Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCP01754, Date: 2024-10-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP01754 Hearing Date: October 17, 2024 Dept: 86
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE
Date: 10/17/24
(1:30 PM)
Case: Bonseph Helinet
LLC v. City of Los Angeles et al. (24STCP01754)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Proposed Intervenor Air Center Aviation, Inc.’s Motion for
Leave to Intervene is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 19, 2021, the City of Los Angeles Department of
Airports dba Los Angeles World Airports (“LAWA”) commenced a Request for
Proposal (“RFP”) process to find a party willing to lease and modernize the
City’s only private helicopter-based mission-support facilities. (Pet. ¶¶ 2.
16, 17.) The facilities are located at 16231 Waterman Drive at Van Nuys Airport
(“Site”), owned and operated by LAWA. (Pet. ¶¶ 2, 10.)
On December 1, 2022, the Board of Airport Commissioners
(“BOAC”), LAWA’s governing body, awarded a lease to petitioner Bonseph Helinet
LLC. (Pet. ¶¶ 3, 10, 21.) Petitioner has operated at the Site for over 35 years
providing pilots, aircrafts, and maintenance for medical operations to local
hospitals. (Pet. ¶¶ 3, 8.) On March 5, 2024, the City Council overruled the
BOAC’s approval and disapproved the lease. (Pet. ¶¶ 5, 30, 31.) Petitioner
contends that the City Council’s jurisdiction to review the proposed lease
expired on December 31, 2022, or at worst January 14, 2023, pursuant to City
Charter section 606. (Pet. ¶¶ 4-6.) Petitioner seeks approval of the lease.
(Pet. Request for Relief at ¶ 1.)
Proposed Intervenor Air Center Aviation, Inc. (“ACAI”) has
been the lessor of the Site since 1971. (Feuerhelm Decl. ¶ 2.) ACAI’s lease is
currently month-to-month. (Feuerhelm Decl. ¶ 7.) Petitioner is ACAI’s
subtenant. (Feuerhelm Decl. ¶ 8.)
II.
ANALYSIS
In this motion, ACAI contends that, if petitioner were to
prevail on the instant petition, ACAI would be evicted from the Site.
As a preliminary matter, petitioner’s evidentiary objections
are OVERRULED.
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 387(b), a nonparty may
intervene as a matter of right if the nonparty demonstrates: (1) it has an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action; (2) it is so situated that the disposition of the action may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and
(3) its interests are not adequately represented by existing parties. (Siena
Court Homeowners Ass'n v. Green Valley Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1416,
1423-1424.)
With respect to the first and second elements, petitioner
argues that ACAI has no interest in this action because it occupies the Site on
a month-to-month lease, that the lease has already reached the 50-year maximum
under the City Charter, and that ACAI never submitted a bid in response to the
Request for Proposal. (See Mehta Decl. ¶¶ 2-6.) Petitioner essentially argues
that, because ACAI may not enforce its possessory interest in the Site, it may
not intervene as a matter of right.
California courts look to federal law for guidance in assessing
the requirements for mandatory intervention. (Edwards v. Heartland Payment
Systems, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 725, 732.) Under federal law, a proposed
intervenor does not need to have any “enforceable rights [or] seek to protect
any of their existing rights.” (California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. (9th
Cir. 2006) 450 F.3d 436, 441.) Rather, “a party has a sufficient interest for
intervention purposes if it will suffer a practical impairment of its interests
as a result of the pending litigation.” (Ibid.)
ACAI is the current tenant of the Site and has been the
tenant for over 50 years. (Feuerhelm Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7.) There appears to be no
foreseeable possibility that either ACAI or the City would terminate the
tenancy. (See Reply at 8:1-2
[“Neither the City nor ACAI has done so or indicated any intention of”
terminating ACAI’s lease].) However, it
appears undisputed that, if petitioner prevails on its petition, ACAI would be
expelled from the Site. ACAI therefore may suffer a practical impairment of its
possessory interest in the Site due to this litigation.
With respect to the third element, petitioner argues that a
presumption of adequacy of representation arises in the following three circumstances:
(1) “[w]hen an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same
ultimate objective”; (2) “[i]f the applicant's interest is identical to that of
one of the present parties”; and (3) “when the government is acting on behalf
of a constituency that it represents.” (Arakaki v. Cayetano (9th Cir.
2003) 324 F.3d 1078, 1086.) According to petitioner, respondents and ACAI share
the same objective and interest in opposing the petition. To begin with, the
presumption of adequacy has been called into question by the U.S. Supreme
Court. (Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (2022)
597 U.S. 179, 197; see also Callahan v. Brookdale Senior Living
Communities, Inc. (9th Cir. 2022) 42 F.4th 1013, 1021, fn. 5 [citing Berger].)
In any event, even if the presumption still exists, “[t]he
burden of showing inadequacy of representation is ‘minimal’ and satisfied if
the applicant can demonstrate that representation of its interests ‘may be’
inadequate.” (Citizens for Balanced Use v. Montana Wilderness Ass’n (9th
Cir. 2011) 647 F.3d 893, 898.) In determining the adequacy of representation,
courts consider three factors: “(1) whether the interest of a present party is
such that it will undoubtedly make all of a proposed intervenor's arguments;
(2) whether the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments;
and (3) whether a proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the
proceeding that other parties would neglect.” (Arakaki v. Cayetano (9th
Cir. 2003) 324 F.3d 1078, 1086, emphasis added.) The three factors, in essence,
seek to ascertain the likelihood that the proposed intervenor will make
arguments that the present party will not.
Because respondents – government entities – protect the
public interest, their concerns in deciding on the occupant of the Site at Van
Nuys Airport are broader than ACAI’s private interest of maintaining its
possessory interest in the Site. (Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton
(10th Cir. 2001) 255 F.3d 1246, 1256 [“In litigating on behalf of the general
public, the government is obligated to consider a broad spectrum of views, many
of which may conflict with the particular interest of the would-be
intervenor”].) Therefore, even if ACAI and respondent “would occupy the same
posture in the litigation” (id. at 1256), the potential conflict between
respondents’ duty to the public and ACAI’s private interest is sufficient to satisfy
the minimal burden of showing inadequacy of representation. (Id. at
1255, quoting In National Farm Lines v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n (10th
Cir. 1977) 564 F.2d 381, 384.)
Further, ACAI raises the possibility that it may assert
arguments that the City may be reluctant to make, including that LAWA did not
comply with the City Administrative Code during the Request for Proposal
process and that the City could not approve petitioner’s proposal after having
previously denied the same to ACAI under Federal Aviation Agency regulations. (Reply
at 12:17-25.) Respondents may be unwilling to state that the underlying RFP
process was unlawful or that its discretion over the approval of proposals is
constrained in any way. Accordingly, it cannot be “undoubtedly” said that
respondents will make the same arguments as ACAI.
For the foregoing reasons, ACAI has an interest in opposing
the petition. The Court finds that ACAI a mandatory right to intervene in the
instant proceeding.
The motion is GRANTED. ACAI’s Proposed Answer in Intervention
electronically received by the Court on 9/3/24 is deemed filed on 10/17/24.