Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCP02075, Date: 2024-10-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP02075 Hearing Date: October 22, 2024 Dept: 86
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM LATE CLAIM
Date: 10/22/24
(1:30 PM)
Case: Bella Donna Medrano v. County
of Los Angeles (24STCP02075)
TENTATIVE RULING:
Petitioner Bella Donna Medrano’s Petition for Relief from
Government Code § 945.4 is DENIED.
On April 13, 2023, on the 101 freeway, petitioner was
rear-ended by a vehicle that he been rear-ended by another vehicle bearing a
“CA EXEMPT” license plate and a government seal related to Los Angeles.
(Whittemore Decl. ¶ 4.) Petitioner sustained injuries. (Whittemore Decl. ¶ 6
& Ex. A [Demand for Bodily Injury Claim].) Petitioner filed a claim with
the City of Los Angeles (“City”). (Whittemore Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. A.) After the
deadline to file a government tort claim had passed, petitioner discovered that
the government vehicle involved in the collision belonged to respondent County
of Los Angeles (“County”). (Whittemore Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. D.)
A claim relating to a cause of
action for personal injury must be presented to the public entity no later than
six months after the accrual of the cause of action.¿ (Gov. Code § 911.2; Munoz
v. State of California¿(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776.)¿Accordingly, petitioner had until October 13, 2023—the longer of six
calendar months or 182 days—to present a claim to respondent County of Los
Angeles (“County”). (Gov. Code § 911.2;
Munoz, 33 Cal.App.4th at 1776; see also Jiminez v. Chavez
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 50, 58 [six-month limitations period is the longer of six
calendar months or 182 days].)
On February 26, 2024, petitioner submitted a written
application to respondent County for leave to present a late claim. (CCP §§
911.4, 911.6; Whittemore Decl. ¶ 10 & Ex. E.) Respondent denied the
application on March 11, 2024. (Whittemore Decl. ¶ 11 & Ex. F.) Petitioner
files this petition seeking relief under Government Code § 946.6 to present a
late claim.
Petitioner is required to demonstrate that the failure to
present a claim under Government Code § 945.4 was “through mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect….” (Gov. Code § 946.6(c)(1).)
“The mere recital of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect is
not sufficient to warrant relief…. There must be more than the mere failure to
discover a fact; the party seeking relief must establish the failure to
discover the fact in the exercise of reasonable diligence.” (Department of
Water & Power v. Superior Court (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1293.) “The
party seeking relief based on a claim of mistake must establish he was diligent
in investigating and pursuing the claim [citation] and must establish the
necessary elements justifying relief by the preponderance of the evidence.” (Ibid.)
Petitioner hired counsel at most eight days after the
subject incident. (Whittemore Decl. ¶ 5.) Petitioner appears to have been
diligent in hiring counsel. Regardless of whether petitioner was diligent in
retaining counsel after her fall, however, petitioner does not demonstrate that
counsel was reasonably diligent in discovering the available claims against
respondent. “[A] late claimant who seeks relief under section 946.6 may be
barred by inexcusable delay by counsel.” (Hasty v. County of Los Angeles
(1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 623, 626, citing Black v. County of Los Angeles
(1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 670, 674-77.)
Here, petitioner’s counsel opened a claim with respect to
damage to petitioner’s car on April 21, 2023, more than five months before the
October 13, 2023 deadline to file a government claim. (Whittemore Decl. ¶ 5.)
However, petitioner did not serve a government claim on the City until October
11, 2023, two days before the deadline to file a government tort claim.
(Whittemore Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. A.) Petitioner provides no explanation as to
why counsel delayed until October 11, 2023 to serve the government claim. Notably,
on this record, it appears petitioner only learned about the potential claim
against respondent County through the City’s response to the February 16, 2024 settlement
demand petitioner made to the City. (Whittemore Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8 & Exs. B-D.)
Had petitioner served a government claim upon the City earlier—instead of delaying
five months to do so—petitioner might have discovered the County’s potential
liability in time to serve a timely government claim by October 13, 2023. In any event, petitioner fails to provide any
meaningful explanation as to why petitioner’s counsel was unable to discover on
its own with the exercise of due diligence the County’s potential involvement
in the collision, as opposed to relying upon the City.
Petitioner contends that her counsel’s mistake regarding the
proper entity against whom to make a claim was reasonable because the vehicle
that hit her bore a seal related to Los Angeles. (Whittemore Decl. ¶ 4.) In
Reply, counsel also avers that at the time of filing of the claim with the
City, he was litigating cases against cities and was not as attuned to the
distinction between the City and County as he is now. (Whittemore Reply Decl.
¶¶ 14, 15; compare Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986)
42 Cal.3d 270, 276 [finding that counsel’s mistaken claim against state agency,
instead of community college district, was reasonable because community college
is overseen by state governing body].) Counsel’s averments do not explain why
counsel waited until the eve of the government claim deadline to file a claim. (Compare
Bettencourt, 42 Cal.3d at 274, 278 [counsel filed government claim four
days after having been retained].) Nor do such averments demonstrate that
petitioner’s counsel made any meaningful effort to confirm or verify what government
entity might be involved in the collision.
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner does not demonstrate
the diligence necessary to obtain relief under Government Code § 946.6. While
there is a “general policy favoring trial on the merits,” it “cannot be applied
indiscriminately so as to render ineffective the statutory time limits.” (Department
of Water, 82 Cal.App.4th at 1293.)
The petition is DENIED.