Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCP01096, Date: 2025-03-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCP01096    Hearing Date: March 18, 2025    Dept: 86

Plaintiff Christina E. Hale petitions for a writ of mandate directing respondent California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to set aside its decision affirming the denial of unemployment benefits and grant unemployment benefits to petitioner.

I.       Factual Background

            From October 10, 2021, through March 26, 2022, petitioner was employed by the United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”). (AR 5; AR 101-126.) In June 2021, petitioner applied for unemployment insurance benefits (“UI”) from the Employment Development Department (“EDD”). (AR 5.) On her application for UI, petitioner attested that she was not working and reported no wages. (AR 5, 42:5-7, 77, 130.) EDD paid UI to petitioner. (AR 2.)

            In September 2022, EDD learned from UPS that UPS had employed petitioner during a time when petitioner claimed on her UI application that she was not earning wages. (AR 74.) On September 12, 2022, EDD sent petitioner a Notice of Determination that, due to her unreported earnings, petitioner was either ineligible for UI or subject to a reduction in UI for twenty-seven weeks between June 27, 2021, and March 26, 2022. (AR 5-6.) On May 5, 2023, EDD also sent petitioner a Notice of Overpayment, informing petitioner that she owed EDD $4,478 in overpaid UI, plus a $1,343.40 penalty for willfully making false statements and/or withholding relevant information. (AR 2.)

            Petitioner appealed EDD’s determination and Notice of Overpayment. (AR 12; AR 129.) On November 27, 2023, Administrative Law Judge M. Cwern (“ALJ”) conducted a hearing regarding (1) whether petitioner worked and earned wages during the weeks for which she claimed unemployment, (2) whether petitioner willfully made a false statement in order obtain UI, (3) whether EDD overpaid UI to petitioner, (4) whether petitioner’s willful false statement caused the overpayment of UI, and (5) whether petitioner is liable for repayment of overpaid UI and an associated penalty. (AR 29; AR 32:24-33:8; AR 35:5-8.) Petitioner testified at the hearing that she had no reason to doubt EDD’s records stating she reported that she had no work and no wages for the weeks in question. (AR 42:2-8.) Petitioner further testified that she was working at UPS for the months of September and October. (AR 42:8-22.) Petitioner also submitted paystubs for the weeks in question after the hearing pursuant to the ALJ’s request. (AR 28; AR 38:5-25; AR 42:23-25; AR 101-26.)

            On December 5, 2023, the ALJ affirmed EDD’s determination, finding that petitioner reported false information in her application and that EDD paid petitioner benefits on the basis of that misinformation. (AR 127, 130.) The ALJ also decided that, because petitioner willfully made a false statement for the purposes of obtaining benefits, she was ineligible for UI, is subject to a reduction in UI due to overpayment, and is disqualified from receiving UI, even if she were otherwise eligible. (AR 131, 133.) Finally, the ALJ found petitioner liable for repaying the UI funds and the penalty due to the willful and false statements. (AR 132-33.)

            Petitioner appealed the ALJ’s decision to respondent California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (“Appeals Board”). (AR 156.) On March 27, 2024, the Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision. (AR 156.) The Appeals Board found no material errors in the issue statement or findings of fact by the ALJ. (AR 156.) The Appeals Board also adopted a corrected reasons for decision, which deleted the ALJ’s citation to the case of Wishnick v. Rye (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 926 [holding willfulness may be established by carelessly or recklessly making a false statement], because it had been decertified by the Board, but noted the ALJ’s decision was based on the correct standard for finding willfulness, namely, making a knowing falsehood. (AR 156-157.)

II.      Procedural History

            On April 8, 2024, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate. On August 27, 2024, respondent filed an Answer to the Petition for Writ of Mandate.

On February 18, 2025, respondent filed an opposition brief, indicating petitioner had not filed an opening brief and urging the Court to deny the petition on that basis, as well as on the merits. (Opp. Br. at 2, 5-7.)  That same day, petitioner filed an Opening Brief.  Subsequently, on March 3, 2025, petitioner file a “Reply Brief” in response to respondent’s opposition brief.

On March 4, 2025, the 161-page Administrative Record was lodged with the Court.

III.     Standard of Review

Under CCP § 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (CCP § 1094.5(b).)

