Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case Number: 24STCP00143, Date: 2024-05-24 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Global Education Collaborative seeks a writ of mandate compelling respondent Los Angeles Unified School District to accept its facilities request and prepare a proposal of facilities to be offered to Global Education Academy for the 2024-25 school year.

In enacting the Charter Schools Act of 1992 (Ed. Code § 47600, et seq.),[1] the Legislature intended “to provide opportunities for teachers, parents, pupils, and community members to establish and maintain schools that operate independently from the existing school district structure.” (§ 47601.) “Charter schools are public schools ‘free from most state laws pertaining uniquely to school districts.’ [Citation.] The freedom granted to charter schools is intended to promote choice and innovation, and to stimulate ‘competition within the public school system.’ [Citation.]” (California Charter Schools Assn. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1221, 1228 [“Cal. Charter Schools Assn.”].)

Prior to the enactment of Proposition 39 by California voters in 2000, due to limited public funding to cover the cost of facilities, charter schools could use facilities which were not currently being used by the districts. (Id. at 1226, 1228.) Proposition 39 amended section 47614 and changed the way charter schools may obtain access to district facilities. (Id. at 1228.) Section 47614 provides, in relevant part:

(a) The intent of the people in amending Section 47614 is that public school facilities should be shared fairly among all public school pupils, including those in charter schools.

(b) Each school district shall make available, to each charter school operating in the school district, facilities sufficient for the charter school to accommodate all of the charter school’s in-district students in conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would be accommodated if they were attending other public schools of the district.

Charter schools seeking to use district facilities are required to provide the district “with a reasonable projection of the charter school’s average daily classroom attendance by in-district students for the following year” on an annual basis. (§ 47614(b)(2).)

The State Board of Education subsequently issued regulations governing the implementation of section 47614. (5 C.C.R. §§ 11969.1-11969.10.) Under regulation 11969.9(b), “[t]o receive facilities during a particular fiscal year, a charter school must submit a written facilities request to the school district on or before November 1 of the preceding fiscal year.” “School districts may require the charter school to submit its facilities request…on a form available from the [California Department of Education] and developed in consultation with the Advisory Commission on Charter Schools (ACCS) or another form specified by the school district.” (5 C.C.R. § 11969.9(c)(3).) The district then has until December 1 to object in writing and state the projects it considers reasonable. (Id. § 11969.9(d).) The charter school then has until January 2 to respond to the district. (Id. § 11969.9(e).)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court, the procedure after submission of a facilities request is as follows:

By the following February 1, the school district receiving the request must make a preliminary space allocation proposal that “[at] a minimum” “shall include (1) the projections of in-district classroom [average daily attendance] on which the proposal is based, (2) the specific location or locations of the space, (3) all conditions pertaining to the space, including a draft of any proposed agreement pertaining to the charter school's use of the space, and (4) the projected pro rata share amount and a description of the methodology used to determine that amount. The district shall also provide the charter school a list and description of the comparison group schools used in developing its preliminary proposal, and a description of the differences between the preliminary proposal and the charter school’s facilities request....” [Citation.] After the charter school has had an opportunity to respond to the proposal, the district must make a final space offer to the charter school by April 1, and the charter school must notify the District whether it accepts the offer within 30 days or by May 1, whichever is later. [Citation.]

Petitioner Global Education Collaborative operates a charter school known as Global Education Academy (“GEA”). (Lee Decl. ¶ 1.) GEA has been operating as a charter school authorized by respondent Los Angeles Unified School District (“District” or “LAUSD”) since 2007 and serves approximately 350 primarily low-income students in grades TK through eight within the geographic boundaries of the District. (Lee Decl. ¶ 2; Pet. ¶ 23.)[2] The California Department of Education recently designated GEA a “high performing” school ranking in the top 10% of charter schools statewide and the top 8% in the District. (Lee Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. 1 at GEA 1.)

