Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 23STCV17779, Date: 2023-12-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV17779    Hearing Date: December 5, 2023    Dept: 82

APPLICATIONS FOR RIGHT TO ATTACH ORDERS

 

Date:               12/5/23 (9:30 AM)

Case:                           Paul Kramer et al. v. Royal Holdings Technologies Corp. et al. (23STCP17779)

 

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Plaintiffs Paul Kramer and Linda Crouse’s UNOPPOSED application for right to attach order with respect to defendant Royal Holdings Technologies Corp. is GRANTED IN PART.

 

Plaintiffs Paul Kramer and Linda Crouse’s UNOPPOSED application for right to attach order with respect to defendant Todd Dunphy is GRANTED IN PART.

 

Plaintiffs Paul Kramer and Linda Crouse’s UNOPPOSED application for right to attach order with respect to defendant Barend Oberholzer is DENIED.

 

With respect to defendant Barend Oberholzer, also known as Barry Oberholzer, defendant Oberholzer was not served with the documents as required by CCP § 484.040, including (a) a copy of the summons and operative First Amended Complaint, (b) notice of application for right to attach order, and (c) a copy of the application for right to attach order and the declarations in support of the application. Pursuant to CCP §§ 484.040 and 484.080(a), the application as to defendant Oberholzer is DENIED.

 

With respect to defendants Royal Holdings Technologies Corp. dba X.Labs and Todd Dunphy, the Court finds:

1)      the claim is one upon which attachment may be issued;

2)      plaintiffs have established the probable validity of the claim;

3)      attachment is not sought for any purpose other than recovery on the claim;

4)      the amount to be attached is greater than zero.

 

Plaintiffs Paul Kramer and Linda Crouse’s claim against Royal Holdings Technologies Corp. (“RHTC”) and Dunphy is based on funds disbursed to RHTC pursuant to three written Loan Agreements – dated April 13, 2020 (“April 2020 Agreement”); November 1, 2020 (“November 2020 Agreement”), as amended on March 1, 2021 and April 1, 2021; and February 9, 2021 (“February 2021 Agreement”) (collectively, “Loan Agreements”) – between plaintiffs and RHTC. (Kramer Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8, 11, 12, 14 & Exs. 1, 3, 6, 7, 8.)

 

On November 1, 2020, Dunphy, a principal of RHTC, signed a Continuing Secured Guaranty (“Guaranty”), whereby Dunphy guarantied the amounts owed by RHTC under the November 2020 Agreement, as well as “any and all loans…extended by” plaintiffs to RHTC and “all debts…of” RHTC to plaintiffs. (Kramer Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 4 at ¶¶ 1, 2.) The Guaranty also applies to future transactions. (Kramer Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 4 at ¶¶ 4, 13.)

 

The Loan Agreements define “default” as including a failure to make all payments when due under the agreements. (Kramer Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1 at § 3; ¶ 8 & Ex. 3 at § 3; ¶ 14 & Ex. 8 at § 4.) RHTC breached the Loan Agreements, as amended, by failing to make the payment due on August 30, 2020 under the April 2020 Agreement, the payment due on May 31, 2021 under the November 2020 Agreement, as amended on April 1, 2021, and the payment due on May 31, 2021 under the February 2021 Agreement. (Kramer Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1 at § 2(a); ¶ 12 & Ex. 7; ¶ 14 & Ex. 8 at § 2(i); ¶ 18.)

 

RHTC failed to pay amounts due under the agreements, purportedly totaling $877,233.45. (Kramer Decl. ¶¶ 18, 20; Shackelford Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 10.) However, plaintiffs compounded interest in calculating the amount owed. (See Shackelford Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 10 [interest accrued during each full year after maturity date added to balance; interest for following year based on sum of principal and interest from previous year].) “[I]n the computation of interest upon any bond, note, or other instrument or agreement, interest shall not be compounded, nor shall the interest thereon be construed to bear interest unless an agreement to that effect is clearly expressed in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith….” (Civ. Code § 1916-2.)

