Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCP00956, Date: 2024-07-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCP00956    Hearing Date: July 18, 2024    Dept: 86

DEMURRER TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

Date:               7/18/24 (1:30 PM) 

Case:                           Maribel S. Medina v. Los Angeles Community College District et al. (24STCP00956) 

TENTATIVE RULING:

Petitioner Maribel S. Medina is a member of the public and General Counsel of defendant Los Angeles Community College District (“LACCD”). (Pet. ¶ 20.) Defendant Francisco C. Rodriguez is LACCD’s CEO and Chancellor. (Pet. ¶ 2.) Defendant Teyanna Louise Jones-Williams is LACCD’s Vice Chancellor of Human Resources. (Pet. ¶ 3.) On January 30, 2024, petitioner’s attorney, Maria G. Diaz from the law firm Allred, Maroko & Goldberg, sent LACCD a request for the following 12 categories of documents:

(1) All written documents regarding complaints against Francisco C. Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), Chancellor, including, but not limited to whistleblower complaints, complaints filed with the Civil Rights Department (formerly, Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH)), EEOC, and ODEI, since 2014.

(2) All written documents regarding complaints against Steve Veres, Board Trustee, including, but not limited to whistleblower complaints, complaints filed with the Civil Rights Department (formerly, Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH)), EEOC, and ODEI.

(3) All written documents regarding complaints against Melinda Nish, including, but not limited to whistleblower complaints, complaints filed with the Civil Rights Department (formerly, Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH)), EEOC, and ODEI.

(4) All written correspondence, including text messages from Rodriguez with LACCD staff, faculty and Board regarding sexual harassment, including, but not limited to email to LACCD employees dated December 8, 2023.

(5) All written correspondence, including text messages from Rodriguez regarding Howard Irvin, including correspondence with Irvin, and any and all versions, including preliminary settlement agreements.

(6) All written correspondence with, or regarding retaining Sue Anne Evans from Dannis Woliver and Kelley, including but not limited to Rodriguez, David Vela (“Vela”) and Teyanna Williams (“Williams”).

(7) Williams’ step placement in the salary scale, current placement in the salary scale, current compensation and resume submitted with employment application.

(8) Jeannette Gordon’s (“Gordon”) step placement in salary scale, current placement in salary scale, current compensation, and resume.

(9) Mark Henderson’s current job title, step placement in salary scale, changes in job title and date of approved change, changes in compensation and dates of approved compensation changes, resume.

(10) All invoices submitted to LACCD from Solomon Law APC from January 1, 2018 to the present.

(11) All invoice approvals and correspondence regarding approving invoices for Solomon Law APC from January 1, 2018 to the present.

(12) All documentation regarding payments made to Irvin, including payments for medical coverage, pension monies, and other payouts from January 1, 2023 to the present.

(Pet. ¶ 40 & Ex. 1.) Although LACCD’s produced 1,253 pages of records in response, petitioner contends the records are mostly not responsive and include redactions without any basis. (Pet. ¶¶ 71, 73-75, 77.) On March 26, 2024, petitioner filed her Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate to Enforce the California Public Records Act.  On May 6, 2024, respondents filed the instant Demurrer.

For the reasons that follow, respondents Los Angeles Community College District, Francisco C. Rodriguez, and Teyanna Louise Jones-Williams’ Demurrer to Petition for Writ of Mandate is OVERRULED.

I.                   EVIDENTIARY MATTERS

Petitioner’s requests for judicial notice are GRANTED, but only for the existence of the documents and not the truth of the matters asserted therein. (See Evid. Code § 452(d); Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-69.)

II.                MEET AND CONFER

Petitioner Maribel S. Medina contends that respondents failed to meet and confer in good faith because counsel for respondents waited until the deadline before attempting to meet and confer.

“The parties shall meet and confer at least 5 days before the date the responsive pleading is due.” (CCP § 430.41(a)(2).) The Petition for Writ of Mandate was personally served on respondents on April 4, 2024. (See Proofs of Personal Service filed on 4/9/24.) Accordingly, the deadline to file a demurrer was May 6, 2024. (CCP § 430.40(a) [30 days after service to file demurrer]; 12a(a) [deadline falling on Saturday moved to next court day].) The deadline to meet and confer was May 1, 2024.