GEA was originally chartered to instruct students in kindergarten through fifth grade but was later expanded to include grades six through eight in 2018. (Pet. ¶ 24.) To accommodate the middle school grades, GEA began making use of Proposition 39 facilities in 2020 and currently uses facility space at the nearby District-operated high school site, Manual Arts Senior High School. (Lee Decl. ¶ 5; Pet. ¶ 24.) GEA currently uses seven classrooms, two special education rooms, and one administrative “office” classroom at the Manual Arts campus. (Lee Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 2 at GEA 57, Ex. 3 at GEA 104.) GEA wishes to continue using the same classrooms in the 2024-25 school year that it is using in the 2023-24 school year, as was stated in the facilities request at issue in this case. (Lee Decl. ¶¶ 5, 10 & Ex. 6 at GEA 179.)

To standardize and help process annual Proposition 39 facilities requests, the District developed an online Proposition 39 facilities request portal for charter schools to submit their Proposition 39 facilities request forms to the District. (Hwang Decl., ¶ 9.) According to the District, the online portal has worked for years to successfully receive and process hundreds of Proposition 39 facilities request forms. (Hwang Decl. ¶ 13; Otto Decl. ¶ 31.) Apart from GEA’s allegations in this lawsuit, LAUSD purportedly has never received any reported failures, glitches, or related problems with the operation of its online Proposition 39 facilities request portal. (Hwang Decl. ¶ 13; Otto Decl. ¶ 31.)

To submit a facilities request, users of the portal register themselves to obtain a login username and password credentials. (Otto Decl. ¶ 5.) After registering and logging in to the District’s online portal, and up until the submission deadline, the user will be able to view any “in progress” or “submitted” Proposition 39 facilities request forms. (Otto Decl. ¶ 6.) A link is also available to begin a new Proposition 39 facilities request. (Otto Decl. ¶ 6.) When a charter school commences a new Proposition 39 facilities request process, the District’s online portal automatically produces a pop-up window detailing instructions applicable to the submission of a facilities request form. (Otto Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. I.)

After acknowledging the instructions, the user is taken to an online form, which includes several sections requesting information pertaining to a charter school’s Proposition 39 facilities request. (Otto Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, 13 & Ex. J.) The form does not need to be completed in a single sitting and information entered into the online form, as well as any uploaded documents, can be saved by the user. (Otto Decl. ¶ 10.) This allows the user an opportunity to work on an “in progress” request, stop, log out, and log back in at a later date and/or time to continue entering information and/or edit any existing information or uploaded documents. (Otto Decl. ¶ 10.) The online facilities request form states: “The District is not responsible for any difficulties charter schools may have in navigating or submitting the Online Facilities Request Form.” (Otto Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. J at LAUSD 13590.)

After a charter school user has finished entering or editing information and uploading documents to the form, the user must scroll to the bottom of the online form and check a box affirming that the information added is true and accurate. (Otto Decl. ¶ 11.) Finally, the charter school user must click the “Submit Facilities Request Form” button. (Otto Decl. ¶ 12.) A charter school user may submit a Proposition 39 facilities request form for the following school year any time on or before November 1 at 11:59:59 p.m. (Otto Decl., ¶ 13.)

The District offers workshops and publishes “how-to” guides on how to navigate the portal. (Lee Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 4 at GEA 162, Ex. 5 at GEA 163-70.) The District provides emailed instructions explaining how to submit a Proposition 39 facilities request form to charter schools, regular virtual workshops to walk through the process, and online office hours to answer any questions. (Hwang Decl., ¶¶ 21, 22, 25; Exs. C, D.)

D. GEA’s Experience with Proposition 39 Facilities Requests Prior to Request for 2024-25 School Year

Until the 2024-25 school year, GEA submitted a Proposition 39 facilities request form through the District’s online portal every year since it first requested facilities for the 2019-20 school year (except for the 2023-24 school year).[3] (Hwang Decl., ¶¶ 18-20 & Ex. B.) GEA’s Principal Linda Lee submitted GEA’s facilities request forms for each of those school years. (Otto Decl. ¶¶ 25-26 & Ex. N.) At her deposition, Lee acknowledged that she did not have difficulty with any step of the entire facilities request process, nor any problems submitting requests, in prior years on behalf of GEA. (Yeomans Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. P at 19:8-15, 21:20-24:9, 28:17-36:15.) Lee understood that she was required to click the “Submit” button to transmit GEA’s facilities request form to LAUSD and have the facilities request processed. (Yeomans Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. P at 34:12-36:15.)