 

The Loan Agreements do not expressly provide for compound interest. They only state the applicable interest rate before and after default. (Kramer Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1 at §§ 2(a), 5; ¶ 8 & Ex. 3 at §§ 2(a), 5; ¶ 14 & Ex. 8 at §§ 2(a), 6.) Because the interest as calculated by plaintiffs violates Civil Code § 1916-2, the Court subtracts from the proposed amount to be attached the interest from the ending balances for each of the Loan Agreements. (April 2020 Agreement [$270,664.47 - $200,000 = $70,664.47]; November 2020 Agreement [$387,252.92 - $315,000 = $72,252,92]; February 2021 Agreement [$184,406.15 - $150,000 = $43,306.15]; $70,664.47 + $72,252.92 + $34,406.15 = $177,323.54 to be subtracted.)

 

With respect to attorney fees, the Loan Agreements provide for attorney fees in connection with the enforcement of rights under the agreements. (Kramer Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1 at § 7; ¶ 8 & Ex. 3 at § 8; ¶ 14 & Ex. 8 at § 9.) Plaintiffs claim fees in the amount of $32,970, with a 10% annual interest rate applied. (Shackelford Decl. ¶ 3.) However, the Loan Agreements do not expressly provide for interest to be calculated for attorney fees, only on the principal. (Compare Kramer Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1 at §§ 2(a), 5; ¶ 8 & Ex. 3 at §§ 2(a), 5; ¶ 14 & Ex. 8 at §§ 2(a), 6.) Plaintiffs do not explain how much of the $32,970 claimed is interest. Accordingly, the Court subtracts $32,970.00 from the amount to be attached as proposed by plaintiffs.

 

With respect to costs, plaintiffs do not break down its claimed costs of $1,939.91. The filing fee for the Complaint is $435.00. The filing fees for two applications for right to attach orders is $120.00. Accordingly, the Court subtracts $1,384.91, the difference of $1,939.91 claimed by plaintiffs and the $555.00 for the aforementioned filing fees, from the amount to be attached as proposed by plaintiffs.

 

The applications with respect to RHTC and Dunphy are GRANTED IN PART in the amount of $665,555.00. ($877,233.45 proposed by plaintiffs - $177,323.54 interest - $32,970.00 fees - $1,384.91 costs).

 

The Court notes that RHTC and Dunphy were served the summons, First Amended Complaint, and moving papers at non-California addresses. The Court cannot attach property that is located out of state. (See Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1108 [“But, of course, a California court lacks jurisdiction to command a sheriff, marshal, or constable in Florida or New Jersey to levy a California writ of attachment on a New Jersey company or a Florida bank”].) To the extent that plaintiffs can locate property of RHTC and Dunphy that is in California, plaintiffs are entitled to attempt to attach such property. (See, e.g., Pacific Decision, 121 Cal.App.4th at 1108 [intangibles have no physical characteristics that serve as basis to assign them to locality]; CCP § 481.115, citing Comm. Code § 9102(a)(42) [defining “general intangibles” to include money and payment intangibles].)

 

By no later than 12/9/23, plaintiffs are ordered to file proposed right to attach orders for defendants RHTC and Dunphy in accordance with this ruling.

 

The Writs as to RHTC and Dunphy shall issue upon the posting of two separate bonds in the amount of $10,000 each for the two defendants. (CCP §489.220.)

 

Plaintiffs also seek a temporary protective order pursuant to CCP § 486.010 et seq. preventing defendants from “transfer[ing], directly or indirectly, any interest in” their property that is subject to attachment. (Proposed Orders at ¶¶ 2(i), 3(a).) Temporary protective orders may issue if plaintiffs “will suffer great or irreparable injury (within the meaning of Section 485.010) if the temporary protective order is not issued.” (CCP § 486.020.) Arguably, “there is a danger that the property sought to be attached would be concealed, substantially impaired in value, or otherwise made unavailable to levy,” as set forth in CCP § 485.010(b)(1) because RHTC has an approximate $1.3 million judgment and an approximate $13,000 judgment against it. (Shackleford Decl. ¶ 6.) However, the proposed temporary protective orders do not account for any priority that these judgments may have. Considering that the amounts at issue in this action have not been reduced to judgment, it would not be in the interest of justice to issue the temporary protective orders as proposed. (CCP § 486.040.) The writs of attachment sought by plaintiffs sufficiently protect their interests.