Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCP00050, Date: 2025-02-20 Tentative Ruling
24STCP02299 Luchia Tsegaberhan
The Petition will be granted. A copy of the signed decree will be available in Room 112 of the clerk’s office seven days after the date of the hearing.
Case Number: 24STCP00050 Hearing Date: February 20, 2025 Dept: 86
DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
Date: 2/20/25 (1:30 PM)
Case: Eric Pelton v. County of Los Angeles et al. (24STCP00050)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Respondent County of Los Angeles’ Demurrer to First Amended Petition
for Writ of Mandate is SUSTAINED.
Respondent’s requests to take judicial notice of the Los
Angeles County Charter and the Civil Service Rules of the County of Los Angeles
are GRANTED. (Morgado v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 1, 13, fn. 8 [court must take judicial notice of county and city
charters]; Olson v. County of Sacramento (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d
958, 964 [taking judicial notice of civil service commission rules].)
Petitioner Eric Pelton seeks a writ of mandate directing
respondent Civil Service Commission (“Commission”) to set aside the dismissal
of his appeal. (FAP ¶ 6; Prayer ¶¶ 1, 2.) In March 2022, while his appeal was
pending, petitioner retired. (FAP ¶ 1.) On October 4, 2023, the Commission
dismissed the appeal, finding it had lost jurisdiction due to Pelton’s
retirement in March 2022. (FAP ¶ 6.)
Petitioner’s retirement while his appeal before the Commission was pending
divested the Commission of jurisdiction. “A civil service commission created by
charter has only the special and limited jurisdiction expressly authorized by
the charter.” (Zuniga v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1259, quoting Hunter v. Los Angeles County Civil
Service Com. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 191, 194.) Under the Los Angeles
County Charter, which applies in this case, once an employee voluntarily
separates from service, the Civil Service Commission is without jurisdiction to
adjudicate the merits of any appeal. (Zuniga, 137 Cal.App.4th at
1261.) This is the case even if the employee was a current employee at the time
of the appeal. (Ibid.; see also County of Los
Angeles Dept. of Health Services v. Civil Service Com. of County of Los Angeles (Latham)
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 391, 401 [“Zuniga stands for the bright line
proposition that, where an employee retires during the pendency of a civil service
appeal, her future status as an employee by definition is no longer at issue….
[T]he Commission has authority to address only matters involving a member of
the civil service, and a person who has retired is no longer a member of the
civil service”].)
Relying on Hudson v. County of Los Angeles (2014)
232 Cal.App.4th 392, petitioner contends that the Zuniga rule
does not apply due to purported “exigent circumstances.” (FAP ¶ 5.) Hudson does
not set forth any exception from the Zuniga rule based on
“exigent circumstances.” In Hudson, pending an appeal from
discharge from employment, the public retirement system granted the employee
deputy sheriff a disability retirement and she withdrew her contributions after
having been told that she was ineligible due to lack of the required numbers of
years of service. (Hudson, 232 Cal.App.4th at 396-97.) The Court of
Appeal found that the bright line rule of Zuniga and Latham did
not apply under the circumstances presented in that case, including the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department initiating the employee’s disability
retirement, the Commission ordering the employment restored, the Sheriff’s
Department agreeing and returning the plaintiff to work in an unsworn position
pending her appeal, the plaintiff actively seeking the public retirement system
Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association’s (“LACERA”) reevaluation
of its finding of disability so that she could return to work, and LACERA’s
refusal to reevaluate the disability on the ground that the plaintiff was no
longer a member after having already withdrawn her retirement contributions. (Id. at
396-99, 406.) Because the plaintiff’s status as an employee was at issue, the
Court of Appeal declined to apply the Zuniga/Latham rule. (Id. at
413.)