With respect to the 2024-25 school year, by November 1, 2023, GEA’s Principal Linda Lee had input, uploaded, and saved all of GEA’s Proposition 39 information responses and documentary support into the District’s facilities request portal. (Lee Decl. ¶ 10.) However, the District maintains it did not receive a Proposition 39 facilities request form from GEA for the 2024-25 school year by the November 1, 2023 deadline. (Hwang Decl., ¶ 27; Otto Decl., ¶¶ 23 & 28-32; 5 C.C.R. § 11969.9(b).)

Lee testified during deposition that she remembers clicking the button to submit her facilities request. (Colomba Supp. Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 27 at 8:9-59:22.) Though Lee thought she had submitted the facilities request, Lee could not confirm whether the District’s system accepted the request. (Lee Decl. ¶ 11.) Lee alerted District staff to the issue by email on November 2, 2023 at 7:47 a.m. (Lee Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. 10 at GEA 195.) Lee wrote: “I thought I had submitted our Prop 39 facilities request yesterday, but I don’t think it went through. I tried to check this morning and it says that I can’t access the application/website. [¶] This was truly an honest mistake, and one that has never been made before on our end. All the documents are uploaded and the application is completed. Is it possible to accept our prop 39 application for the 2024-25 school year?” (Lee Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. 10 at GEA 195; see also Hwang Decl. ¶ 33 & Ex. F [same email].)

Lee also telephoned the District. (Pawinski Decl. ¶¶ 8, 9.) According to the District, Lee acknowledged that she did not submit GEA’s facilities request form for the 2024-25 school year. (Pawinski Decl. ¶¶ 8-10; Exh. G.) Lee purportedly never claimed to have submitted GEA’s facilities request, or that there was any issue or glitch with the District’s portal. (Pawinski Decl. ¶ 9.) Lee also purportedly did not express any confusion about what had happened, although she was very upset. (Pawinski Decl. ¶ 9.) After Lee’s telephone call, Lee sent an email identically worded to the email she had sent earlier to additional District staff at 7:58 a.m. (Lee Decl. ¶ 12 & Ex. 11 at GEA 196.)

The District did not provide the confirmation requested by Lee. (Lee Decl. ¶ 12.) On November 2, 2023, at 3:48 p.m., the District’s Proposition 39 email address responded that Lee’s email was received and that the District would review the communication. (Lee Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. 10 at GEA 195.) The District did not substantively respond for several weeks. (Lee Decl. ¶ 13.) Out of an abundance of caution, on November 22, 2023, GEA sent by email to the District all of the documents and questionnaire responses comprising its facilities request, as they were uploaded on November 1.[4] (Lee Decl. ¶¶ 13, 14 & Ex. 12 at GEA 197-98, Ex. 13 at GEA 200.)

Global Education Academy (“Charter School”) did not submit a written facilities request for the 2024-25 school year to the Los Angeles Unified School District (“District”) on or before November 1, 2023, and therefore, failed to comply with the requirements of California Code of Regulations, title 5, section 11969.9, subdivisions (b) and (c)(3). As such, Charter School is not entitled to be allocated and/or provided access to facilities by the District for the 2024-25 school year pursuant to Proposition 39.

(Lee Decl. ¶¶ 15, 16 & Ex. 14 at GEA 201.) The District stated it had no duty under 5 C.C.R § 11969(d) to respond to GEA’s Proposition 39 request. The District then asserted a reservation of its rights to evaluate the reasonability of GEA’s request per section 11969.9(d). Finally, the District claimed that, even if GEA’s request should later be found valid, the District would still not allocate any facilities to GEA, because in that case the District would allocate facilities to accommodate “0.00” daily classroom attendance. (Lee Decl. ¶ 15 & Ex. 14 at GEA 201.)

