Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 23STCV23660, Date: 2024-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV23660    Hearing Date: September 19, 2024    Dept: 86

APPLICATIONS (2)

FOR RIGHT TO ATTACH ORDER

Date:               9/19/24 (1:30 PM)

Case:                           Teichman Enterprises, Inc. v. 4Front California Capital Holdings, Inc. et al. (23STCV23660)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff Teichman Enterprises, Inc.’s Renewed Applications for Right to Attach Orders Against: (1) 4Front California Capital Holdings, Inc.; and (2) 4Front Ventures Corporation, Inc. are DENIED.

On 3/21/24, the Court heard plaintiff’s applications for right to attach orders against defendants 4Front California Capital Holdings, Inc. and 4Front Ventures Corporation, Inc. The Court denied the applications because plaintiff did not set forth the basis on which it calculated the proposed amount of attachment. Plaintiff now files renewed applications against the same defendants setting forth how it calculated the $2,923,293.62 it proposes to be attached.  

CCP § 1008(b) allows a party to file a renewed motion “upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (CCP § 1008(b).) The supporting affidavit must show “what ‘new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed’ [citation] to justify the renewed application, and show diligence with a satisfactory explanation for not presenting the new or different information earlier.” (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 833, citing CCP § 1008(b).)

The renewed applications do not comport with the requirements of CCP § 1008(b). The supporting declaration makes no reference to the prior applications, nor the order made thereon. (See generally Teichman Decl.) The supporting declaration also does not state what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. The Master Lease (dated 12/1/18), Addendum to the Master Lease (dated 1/17/19), Escrow Agreement (dated 1/28/19), Expansion Amendment (dated 3/21/19), First Amendment to the Master Lease (dated 5/22/20), and Second Amendment to the Master Lease (dated 5/10/23), pursuant to which plaintiff calculated the amount owed by defendants, existed prior to the hearing on plaintiff’s previous applications. (See Teichman Decl. ¶¶ 4-36 & Exs. 1-6; Memo. at 3:18-4:19 [table showing calculation of proposed amount of attachment].) Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction under CCP § 1008(b) to reconsider the denial of the prior right to attach applications. (See CCP § 1008(e) [“This section specifies the court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final”].)

Even if the Court had jurisdiction to hear a renewed motion, whether to grant the motion would still be within the Court’s discretion. (Film Packages, Inc. v. Brandywine Film Productions, Ltd. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 824, 830.) Because petitioner’s counsel does not provide any reason why the failure to explain how it calculated its proposed amount of attachment in the prior applications was excusable, the Court would decline to exercise such discretion. Unlike, for example, the second application for a right to attach order in Film Packages, where the applicant presented transcripts of depositions taken after the prior attachment hearing (Film Packages, 193 Cal.App.3d at 829), the information plaintiff finally presents to this Court to establish the requested amount of attachment in the renewed application was readily available when

plaintiff made the prior failed applications. When denying the prior applications, the Court explained:

“[I]t is plaintiff’s burden to set forth the basis on which its damages can be computed. Instead, plaintiff merely states in conclusory fashion the amount off unpaid rent and license fees without reference to the contract or any meaningful computation from which this Court could determine to what attachment, if any, plaintiff may be entitled.”

(3/21/24 Ruling at 4.)  Plaintiff cannot return six-months later with neither acknowledgment nor explanation of the prior shortcomings and why plaintiff is entitled to a second opportunity.

The applications are DENIED.