Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case Number: 24STCP03177, Date: 2025-04-24 Tentative Ruling

Petitioner Maria Stumman, seeks a writ of mandate directing Respondent California Department of Social Services (“DSS”) to set aside the administrative decision sustaining the revocation of her license and Trustline registration.

DSS licensed petitioner to operate a family childcare home facility out of her home on March 1, 2007. On June 4, 2002, DSS had approved petitioner’s Trustline childcare provider registration. (AR 227-28, 518.)

On February 15, 2024, DSS issued an Accusation for the revocation of petitioner’s license and Trustline registration, as well as excluding petitioner from childcare related activities. The Accusation was based on three grounds: (1) violating Health and Safety Code sections 1596.885 and 1596.8595(c) by possessing poisons, toxins, and flammable products in an unlocked cabinet in a room accessible to children while providing care on March 22, 2023, as well by possessing firearms and ammunition in an area accessible to children while providing care on March 2, 2020; (2) violating Health and Safety Code sections 1596.885(c) and 1596.8897(a)(2) by engaging in conduct that is inimical to health, morals, welfare or safety of an individual receiving services from the facility, to wit: petitioner caused injuries to Victim No. 1[1] during a verbal and physical altercation on January 16, 2023; and (3) violating Health and Safety Code section 1596.608(a)(1)(D) by engaging in conduct that poses a threat to the health and safety of a person who may become a client, namely, the aforementioned possession of poisons, toxins, and flammable products, possession of firearms and ammunition, and causing injury during a verbal and physical altercation. (AR 8-10.)

On March 7, 2024, petitioner requested a hearing to present a defense to the allegations in the Accusation. (AR 13-14.) Thereafter, on July 2 and 3, 2024, administrative hearings were held on the matter before Administrative Law Judge Debra D. Nye-Perkins (“ALJ”). (AR 226, 264, 487.)

At the hearing, DSS presented oral testimony from six witnesses: (1) Officer Joshua Carrasco; (2) Officer Luis Pulido; (3) Victim No. 1, (4) Licensing Program Manager (“LPM”) Martha Jean Malane; (5) Associate Governmental Program Analyst (“AGPA”) Rajani Goudreau; and (6) Licensing Program Analyst (“LPA”) Vicky Williamson. (AR 229-44.) DSS also presented documentary and video evidence. (AR 229.) In turn, petitioner testified, elicited the testimony of five other witnesses, and introduced documentary evidence. (AR 244-54.) The additional witnesses included: (1) Roderic H. Stumman, petitioner and Victim No. 1’s son; (2) Shanna Marie Gainer and Benjamin Adam Gainer, parents of children who attended petitioner’s child care (the “Gainers”); (3) Margarita Lopez, a licensed child care provider; and (4) Wendy Stumman, petitioner and Victim No. 1’s daughter. (AR 244-54.) Petitioner’s documentary evidence consisted of two photographs of a repaired bathroom cabinet safety hinge and six character reference letters that “praised [petitioner’s] caretaking abilities, love for children, friendliness, and gentle nature.” (AR 255.)

Officer Carrasco, who responded to a domestic violence call for service on January 16, 2023 at petitioner’s facility, testified that Victim No. 1 provided a statement that he was in an altercation with petitioner during which petitioner threw children’s toys and other objects at him due to his drinking and a phone call. (AR 229-31, 310-12.) Victim No. 1 admitted to slapping petitioner once during the altercation. (AR 230, 325.) At the scene, the police found evidence that corroborated Victim No. 1’s statements, including blood found on Victim No. 1, blood found on a large toy, and redness observed on petitioner’s lower lip. (AR 145-52, 230-31.) Officer Pulido, who accompanied Officer Carrasco on January 16, 2023, also testified that there were no defensive markings on petitioner’s body. (AR 361-362.) Concerning their interview of petitioner, Officers Carrasco and Pulido testified that petitioner gave contradictory versions of what transpired by giving meandering statements and changing the order in which events were said to have occurred. (AR 145-48, 232, 319-20, 620.) Petitioner had claimed Victim No. 1 sustained his injuries by falling multiple times, but the evidence collected at the scene did not support this narrative. (AR 146-47, 153-55, 232-35, 355, 357, 368, 617-20.) Both officers testified that they determined Victim No. 1’s testimony had been substantiated and that petitioner was the primary aggressor, which resulted in her arrest on January 16, 2023. (AR 147, 235, 362.) During Victim No. 1’s testimony, his statements were consistent with this narrative. (AR 237-38, 386-94.) Other than slapping petitioner, Victim No. 1 denied having kicked or thrown anything at petitioner, and he further denied ever being physically abusive towards her during the relationship. (AR 422-23.)