F. GEA’s Contentions Regarding Consequences if Facilities Request Not Processed

If GEA cannot continue using the public school facilities it currently occupies, GEA contends there is a substantial risk it will have to close its sixth through eighth grade classes. (Lee Decl. ¶¶ 19-20.) GEA has worked with a charter school property development firm, a real estate broker, and the California Charter School Association to find other facilities. (Lee Decl. ¶ 20.) Despite these efforts, GEA has been unable to find any suitable replacement school site. (Lee Decl., ¶ 20; Pet. ¶ 42.) As a result, GEA contends it likely will have to close its sixth through eighth grade classes, terminate over 20 employees, and disenroll 150 middle school students. (Lee Decl. ¶¶ 19-20.)

On January 16, 2014, petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate. No answer has been filed. On April 2, 2024, petitioner filed an opening brief. On April 23, 2024, respondent filed an opposition. On May 7, 2024, petitioner filed a reply.

The Court has received a lodged hard copy of a joint appendix containing exhibits attached to declarations filed in support of the opening brief, opposition, and reply. The Court has also received a USB drive containing the exhibits cited in support of the papers.

CCP § 1085(a) provides: “A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded by that inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person.”

“There are two essential requirements to the issuance of a traditional writ of mandate: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty.” (California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “An action in ordinary mandamus is proper where…the claim is that an agency has failed to act as required by law.” (Id. at 705.)

“When a party seeks review of an administrative decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, judicial review is limited to examining the agency proceedings to ascertain whether the agency’s action has been arbitrary, capricious or lacking entirely in evidentiary support, or whether the agency failed to follow the proper procedure and give notices required by law. And, where the case involves the interpretation of a statute or ordinance, our review of the trial court’s decision is de novo.” (Ideal Boat & Camper Storage v. County of Alameda (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 301, 311, citing Pomona Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Pomona (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 578, 584.) In independently reviewing legal questions, “[a]n administrative agency’s interpretation does not bind judicial review but it is entitled to consideration and respect.” (Housing Partners I, Inc. v. Duncan (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1343.)

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) In a CCP § 1085 writ petition, the petitioner generally bears the burden of proof. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.)

Respondent District’s request to take judicial notice of the California State Board of Education’s Final Statement of Reasons with respect to Proposition 39 regulations is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452(c); Ochoa v. Anaheim City School Dist. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 209, 221 [taking judicial notice of State Board of Education’s agenda, minutes, and “Final Statement of Reasons” for adoption of regulations].)

Petitioner argues that the District’s requirement that charter schools submit facilities requests through an online submission portal is preempted by the regulations promulgated by the State Board of Education to implement Proposition 39. Petitioner contends that the state regulations did not impose any single method by which charter schools must submit their facilities requests. The Court disagrees.

“‘Under article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, ‘[a] county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.’ If otherwise valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void. A conflict exists if the local legislation duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication. Local legislation is ‘duplicative’ of general law when it is coextensive therewith. Similarly, local legislation is ‘contradictory’ to general law when it is inimical thereto. Finally, local legislation enters an area that is ‘fully occupied’ by general law when the Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to ‘fully occupy’ the area, or when it has impliedly done so in light of one of the following indicia of intent:’….” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Carlsbad (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 785, 792-793, quoting Sherwin–Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 897–98.)

With respect to education, the Legislature is charged with determining and forming policy and fixing a primary standard. (Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1146.) Afterward, the Legislature may “confer upon executive or administrative officers the ‘power to fill up the details’ by prescribing administrative rules and regulations to promote the purposes of the legislation and to carry it into effect.” (Ibid., quoting State Bd. of Education v. Honig (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 720, 750 [Honig].) “In the educational setting, legislatures rarely control public school operations directly, but delegate authority which permits state, regional, and local education agencies to establish school policies and practices.” (Honig, 13 Cal.App.4th at 750.)

