Commission to be resolved first. Accordingly, petitioners’ motion to bifurcate the first cause of action is DENIED. Respondents’ motion to stay is GRANTED. The action is stayed in its entirety pending resolution of petitioners’ appeal before the Coastal Commission.