Testimony was also provided regarding the violations that occurred on March 2, 2020, and March 22, 2023. AGPA Goudreau testified that, on March 2, 2020, she observed two unsecured rifles and a box of ammunition in an unlocked shed in the backyard of petitioner’s home facility, which was an accessible area. (AR 241-43, 460-62.) LPM Malane testified that, on March 22, 2023, she observed toxic cleaning solutions in an unsecured cabinet in the bathroom accessible to children. (AR 165-67, 239-40, 438.) Both incidents were documented within their Facility Evaluation Reports. (AR 159-64, 165-74.) Petitioner testified that LPM Malane broke the safety latch on the bathroom cabinet and that the rifles and ammunitions were behind a locked door. (AR 537, 539-40.) As to both violations, petitioner remedied them on the same day they were cited. (AR 462, 538, 540.)

Petitioner’s son testified, confirming that Victim No. 1 is an alcoholic. (AR 493.) He further added that Victim No. 1 does not reside with petitioner but does come to petitioner’s residence approximately once per week when petitioner requests his assistance. (AR 497.)

During petitioner’s testimony, she testified that Victim No. 1 had strangled her for nearly 10 seconds. (AR 528.) Petitioner, however, did not report any strangulation to the responding officers on January 16, 2023, and they did not observe any strangulation marks on petitioner. (AR 146, 207, 236, 617-19.) Petitioner also denied seeing Victim No. 1 fall and denied that this occurred near the fish tank, whereas petitioner made contrary statements to the responding officers on the day of the altercation. (AR 559-63.) Petitioner also denied knowing how Victim No. 1 sustained his injuries, despite previously reporting to the responding officers that Victim No. 1 had slipped. (AR 146, 531-532.) Petitioner provided different testimony as to how Victim No. 1 may have sustained his injuries, which included: (1) Victim No. 1 had sustained scratches while gardening at his mother’s home (AR 563-64); (2) Victim No. 1 had hurt his hand on a high chair (AR 565, 570); and (3) the injuries occurred when Victim No. 1 exited the garage (AR 566). Petitioner further denied throwing any toys at Victim No. 1 and reasoned that the blood found on a toy got there when Victim No. 1 fell on it. (AR 571-72.)

The Gainers testified that they felt comfortable sending their children to petitioner for childcare services for the past twelve years and were not concerned by the allegations raised in the Accusation. (AR 579, 582-583.) Ms. Lopez testified on petitioner’s behalf by stating that petitioner operates a safe facility for children in spite of the allegations in the Accusation. (AR 596.)

On August 1, 2024, the ALJ issued a Proposed Decision to revoke petitioner’s daycare license and Trustline registration. (AR 186-222.) On August 23, 2024, DSS adopted the Proposed Decision (“ALJ Decision”). (AR 223-24, 226-62.)

In the ALJ Decision, the ALJ summarized the evidence that had been presented over the course of the two-day hearing. (AR 228-55.) Based on this evidence, the ALJ made the following findings: (1) petitioner had toxins in an unlocked cabinet accessible to children while providing care on March 22, 2023 (AR 258); (2) petitioner had firearms and ammunition accessible to children while providing care on March 2, 2020 (AR 258); (3) petitioner’s testimony lacked credibility and was self-serving, including blaming the LPM for breaking the bathroom safety latch on March 22, 2023 (AR 259); (4) petitioner engaged in conduct inimical and conduct posing a threat to the health and safety of any person who is or may become a client because petitioner physically attacked Victim 1, including throwing children’s toys at him and causing serious and significant injuries (AR 259-60); (5) petitioner provided conflicting versions of events for the altercation with Victim No. 1, which undermined her credibility to a significant degree (AR 259); (6) petitioner’s failure to take responsibility for her actions on January 16, 2023, and blaming Victim No. 1 were deeply concerning and indicate petitioner is not able to be truthful (AR 260); (7) protection of the public required the revocation of petitioner’s license based on the facts (AR 260); and (8) petitioner’s failure to take responsibility for her actions and providing noncredible versions of the events that occurred demonstrate that she poses a danger to potential clients for failing to tell the truth. (AR 260.)