Petitioner is correct that section 47614 sets forth a policy that school districts share their facilities with charter schools “in conditions reasonably equivalent to those in which the students would be accommodated if they were attending other public schools of the district.” (§ 47614(b); see Reply at 10:23-27.) Section 47614 states explicitly that “[t]he school district shall make reasonable efforts to provide the charter school with facilities near to where the charter school wishes to locate, and shall not move the charter school unnecessarily.” (§ 47614(b).)

But, having determined and formed its policy regarding charter schools and fixed a primary standard, the Legislature permissibly delegated the establishment of policies and practices regarding the review of facilities requests under Proposition 39 down to the District. The Legislature delegated the task of defining the procedures and establishing the timelines for the request of facilities to the State Board of Education. (§ 47614(b)(6).) In turn, the State Board of Education expressly allowed school districts to mandate forms by which charter schools are to submit their facilities requests. Regulation 11969.9 states: “School districts may require the charter school to submit its facilities request containing the information specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) on a form available from the [California Department of Education] and developed in consultation with the Advisory Commission on Charter Schools (ACCS) or another form specified by the school district.” (5 C.C.R. § 11969.9(c)(3), emphasis added; see also § 35160.1(a), (c) [school districts “should have the flexibility to create their own unique solutions,” as they “have diverse needs unique to their individual communities and programs”].)

The District’s requirement for charter schools to submit their facilities requests through the District’s portal neither duplicates nor contradicts Proposition 39 regulations. Nor has the Legislature expressed any intent to fully “occupy the area” of submission of facilities requests. The Court thus concludes that the District’s use of a submission portal is not preempted by state law.

As stated above, the Legislature charged the State Board of Education with establishing the timelines for Proposition 39 facilities requests. Regulation 11969.9(b) states: “To receive facilities during a particular fiscal year, a charter school must submit a written facilities request to the school district on or before November 1 of the preceding fiscal year.” (5 C.C.R. § 11969.9(b).)

Lee avers that, on November 1, 2023, she finalized, entered, and uploaded GEA’s facility request to the online portal. (Lee Decl. ¶ 10.) Lee further avers that she thought she had submitted the request on November 1, 2023. (Lee Decl. ¶ 11.)

Petitioner contends that merely uploading the facilities request on November 1 should be deemed the same as actually submitting such request. (Reply at 2:18-19.) The Court disagrees. Regulation 11969.9(b) does not define “submit.” (See 5 C.C.R. § 11969.2 [definitions governing charter school facilities do not include “submit”].) The Court therefore looks to dictionary definitions for the usual and ordinary meaning of “submit.” (People v. Killian (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 191, 212.)

Merriam-Webster defines “submit” to mean “to present or propose to another for review, consideration, or decision.”[5] (See Merriam-Webster, definition of “submit,” located at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/submit.) As section 47614(b)(6) requires the adoption of regulations governing the procedures and timelines for the “request” of facilities, it makes sense that submitting a facilities request must be a method by which the charter school transmits or conveys its request for the District’s actual review, consideration, and decision. (See 5 C.C.R. § 11969.9(d) [“The school district shall review the charter school's projections of in-district and total ADA and in-district and total classroom ADA and, on or before December 1, express any objections in writing and state the projections the district considers reasonable”].)

This interpretation of “submit” is consistent with the instructions provided by the District. The “Submission Instructions” for the online facilities request form instructs the charter school user to complete each section and attach all required and supporting documents. (Otto Decl. ¶¶ 7, 13 & Exs. I at LAUSD 13589, J at LAUSD 13590.) The user must then check a box affirming that the information provided by the charter school is true and accurate. (Otto Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. J at LAUSD 13597.) The user must then click the “Submit Online Facilities Request Form” button. (Otto Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12, 13 & Exs. I at LAUSD 13589, J at LAUSD 13590.) Otherwise, the request remains “in progress.” (Otto Decl. ¶ 14.) A request that is still “in progress” because it has not been submitted is not distributed to the District’s Charter Schools Division. (Otto Decl. ¶ 14.)