The Court exercises its independent judgment in reviewing denials of applications for public assistance. (See Norasingh v. Lightbourne (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 740, 752.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143.) The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) 

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.”  (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817, internal quotations omitted.)

“On questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s] independent judgment.’” (Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.) The interpretation of statute or regulation is a question of law. (See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 65, 77.)

IV.     Analysis

As a preliminary matter, while petitioner represents herself in this proceeding, she is held to the same procedural standards as an attorney. “Under the law, a party may choose to act as his or her own attorney. [Citations.] ‘[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus, as is the case with attorneys, pro. per. litigants must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-47.) “[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984.)

Petitioner’s opening brief does not cite to the administrative record or contain any factual allegations, legal analysis, or references to the underlying decision that should be overturned. (Opening Br. at 1-2.)  That alone may be sufficient grounds to deny the petition.  (See South Orange County Wastewater Authority v. City  of Dana Point (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 104, 1612 [petitioner “bears the burden of proof to demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record”]; Gong v. City of Fremont (1967) 250 Cal.App2d 568, 574 [petitioner bears responsibility for providing record to support claims, else the presumption of regularity of the administrative decision will prevail].)  Petitioner’s Opening and Reply briefs merely state in conclusory fashion that the EDD erred in denying petitioner’s unemployment benefits and that the ALJ abused his discretion by not giving any credence to petitioner’s statement that the overpayment was to her was not her fault. The Court addresses these claims on the merits below.

A.      Unemployment Status of Petitioner

An individual is unemployed, for purposes of UI eligibility, when she performs no services for wages or when her earnings do not exceed her weekly benefit amount. (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 1252, subd. (a)(1), (2).)

Petitioner contends EDD failed to prove that she was ineligible to receive UI. (Opening Br. at 1.) However, UPS provided information to EDD that petitioner was working during the periods of June 27, 2021, through March 26, 2022. (AR 8-9.) Furthermore, during the hearing, when asked whether there was any reason to doubt EDD’s records showing that she performed services for UPS in exchange for wages for the time periods she sought UI, petitioner replied “No.” (AR 42:2-8.) Likewise, petitioner admitted that she worked for UPS in September and October. (AR 42:8-22.) Lastly, petitioner submitted paystubs for the weeks of July 4, 2021 to July 10, 2021; October 3, 2021 to October 9, 2021, and October 10, 2021 to Marcy 26, 2033, which indicate petitioner earned wages from UPS that were not reported on her UI claim and that exceed her weekly benefit amount of $211. (AR 101-126, 65.)

Therefore, petitioner was ineligible for UI because she was not unemployed during the periods she received UI.

B.      Disqualification of Petitioner

An individual is disqualified for UI if she willfully makes a false statement for the purposes of obtaining benefits. (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 1257, subd. (a).)

During the hearing, when asked why on petitioner’s claim forms she reported that she had not received any wages or work, petitioner merely stated: “I have to look into that myself only because I know that I did report my wages for September, or I believe October, because I was working at UPS. So yeah.” (AR 42:13-22.) Petitioner also asked: “So in regards to this not being my fault and all the extra funds that is overpaid…am I eligible for a waiver for the overpayment?” (AR 43:8-10.) Petitioner provided no further explanation or evidence to demonstrate that she did not willfully report that she was not working and received no wages in order to obtain UI.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ correctly found that petitioner was disqualified for UI due to willfully made false statements on her claim forms that she was not working and received no wages during the periods in question in order to obtain UI.

C.      Overpayment and Penalty

Recipients of UI overpayments must repay the amount overpaid and also face a thirty percent penalty if the overpayment resulted from willful false statements. (Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 1375, 1375.1.)

The ALJ found that petitioner was overpaid $4,249 for the weeks at issue and that overpayment was due to petitioner’s willful false statements. (AR 132.) As discussed above, petitioner presented no evidence demonstrating the overpayment was due to anything other than willful false statements made on her claim forms. (AR 42:13-22; AR 43:8-10.) As such, the ALJ correctly applied the 30% penalty of the overpaid amount, resulting in a penalty assessment of $1,274.70. (AR 132.)

            Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the determination of overpayment and accompanying penalty assessment was a prejudicial abuse of discretion.

IV.     Conclusion

            The petition is DENIED. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.231(n), respondent California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board shall prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed judgment.