Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCP02890, Date: 2024-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCP02890    Hearing Date: October 24, 2024    Dept: 86

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

RE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Date:               10/24/24 (1:30 PM) 

Case:               Yvonne Marin et al. v. Torrance Unified School District (24STCP02890) 

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiffs/Petitioners Yvonne Marin and Dylan Farris’ request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

I.                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arises from an incident on 9/17/23, which led to the arrest of plaintiffs/petitioners Yvonne Marin and Dylan Farris. At the time, Marin was the Senior Director of Elementary Schools at defendant/respondent Torrance Unified School District (“District”). (Stowe Decl. ¶ 4.) Farris was the Chief Personnel Officer for the District. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 4.)  

On 9/17/23, Farris sent to Dr. Tim Stowe, the Superintendent of the District, a text message indicating that Marin and he wanted to talk to Dr. Stowe as soon as possible. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 4.) Later that afternoon, petitioners met with Dr. Stowe and, according to Stowe, told him that they were caught urinating in public at a park in Redondo Beach and were subsequently arrested. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 4.) According to Dr. Stowe petitioners also stated that they may have been cited for committing a “lewd act in public” but that they were actually arrested for urinating in public. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 4.)

On 9/18/23, the District received an arrest notification from the California Department of Justice, informing the District that petitioners had been arrested, cited, and detained by the Redondo Beach Police Department for having violated Penal Code sections 647(a) (Solicit Lewd Act in Public) and 90(c) (Disorderly Conduct). (Stowe Decl. ¶ 5.) Dr. Stowe then separately interviewed petitioners regarding the events leading to their arrest. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 6.) According to Dr. Stow, petitioners repeated the same story they had provided on 9/17/23. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 6.)

On 9/20/23, Dr. Stowe spoke with the Chief of Police of the Torrance Police Department. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 7.) The Chief of Police had communicated with the Redondo Beach Police Department and told Dr. Stowe that the officers involved in the arrest were wearing body cameras, the footage from which showed that petitioners were arrested for having openly engaged in oral copulation approximately 20 to 30 feet from families at a park. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 7.) Dr. Stowe concluded that petitioners had lied to him about the nature of their conduct. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 8.) Dr. Stowe notified petitioners that he would seek their dismissal or that they could resign. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 8.) Petitioners resigned from their employment with the District. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 8.) Dr. Stowe then notified the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing (“CCTC”) of petitioners’ resignations and the nature of the allegations of misconduct that led to their resignations. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 10; see Hernandez Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. D [contents of reports to CCTC consistent with Dr. Stowe’s averments in declaration].)

On 1/9/24, the Court (Commissioner Brad Miles Fox) dismissed the criminal prosecution arising from petitioners’ arrest. (Farris Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 4; Marin Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 4.) On 2/15/24, the Court sealed the records of the arrest of both petitioners and deemed the arrests “not to have occurred.” (Farris Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 4; Marin Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 4.)

On 6/14/24, the District received a Public Records Act request from reporter Holly McDede. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 2.) As pertinent to this motion, the request sought “records related to any and all reports to the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing (CCTC) from 2014 to the date this request is fulfilled.” (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. A.) The District notified McDede that it had responsive documents but that it had to notify the employees whose personnel records would be produced and ascertain whether they would file an action to prevent disclosure of the records. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. C.) On 8/26/24, the District served notices to petitioners with copies of the responsive documents attached. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. D.) The notices stated that the documents would be produced on 9/11/24 unless petitioners provided proof of a court order enjoining production. (Hernandez Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. D.)

On 9/9/24, petitioners filed a Verified Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandate seeking various forms of relief that would bar production of the documents that the District intends to disclose. (See Pet. Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-4.)

On 9/11/24, pursuant to petitioners’ ex parte application, the Court issued an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction enjoining respondent from producing respondents’ personnel files should not be issued pending trial in this case. The Court also issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent from producing respondents’ personnel files pending the determination on the order to show cause.

II.                ANALYSIS

Petitioners seek a preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Torrance Unified School District from disclosing their personnel records in response to a California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) request.  Specifically, petitioners seek to prevent the District from disclosing the notifications the District had sent to CTCC concerning petitioners’ resignations. (See Hernandez Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. D.)

“[T]he question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.”  (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) 

Under the CPRA, “every person has a right to inspect any public record” of a state or local agency subject to statutory exemptions. (Gov. Code § 7922.530(a); see also Gov. Code § 7920.510(d) [definition of “local agency” includes school district].) One of those exemptions is that the CPRA “does not require disclosure of personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” (Gov. Code § 7927.700.) A public sector employee, like all persons, has a constitutional right of privacy. (See Cal. Const. Art. I, § 1.) A citizen cannot be said to have waived that right in return for the privilege of public employment. (Marken v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1271.)

Third parties seeking to prevent an agency from producing their personnel records can file a “reverse-CPRA” action to obtain a determination that such records are exempt from disclosure. (Marken, 202 Cal.App.4th at 1265-67.) Courts engage in a three-part analysis to determine whether the exemption of personnel files from disclosure applies. (Associated Chino Teachers v. Chino Valley Unified School Dist. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 530, 539.) First, the court must determine whether the records sought constitute a personnel file or other similar file. (Ibid.) Second, if the requested records are personnel or similar files, the court must then determine whether the disclosure of the requested records would compromise substantial privacy interests. (Ibid.) Third, the court must balance the potential harm to privacy interests with the public interest of disclosure and determine which interest prevails. (Ibid.)