The District’s records reflect that GEA initiated a facilities request form on October 9, 2023 for the 2024-25 school year but that the request remained “in progress.” (Otto Decl. ¶ 27 & Ex. B at LAUSD 152.) This is in contrast to GEA’s requests in 2018 through 2022—corresponding to the 2019-20, 2020-21, 2021-22, 2022-23, and 2023-24 school years—which the District reflects as having actually been “submitted.” (Ibid.) It therefore appears that GEA did not, in fact, submit a facilities request form for the 2024-25 school year.

Further, it was no surprise to Lee that she needed to take action to actually submit the application. When Lee was asked during her deposition whether she understood that by not clicking the “Submit Online Facilities Request Form” button the District would not process the facilities request, Lee said, “Yes.” (Yeomans Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. P at 34:4-36:15.) Prior to Lee’s attempt to request facilities for the 2024-25 school year, Lee used the online portal to submit facilities requests on October 23, 2018; November 1, 2019; October 31, 2020; and November 1, 2021. (Hwang Decl. ¶¶ 18, 20; Otto Decl. ¶¶ 26, 27 & Ex. B at LAUSD 152.) Lee had no difficulties submitting facilities requests during those years. (Yeomans Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. P at 19:8-15, 21:20-24:9, 28:17-36:15.)

In the reply, petitioner refers to a facilities request form completed by GEA for the 2024-25 school year, which the District provided in discovery. (Colomba Supp. Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 23 at GEA 277-85.) Even if it is true the District had possession of GEA’s facilities request, the District’s records reflect that any such request was never submitted by GEA for the District’s consideration. Indeed, when a request form is submitted through the District’s portal, an automated email confirming the date and time of submission is immediately generated and sent to the charter school user. (Otto Decl. ¶ 19 & Ex. M at LAUSD 13626.) Petitioner has not referred the Court to any confirming email evidencing GEA’s timely submission of a facilities request.

Petitioner also posits that, if the portal did not register GEA’s facilities request as having been submitted, there must then be a “substantial likelihood” that the portal malfunctioned, as opposed to user error in the submission process. (Reply at 5:14-25.) This is pure speculation. The only asserted basis for this supposition is the fact that the portal was inoperative for requests for the 2023-24 school year. (Hwang Decl. ¶ 19.) However, the systemwide network security issues that caused the District to accept requests by email for that school year does not indicate (let alone establish a “substantial likelihood”) that there was technical problem for the 2024-25 school year. In the absence of any other evidence of malfunction, petitioner argues that the District “has [no]t done much at all to conclusively rule out the possibility of a system malfunction….” (Reply at 5:19-21.) But petitioner bears the burden of proof in demonstrating that GEA submitted a facilities request that the District was obligated to consider. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn., 10 Cal.4th at 1154.) Petitioner has not satisfied that burden. Instead, the Court is left with the District’s uncontradicted averment that the portal has worked for years without failures or glitches and that it was not notified of any technical issues, glitches, shut-downs, or other errors associated with the District’s portal in November 2023, when Lee attempted to submit the facilities request. (Otto Decl. ¶¶ 21, 30, 31.) The Court has no basis to doubt these averments.

Finally, petitioner argues that, even if the GEA facilities request was not actually submitted, it has substantially complied with the legal requirements of Proposition 39. “Substantial compliance…means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.” (Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman (1962) 58 Cal.2d 23, 29.) “When there is such actual compliance as to all matters of substance then mere technical imperfections of form or variations in mode of expression…or such minima as obvious typographical errors, should not be given the stature of noncompliance….” (Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman (1962) 58 Cal.2d 23, 29, superseded by statute on other grounds.) This is not a case where the doctrine of substantial compliance is applicable. GEA’s failure to submit the facilities request is far from an imperfection of form, variation in expression, or typographical error. Rather, like preparing an application but failing to deposit the application in the mailbox to be delivered to the reviewing entity, GEA failed to submit the request to the District. GEA simply failed to trigger any duty by the District to consider its request.