Respondents left a phone message for petitioner on May 1, 2024 and sent a meet and confer at 11:35 p.m. on the same day at petitioner’s request. (Wood Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8 & Ex. 2; Díaz Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. 1.) Even if the timing of respondents’ attempt to meet and confer was not ideal to allow petitioner to meet and confer with respondents, petitioner was able to meet and confer with respondents two days later. (Wood Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11 & Ex. 4; Díaz Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. 2.) “A determination by the court that the meet and confer process was insufficient shall not be grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer.” (CCP § 430.41(a)(4).)

Petitioner also argues that the hearing on the demurrer is not taking place within 35 days of its filing, as purportedly required by Rule of Court 3.1320(d). However, petitioner does not quote the rule in full. (See Opp. at 2:25-26.) Rule of Court 3.1320(d) states: “Demurrers must be set for hearing not more than 35 days following the filing of the demurrer or on the first date available to the court thereafter.” Due to the impacted nature of the Court’s docket, the Court was not able to schedule the demurrer within 35 days of its filing.

The Court rules on the merits of the demurrer.

III.             JUSTICIABILITY AND RIPENESS

Respondents contend that the issues presented in the writ petition are not justiciable or ripe because defendant Los Angeles Community College District (“LACCD”) has not conclusively withheld the requested records. Rather, the requested records are voluminous and require time to review and produce.

“A trial court remains free to promptly adjudicate whether a public agency has failed to comply with its obligations under the Public Records Act by slow-rolling its production of records or by refusing to propose an enforceable schedule for timely production; on an appropriate finding, it may craft remedies, including an order that the agency to meet a schedule for production. Trial courts have the ability to manage a public records action, even one including a plaintiff's allegation of improper delay, consistent with the statutory directive to secure a decision as to the matters at issue at the earliest possible time (§ 7923.005)—by setting hearings on the merits and receiving argument and evidence on those merits [citations].” (County of San Benito v. Superior Court (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 243, 264.)

As alleged by petitioner, the subject California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) request was sent to LACCD on January 30, 2024. (Pet. ¶ 40 & Ex. 1.)  On February 23, 2024, LACCD requested clarification as to Request Nos. 4 and 5 of the subject CPRA request, which petitioner alleges was a delay tactic because the meaning of those requests is clear. (Pet. ¶¶ 44-48, 55, 56, 69 & Exs. 5 & 7.) Petitioner alleges with respect to Request Nos. 7 and 8 that LACCD did not provide the resume of defendant Williams or Jennette Gordon. (Pet. ¶¶ 51-54.) Petitioner further alleges that, on March 8, 2024, LACCD indicated it is withholding records based on Williams’ role as legal counsel, even though Williams is part of Human Resources and not the Office of General Counsel. (Pet. ¶¶ 6, 61-66 & Ex. 7 at 3.)

The Petition alleges that, even though LACCD’s counsel produced 1,253 pages of records, such records are mostly not responsive and include redactions without providing a basis for the redaction. (Pet. ¶¶ 71, 73-75, 77.) LACCD has also purportedly not provided complaints by students, staff and faculty of discrimination, harassment and retaliation against its top officials, as requested in Request Nos. 1-3. (Pet. ¶¶ 72, 76.)

In light of the foregoing, petitioner has sufficiently alleged that LACCD is “slow-rolling” the production of requested records. Whether LACCD’s review and production of requested records is sufficiently prompt, as required by Government Code § 7922.530(a), is a matter to be determined at the merits hearing. Whether LACCD’s withholding of records based on various privileges (including the attorney-client privilege under Evidence Code § 954) is warranted is also a matter to be determined at the merits hearing.

Respondents cite City of Santa Rosa v. Press Democrat (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1315 for the assertion that a “difference of opinion as to the interpretation of a statute as between a citizen and a governmental agency does not give rise to a justiciable controversy…and provides no compelling reason for a court to attempt to direct the manner by which the agency shall administer the law.” (Santa Rosa, 187 Cal.App.3d at 1324, quoting Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 665.) Santa Rosa is inapposite. The issue in Santa Rosa was whether the governmental entity could maintain a declaratory relief action to determine its obligation to disclose a public record in response to a CPRA request. (Santa Rosa, 187 Cal.App.3d at 1317.) The Court of Appeal determined that, under the CPRA, an action may be brought to enforce the right to receive a copy of the public record, but not to prevent disclosure. (Id. at 1320.) A court may not, in the first instance, exercise administrative discretion in deciding whether the governmental entity shall disclose public records. (Id. at 1322-24.) Rather, the governmental entity must make a decision concerning disclosure, after which a court can review the decision against legal standards. (Id. at 1024.)