The parties do not dispute that the first two parts of the three-step analysis apply, i.e., the request at issue concerns a personnel file, the disclosure of which would compromise substantial privacy interests. (See Associated Chino Teachers, 30 Cal.App.5th at 539, quoting Lab. Code § 1198.5(a) [scope of personnel records generally covers records “relating to the employee's performance or to any grievance concerning the employee”]; Associated Chino Teachers, 30 Cal.App.5th at 541, citing Bakersfield City School Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1045-47 [“disclosure of a school district employee's alleged wrongdoing involves substantial privacy interests”].) The parties focus on the third and last part of the analysis with respect to balancing the respective interests.

“[W]here complaints of a public employee’s wrongdoing and resulting disciplinary investigation reveal allegations of a substantial nature, as distinct from baseless or trivial, and there is reasonable cause to believe the complaint is well founded, public employee privacy must give way to the public’s right to know.” (Bakersfield City School Dist. v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1046, citing American Federation of State etc. Employees v. Regents of University of California (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 913, 918.) There is no question that the allegations in the CCTC report—specifically, that police officers arrested petitioners for engaging in oral copulation in the open, approximately 20 to 30 feet from families in the park and that petitioners lied to Dr. Stowe about the events leading to their arrest—are substantial in nature. The question here is whether there was reasonable cause to believe that the allegations were well-founded, in which case the records must be disclosed.

Upon review of the entire record, the Court finds that Dr. Stowe reasonably concluded that the allegations in the CCTC report were well-founded. Dr. Stowe spoke with the Chief of Police from the Torrance Police Department, who learned from the Redondo Beach Police Department that the arresting officers had video footage from the arrests. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 7.) Dr. Stowe was informed the footage demonstrated that plaintiffs were arrested not for public urination, but for engaging in oral copulation approximately 20 to 30 feet from families at Veteran’s Park. (Stowe Decl. ¶ 7.)

Petitioners contend the allegations are not well-founded because they are based on second-hand and purportedly unreliable information from the Torrance Chief of Police regarding what he learned from the arresting agency. (See Stowe Decl. ¶ 7.) Petitioners also emphasize that neither petitioners nor the District were ever provided the arresting officer body camera footage so that the allegations could be verified. (Farris Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10.)  The Court is not persuaded that the circumstances under which Dr. Stowe learned the information about petitioners’ arrests renders the allegations unfounded.

Under Penal Code § 291, the chief of police is required to notify the superintendent of the arrest of nonteacher public school employees for lewd conduct in any place open to the public or in public view. (Pen. Code § 291(b); Ed. Code § 44010(a) [“sex offense” includes offense defined in Penal Code § 647(a)]; Farris Decl. ¶¶ 9, 10 & Ex. 5 [arrested for violation of Penal Code § 647(a)].) On this record, the Court has no reason to doubt the Torrance Chief of Police’s understanding of the events leading to petitioners’ arrest or the accuracy of the information he conveyed as required.  Indeed, the Court presumes that to be the case.  (Evid. Code § 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed”].)  The fact that the arresting officer body camera footage is unavailable does not cause this Court to doubt the presumably correct information conveyed by the Chief of Police.  Indeed, petitioners can hardly be heard to complain about the absence of the video footage when they were permitted access to it in connection with their criminal case but opted to forego such access in favor of a plea deal.  (Farris Decl. ¶ 9.) 

Petitioners also deny having told Dr. Stowe that they were arrested for urinating in public. (Farris Decl. ¶ 8; Marin Decl. ¶ 4.) Petitioners point to notes taken during their investigatory interviews which reflect their recounting that were only looking for a restroom, not that they had urinated in public. (Reply at 6:8-7:6; Kolodziej Decl. ¶ 2 & Ex. 6.)  To the extent there is any discrepancy, it is immaterial.  What is material is that petitioners gave Dr. Stowe some account of their arrest relating to their need to urinate, as opposed to having been arrested for oral copulation in public.  When Dr. Stowe eventually learned the true circumstances of petitioners’ arrest, he had a well-founded belief that petitioners had been dishonest with the District regarding their arrest.

Lastly, petitioners contend that the records of their arrest were sealed, as if the arrest never occurred. (Farris Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 4; Marin Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 4.)  That may be true, but it is beside the point.  The sealing order itself pertains only to “[t]he record of arrest in the [criminal] matter.”  (Farris Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. 4; Marin Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 4.)  By its explicit terms, the sealing order does not extend to other records referencing the arrest, such as the CTCC notifications at issue here.  Further, insofar as the criminal sealing pursuant to Penal Coode section 851.91 may evidence a general policy or desire for “the arrest deemed not to have occurred” (Farris Decl. Ex. 4; Marin Decl. Ex. 4), that general interest still gives way to other competing interests.  Per the explicit terms of the petitioners’ sealing orders, their arrests may still be pleaded and proved in a subsequent prosecution and must be disclosed if required by law to be disclosed in the future. (Farris Decl. Ex. 4; Marin Decl. Ex. 4.)  Here, the CPRA requires disclosure of the District’s records referencing petitioners’ arrests limited to certain exceptions, which, as discussed above, the Court does not find applicable.

Because the Court concludes there is reasonable cause to believe that the allegations were well-founded, there is no basis for the District to withhold disclosure of CCTC notifications, as requested in the CPRA request. Consequently, the Court finds that petitioners fail to demonstrate any likelihood of prevailing on any cause of action.  Accordingly, their request for a preliminary injunction must be DENIED, notwithstanding any harm that may result from the denial of the request. (Jessen v. Keystone Savings & Loan Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 459 [“In a practical sense it is appropriate to deny an injunction where there is no showing of reasonable probability of success, even though the foreclosure will create irreparable harm, because there is no justification in delaying that harm where, although irreparable, it is also inevitable”].)

For the foregoing reasons, the Court’s Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction issued on 9/11/24 is DISCHARGED.