In sum, the State Board of Education allowed the District to specify the form under which facilities requests are to be submitted. (5 C.C.R. § 11969.9(c)(3).) The District required requests to be submitted, not just uploaded, through its online portal. (Hwang Decl. ¶ 9; Otto Decl. ¶¶ 12, 14.) The Proposition 39 regulations impose a mandatory submission date of November 1, to which the District must timely object or else it waives the ability to challenge the charter school’s projections of daily classroom attendance. (5 C.C.R. § 11969.9(b).) The regulatory timeframe for the review and response to facilities requests “is a compromise that balances the time needed for charter schools to determine and provide accurate projections of average daily attendance (ADA), with the time needed for districts to evaluate those projections (and other aspects of charter schools’ facilities requests) and prepare their preliminary proposals and final offers.” (Yeomans Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. Q at 25.) Given the serious consequence to the District of not timely objecting to a timely submitted facilities requests, GEA cannot rely on the mere uploading of its request to assert that it substantially complied with Proposition 39. GEA must submit the request in the manner required by the District to trigger its review. GEA fails to demonstrate the timely submission of its request for the 2024-25 school year.

The Court is mindful of the possible severe consequences of this ruling, including the effect it may have on students currently enrolled at GEA, their parents, and the teachers employed by GEA. Notwithstanding the potentially harsh result here, the District was entitled to set forth the procedure GEA was required to follow to request to use District facilities. Petitioner having failed to show that GEA complied with that procedure and thereby created a mandatory duty for the District to process its facilities request, the Court finds that petitioner is not entitled to traditional mandamus relief.

Petitioner requests that evidence sanctions be imposed for the purported failure to respond to its discovery requests before the due date of its opening brief. (Opening Br. at 14:19-20.) Petitioner does not specify the nature of the proposed evidence sanction, such as what evidence the District would be barred from presenting. (See CCP § 2023.030(c).) In any event, petitioner does not demonstrate the existence of any court order compelling discovery, the violation of which is necessary before the Court may impose evidentiary sanctions. (See CCP § 2030.300(e), 2031.310(i); see Colomba Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. 20 [requests for production and form interrogatories].) While the parties contemplated limited discovery during the trial setting conference (see Colomba Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. 19 at GEA 242-43), the Court never ordered discovery to be provided by a particular date. (3/12/24 Minute Order.) The District provided discovery responses 30 days after service, as contemplated by the discovery statutes. (Colomba Decl. ¶ 4 [discovery propounded on 3/15/24]; Colomba Supp. Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 22 [discovery responses provided on 4/15/24]; CCP §§ 2030.260(a), 2031.260(a), 2033.250(a) [responses due 30 days after service].)

Further, even if the Court were to possess authority to impose an evidentiary sanction, the Court would decline to do so under the circumstances. It appears that petitioner obtained discovery responses in time to incorporate them into the reply. (See Colomba Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5 & Ex. 22-26.) Petitioner does not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from not having had the responses in time to file the opening brief.

The petition is DENIED. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.231(n), respondent Los Angeles Unified School District shall prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed judgment.

[1] Subsequent statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise indicated.

[2] Respondent District never filed an Answer to the Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate. Accordingly, the facts alleged are thus deemed admitted. (CCP § 431.20(a); Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 898 [“A defendant's failure to answer the complaint has the same effect as admitting the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint”].)

[3] The District did not use the online portal to accept Proposition 39 facilities requests for the 2023-24 school year because the District was addressing systemwide network security issues that had arisen from an external cyber attack. (Hwang Decl. ¶ 19.)

[4] In its November 22, 2023 email, GEA also sought to initiate the dispute resolution process set forth in its charter. (Lee Decl. ¶ 13 & Ex. 12 at GEA 197-98.) The District later moved to dismiss this proceeding on the ground that GEA did not engage in the mandatory dispute resolution process, or, in the alternative, to compel petitioner to participate in dispute resolution. On March 13, 2024, the Court denied the District’s motion.

[5] Similarly, in the legal context, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “submit” as “[t]o end the presentation of further evidence in (a case) and tender a legal position for decision.” (Black's Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019).)