Here, petitioner seeks review of LACCD’s alleged failure to currently disclose requested public records, which is authorized under the CPRA. (Gov. Code § 7923.100.) This proceeding was not brought by a governmental entity to determine whether it had an obligation to disclose, as was the case in Santa Rosa. While respondents contend that they have not refused to produce the requested records, petitioner alleges that respondents have unduly delayed in producing responsive records. LACCD may certainly produce additional records pending the merits hearing, which might moot or defeat petitioner’s CPRA claim in whole or part. However, based on the allegations of the Petition, the case is justiciable and ripe as a matter of pleading.

IV.             STANDING

Respondents next argue that petitioner does not have standing because petitioner did not send the subject CPRA request. The request was sent by María G. Díaz of the Law Offices of Allred, Maroko & Goldberg without any mention of petitioner. (Pet. Ex. 1.) However, on the last page of the request after counsel’s signature, the letter states “cc: Client.” (Pet. Ex. 1 at 4.) Petitioner also alleges that, on February 26, 2024, a letter was sent to counsel for respondents, which stated: “As an initial matter, my Client, Ms. Medina filed charges with the California Civil Rights Department against Veres and LACCD in 2023 and yet you are representing there are no such records.” (Pet. ¶ 50 & Ex. 6 at 4.) The February 26, 2024 letter also stated on the last page “cc: Client.” (Pet. Ex. 6 at 5.) On March 13, 2023, counsel for petitioner also sent her response to counsel for respondents to petitioner. (Pet. Ex. 8 [email sent to Maribel Medina].)

Further, petitioner has filed a lawsuit against LACCD for employment-based claims. (RJN Ex. 8.) “[A] plaintiff who has filed suit against a public agency may, either directly or indirectly through a representative, file a CPRA request for the purpose of obtaining documents for use in the plaintiff's civil action, and that the documents must be produced unless one or more of the statutory exemptions set forth in the CPRA apply.” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Axelrad) (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 819, 826.)

“[T]he allegations of the [petition] must be read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and liberally construed with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.” (Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Newman & Holtzinger (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1199.) Counsel for petitioner carbon copied petitioner on the CPRA request and later referred to petitioner by name in subsequent communications to respondents’ counsel concerning the CPRA request. Petitioner has also filed suit against LACCD. Consequently, it can be inferred that the CPRA request was sent on behalf of petitioner. Petitioner has sufficiently alleged standing.

V.                INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

Respondents also argue that the Petitioner fails to state a cause of action against Rodriguez, as well as against Williams in her individual capacity.

“Whenever it is made to appear, by verified petition to the superior court of the county where the records or some part thereof are situated, that certain public records are being improperly withheld from a member of the public, the court shall order the officer or other person charged with withholding the records to disclose those records or show cause why that person should not do so.” (Gov. Code § 7923.100.)

Respondents, which includes Rodriguez and Williams, are alleged to have failed to “search for responsive public records maintained on personal accounts and/or devices of public officials.” (Pet. ¶ 86; see also City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 608, 629 [“a city employee's writings about public business are not excluded from CPRA simply because they have been sent, received, or stored in a personal account”].) In particular, Rodriguez, LACCD’s Chief Executive Officer and Chancellor, is alleged not to have searched his cell phone, iPad, and computer for responsive records. (Pet. ¶¶ 2, 86.) Further, Williams, the Vice Chancellor of Human Resources, is alleged to be the person responsible for the denial of the records request. (Pet. ¶¶ 3, 23, 62.)

As alleged, both Rodriguez and Williams are officers who are “charged” with withholding records and are thus the proper subject of any order issued under Government Code § 7923.100. The statute does not expressly prohibit Rodriguez and Williams from being named in their individual capacities as “other person[s] charged with withholding the records.”

A cause of action under the CPRA has been stated against Rodriguez and Williams, in their individual and official capacities.

VI.             CONCLUSION

Respondents’ demurrer is OVERRULED in its entirety. Respondents Los Angeles Community College District, Francisco C. Rodriguez, and Teyanna Louise Jones-Williams are ordered to file an answer within 10 days of this ruling.