Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCP02138, Date: 2025-03-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCP02138    Hearing Date: March 11, 2025    Dept: 86

Petitioner Charles Spencer petitions for a writ of mandate directing respondent Los Angeles Housing Authority to set aside the decision to terminate his Section 8 voucher payments.

I.       Factual Background

            The federal government funds a rental voucher program designed to help low-income families make housing payments. (Crooks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 893, 903.) Respondent Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”) is the local public housing agency that administers the rental voucher program in the City of Los Angeles. (Ibid.)

Petitioner Charles Spencer started received a Section 8 rent subsidy in 2016. (AR 27.) On October 27, 2021, HACLA sent petitioner notice that it intended to terminate petitioner’s voucher as of November 30, 2021, because he: (1) participated in violent criminal activity; (2) committed fraud; and (3) failed to provide true and correct information. (AR 15.) HACLA explained that petitioner committed a felony. HACLA also asserted that petitioner failed to disclose his monthly household expenditures, his criminal history, and the fact that he was financially responsible for numerous credit cards. (AR 15.)

On April 3, 2024, HACLA notified petitioner that his voucher would be terminated as of May 31, 2024. (AR 3.) Petitioner requested an informal hearing, which took place on January 30, 2024. (AR 4.)

The administrative record reflects the following:

On February 23, 2018, petitioner pled nolo contendere to a violation of Penal Code § 594(a) (malicious mischief) and 245(a)(4) (assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury). (AR 22.)

According to a credit report dated September 16, 2021, petitioner had three open credit cards with $266 due monthly and a total balance of $9,847. (AR 41-42.)

On March 10, 2019, petitioner filled out eligibility forms. (AR 46-56.) Petitioner stated that he did not receive money to pay bills from someone outside his household. (AR 50.) Petitioner also stated that he did not have monthly credit card expenditures. (AR 51.) Petitioner also represented that he had not been convicted of any crime. (AR 53.)

            The Hearing Officer upheld the termination of petitioner’s Section 8 voucher based on the following: (1) petitioner engaged in criminal activity while participating in the Section 8 voucher program; (2) petitioner has monthly debt obligations that exceed his reported monthly income; (3) petitioner failed to disclose his criminal convictions and household expenditures, sources of income, and contributions on the eligibility forms; and (4) petitioner committed fraud by failing to provide correct information on the eligibility forms. (AR 8.) Petitioner was provided notice of the Hearing Officer’s decision on March 8, 2024. (AR 4.)

II.      Procedural History

            On July 3, 2024, petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate. On August 13, 2024, respondent filed an Answer.

            On October 10, 2024, during the Trial Setting Conference, the Court ordered petitioner’s opening brief to be filed 60 days prior to the original hearing date, i.e., January 6, 2025, as January 5 was a Sunday.[1] The Court ordered the opposition to be filed 30 days prior to the original hearing date and the reply to be filed 15 days prior to the original hearing date.

No opening brief or reply was filed. On January 29, 2025, respondent filed the administrative record. On February 3, 2025, respondent filed its Respondent’s Brief.

III.     Standard of Review

Under CCP § 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (CCP § 1094.5(b).)

A decision denying public assistance benefits affects a fundamental vested right. (Harlow v. Carleson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 731, 737 [“right of a welfare recipient to continued welfare benefits” is fundamental and vested].) Because the administrative decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the Court exercises its independent judgment on the record. (See Prentice v. Board of Admin. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 983, 988.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby, 4 Cal.3d at 143.) The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.) 

“In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.”  (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817, internal quotations omitted.) A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for either party to an appeal and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950) 99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.)

IV.     Analysis

            As stated above, petitioner did not file an opening brief. However, in the Petition, petitioner asserts the following arguments: (1) he was not convicted for any crime, as all charges have been dismissed (Pet. at 6:18-7:3, 9:3-18, 15:26-16:26); (2) respondent did not provide him discovery of the information that it intended to use against him (Pet. at 11:2-12:13); (3) petitioner was added to his relatives’ credit cards so that he could help them shop for groceries, as they were physically unable to do the shopping themselves (Pet. at 12:14-22); and (4) petitioner disclosed his financial status and law enforcement issues to his case worker, who assured petitioner that his eligibility for Section 8 benefits would not be threatened (Pet. at 13:23-14:12).

            With respect to the second ground, petitioner signed a “Certification of Receipt” indicating that he received a copy of the hearing folder. On March 28, 2023. (AR 9.) The second ground is without merit.

            With respect to the first ground, petitioner relies on a minute order indicating that his convictions from February 23, 2018 were dismissed. (Pet. at 10-11, 20; compare AR 36 [petitioner pled nolo contendere for Count 2 (Penal Code § 594(a)) and Count 4 (Penal Code § 245(a)(4))].) The document upon which petitioner relies is not part of the administrative record. “In an administrative mandamus action, judicial review is limited to matters in the administrative record. Additional evidence is admissible only if it was not available at the time of the administrative hearing or was excluded improperly from the record.” (Evans v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 958, 977, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(e).) Petitioner has not sought to augment the record, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1095.4(e).

            Even if the Court were to consider the document, it reveals that petitioner’s convictions were dismissed pursuant to Penal Code § 1203.4 in May 2023. A dismissal under Penal Code § 1203.4 does not nullify or expunge a conviction. (People v. Vasquez (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1225, 1230.) The conviction still exists. Further, petitioner represented on eligibility form HAPP-27P on March 10, 2019 that he was not convicted of any crime. (AR 50, 54.)  This was over four years before such convictions were dismissed on May 2023. Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a violation of Penal Code § 594(a) (malicious mischief) and 245(a)(4) (assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury) on February 23, 2018. (AR 22.) A plea of nolo contendere constitutes a conviction. (Estrada v. Public Employees' Retirement System (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 870, 883.) Because petitioner had been convicted of a crime at the time he completed form HAPP-27P, petitioner’s representation that he had not been convicted of any crime was false.

With respect to petitioner’s contention in the fourth ground that he disclosed criminal activity to his case worker, petitioner does not point to any evidence in the administrative record indicating that he made such disclosure. It is petitioner’s burden to point to evidence indicating that the weight of the evidence supports him. (Fukuda, 20 Cal.4th at 817.)

Accordingly, regardless of the merit of the third ground, the weight of the evidence supports HACLA’s termination of petitioner’s Section 8 voucher because he failed to supply truthful information to HACLA concerning his criminal activity on the eligibility form. (Crooks, 40 Cal.App.5th at 903, citing 24 CFR §§ 982.551(b)(4), 982.552(c)(1)(i).)

V.      Conclusion

The petition is DENIED. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.231(n), respondent shall prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed judgment.