Here, there is no allegation in the First Amended Petition
that petitioner’s status as an employee was at issue. There is no allegation
that the Department of Parks and Recreation (“DPR”), petitioner’s employer, or
the Commission ever gave any indication that petitioner could return to
employment. Rather, the DPR terminated petitioner’s employer for not having
registered with Fulgent Genetics and having vaccinated against COVID-19. (FAP
¶¶ 1, 8.) While petitioner’s appeal was pending, he retired “[d]ue to exigent
and financial circumstances.” (FAP ¶ 1.) While the employee in Hudson had
withdrawn her retirement contributions due to economic need (Hudson, 232
Cal.App.4th at 397), the Hudson court in no way indicated that
economic need would allow the Commission to retain jurisdiction of an appeal
when the employee has retired. (Deiro v. Los Angeles County Civil Service
Commission (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 925, 933.) “The essence of the Zuniga/Latham rule
is that a plaintiff's future status as an employee is not at issue after he has
retired. In the ordinary case, this is…true…of retirees who choose to retire
after years of service: their future status as employees is not at issue,
unless they or their former employer choose to place it in issue.” (Id. at
934.) “The existence of a case like Hudson…does not change the
general rule. It is the exception, on egregious facts—and it was clear
throughout the long saga that the plaintiff's future status as an employee was
at issue.” (Ibid.) There are no egregious facts alleged here. This is a
straightforward case where the Commission had “no authority to order
reinstatement or any other relief to a retired person whose future status as an
employee is not at issue.” (Id. at 927.)
Petitioner alleges that he “was encouraged to retire…to
procure a minimal retirement benefit…with the explicit understanding that said
application would not impact [his] ability to be restored to service through
the Civil Service Commission processes, upon prevailing at hearing.” (FAP ¶ 1.)
“An employee who claims that a resignation has been obtained by duress, fraud,
or undue influence, may appeal to the director of personnel, setting forth in
writing the facts substantiating the allegation, within 10 business days of the
acceptance of the resignation by the appointing power.” (RJN Ex. 2 at 117
[Civil Service Rule 18.09].) To the extent that petitioner contends that his
retirement was obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence, petitioner has
not alleged that he appealed the acceptance of his retirement. Accordingly,
petitioner cannot argue that his resignation and retirement is void.
Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of his appeal
constitutes a denial of due process and that he was wrongfully terminated for
refusing to get vaccinated against COVID-19 despite being entitled to a
religious and medical exemption. (FAP ¶¶ 6, 8, 12.) In the First Amended
Petition, petitioner newly alleges that, by failing to adjudicate his appeal,
the Commission is preventing petitioner from clearing his name and being
reinstated as a permanent employee or as a temporary employee for a 120-day
period. (FAP ¶¶ 13, 14.)
These new allegations do not address the lack of
jurisdiction of the Commission that resulted from petitioner’s retirement. Regardless
of the validity of petitioner’s arguments, the Commission is unable to
adjudicate their merit because petitioner chose to retire. Petitioner cites no
authority demonstrating how the possibility of reinstatement remedies the
Commission’s lack of jurisdiction.
The other cases on which petitioner relies are unavailing
because jurisdiction was defined under rules other than the Los Angeles County
charter and civil service rules at issue here. (Cf. SEIU, Local 1021 v.
County of San Joaquin (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 449 [Memorandum of
Understanding between county and union]; Hughes vs. County of San
Bernardino (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 542 [San Bernardino County personnel
rules]; Hall-Villareal vs. City of Fresno (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 24 [Fresno City Charter].)
Because the Court finds the Commission lost jurisdiction,
petitioner fails to allege in his second cause of action that there was a
prejudicial abuse of discretion, denial of a fair trial, or conduct without or
in excess of jurisdiction that would warrant administrative mandamus under CCP
§ 1094.5 arising from the Commission’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal.
Relatedly, because the Commission had no jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s
appeal, petitioner fails to state a ministerial duty to support his claim for
traditional mandamus under CCP § 1085 in his first cause of action.
The demurrer is SUSTAINED in its entirety. The Court
previously sustained respondent’s demurrer to the initially filed Petition
based on a jurisdictional defect with leave to amend. (7/25/24 Minute Order.) For
the reasons stated above, petitioner has failed to remedy the jurisdictional
defect despite previously having been given leave to amend in order to do so.
Accordingly, further leave to amend is DENIED.
By no later than 2/27/25, respondent County of Los Angeles
shall submit a proposed judgment of dismissal.