On October 3, 2024, petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate. On November 5, 2024, respondent filed its answer.

On February 21, 2025, petitioner filed her opening brief. On March 14, 2025, respondent filed its opposition brief. On April 9, 2025, petitioner filed a reply. The Court has received a hard copy of the administrative record.

Petitioner challenges the punishment imposed by respondent for her Health and Safety Code violations. Specifically, petitioner argues that the punishment was excessive because the ALJ had other less restrictive means to address public safety. (Pet. Br. at 11-12.) Petitioner also contends that, in imposing punishment, the ALJ failed to consider various purportedly mitigating factors, including: (1) petitioner’s record as a childcare provider (Pet. Br. at 12-13; (2) that the violations were not related to petitioner’s qualification, functions, and duties as a child care provider (Pet. Br. at 13); (3) no child was injured (Pet. Br. at 14); (4) the hardship families using petitioner’s childcare service might suffer (Pet. Br. at 14-15); (5) countervailing evidence that petitioner was a conscientious and professional childcare provider (Pet. Br. at 15-16); and (6) probation as a sufficient remedy to protect the public (Pet. Br. at 16-17).

Because the Court does not find that revocation of petitioner’s facility license and Trustline registration was an abuse of discretion, petitioner’s challenge to the respondent’s decision must fail.

DSS may deny, suspend, or revoke any license, registration, or special permit it issues if the license holder (1) violates the provisions of the Child Day Care Act or pertinent rules and regulations; (2) aids, abets, or permits violation of the Act or pertinent rules and regulations; (3) engages in conduct which is inimical to the health, morals, welfare, or safety of either an individual in or receiving services from the facility or the people of the state; or (4) is convicted of a crime. (H&S Code § 1596.885.)[2] A Trustline registration may be revoked or suspended when there is an incident of child abuse, neglect, or other conduct that poses a threat to the health and safety of any person who is, was, or may become a client. (§§ 1596.608(a)(1)(D), (a)(2).)

A claim that an administrative agency imposed excessive discipline is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Hoang v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 448, 456 [review of propriety of State Board of Pharmacy’s decision to revoke petitioner’s pharmacy license].) “The penalty imposed by an administrative body will not be disturbed in mandamus proceedings unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Neither an appellate court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. In reviewing the exercise of this discretion we bear in mind the principle ‘courts should let administrative boards and officers work out their problems with as little judicial interference as possible . . . Such boards are vested with a high discretion and its abuse must appear very clearly before the courts will interfere.” (Ibid., citations omitted.)

“One of the tests suggested for determining whether the administrative body acted within the area of its discretion is whether reasonable minds may differ as to the propriety of the penalty imposed. The fact that reasonable minds may differ will fortify the conclusion that there was no abuse of discretion.” (Hanna v. Dental Bd. of California (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 759, 764.)

Petitioner argues respondent abused its discretion by imposing the severe punishment of license revocation when less restrictive means were available to address public safety concerns. (Pet. Br. at 11-12.) The Court does not find that there was an abuse of discretion in the level of punishment imposed.

Here, petitioner does not dispute that section 1596.885(c) authorizes DSS to revoke a license for conduct “inimical to the health, morals, welfare, or safety of either an individual in or receiving services from the facility or the people of this state.” Nor does petitioner meaningfully dispute the ALJ’s findings (1) that petitioner had toxins in an unlocked cabinet accessible to children while providing care on March 22, 2023; (2) that petitioner had firearms and ammunition accessible to children while providing care on March 2, 2020; and (3) that petitioner engaged in conduct inimical and conduct posing a threat to the healthy and safety to clients when petitioner physically attacked Victim 1 by throwing toys at him and causing serious and significant injuries on January 16, 2023.[3] (AR 258-60.)

While loss of a facility license and Trustline registration is undoubtedly a harsh result, this Court cannot say it was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. There were three separate and serious violations. It was not unreasonable to conclude that two, independent instances of failing to prevent children’s access to toxic materials or deadly firearms presented such serious risk of harm that the harshest penalty was warranted, even if petitioner had remedied the violation each time. Moreover, and more serious, petitioner attacked and seriously injured Victim 1 on January 16, 2023. Such a violent act by petitioner is sufficient to support a finding that she should not be entrusted with the care of children, particularly given her lack of candor about the attack with law enforcement and during the hearing before the ALJ.[4] (See AR 146-47, 153-55, 232-35, 355, 358, 368, 617-20.) Moreover, so long as petitioner retains a license to operate, a repeat of such an episode while children are present cannot be avoided with certainty on this record, as there was evidence before the ALJ that Victim 1 went to the facility three to five times per week, had assisted with childcare, and would come to the facility whenever petitioner “needs something.” (AR 238, 241.)

Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion “upon consideration of the entirety of the facts” for respondent to conclude that “public protection requires that [petitioner]’s license to operate a family child care facility be revoked.” (AR 260.) As the ALJ explained, petitioner’s “failure to take responsibility for her actions on January 16, 2023, and her giving multiple version[s] of events of that day, demonstrate that she poses a danger to potential clients for failing to tell the truth.” (AR 260.)

Petitioner also challenges the punishment imposed on the ground that certain mitigating factors were not properly considered. (Pet. Br. at 12-17.) The Court addresses each in turn and finds no abuse of discretion.

Petitioner contends she has an “otherwise impeccable record as a childcare provider since 2007” and “has no criminal record.” (Pet. Br. at 12, 13.) While petitioner may have had no criminal record prior to her arrest for domestic violence on January 16, 2023, her record as a childcare provider was not unblemished. As discussed above, she was cited in 2020 for having firearms and ammunition accessible to children in her care. In March 2023, a mere two months after the domestic violence incident, she was cited for having hazardous substances in her bathroom cabinet accessible to children in her care, which petitioner blamed on the LPM who conducted the inspection of her facility instead of taking full responsibility. In light of this record, the punishment imposed by respondent was not an abuse of discretion.

Petitioner argues that a license “cannot be revoked unless the misconduct is directly related to the licensee’s qualifications, functions, or duties.” (Pet. Br. at 13.) For this proposition, petitioner relies on Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214, 229, which held that a teacher’s private sexual conduct could only serve as the basis for revocation of his teaching license if such conduct “indicate[d] his unfitness to teach.” (Morrison, 1 Cal.3d at 235.)

Here, revocation of petitioner’s license was pursuant to section 1596.885(c), which provides more broadly for revocation of a facility license for misconduct that is “inimical to the health, morals, welfare, or safe of either an individual in or receiving services from the facility or the people of this state.” In any event, even if revocation under section 1596.885(c) were to require misconduct that directly relates to petitioner’s fitness as a childcare provider, it would not be an abuse of discretion to find that requirement satisfied here. Failing to prevent access by children under her care to hazardous substances and firearms most certainly bears on a provider’s ability and fitness to protect such children and keep them safe. Likewise, a violent outburst resulting in physical injury to another may demonstrate a childcare provider’s unfitness to be entrusted with the safety and care of children who cannot defend themselves against such physical aggression by an adult. Moreover, here, the violent altercation occurred at petitioner’s home, where she operates her childcare facility.

Petitioner argues that “[r]espondent did not present any evidence that a child was ever harmed in [petitioner]’s care.” (Pet. Br. at 14.) While that may be true, it does not render the decision to revoke petitioner’s license an abuse of discretion. Here, the prospect of great harm to children in petitioner’s care was demonstrated by the potential exposure of her children to toxic materials, the potential exposure of her children to deadly firearms, and the potential exposure of her children to violence by petitioner herself. As held by the Court of Appeal in Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, a licensing board is not precluded from revoking a person’s license absent a showing of actual harm to the licensee’s client. Rather, a “preventive response” is “within the Board’s discretion,” as holding otherwise “would significantly diminish . . . the protections intended” by statutory provisions that authorize disciplinary action for misconduct. (Id. at 692-93.)

Citing Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, petitioner argues that decisions made by administrative bodies must weigh the hardships imposed on individuals, claiming that respondent “failed to consider the severe impact revocation would have on the families who rely on [petitioner]’s daycare services.” (Pet. Br. at 14.) It is not at all clear that the ALJ was required to consider the impact upon petitioner’s clients, as, in every case in which a childcare provider were to lose its license, there would presumably be a material, adverse impact upon the children and families left without childcare.

Even if the hardship of third-parties should be considered here, including, for example, the impact upon the Gainers who had sent their children to petitioner for childcare for twelve years, reasonable minds could differ over whether revoking petitioner’s license was warranted in light of the violations and potential for harm to children in petitioner’s care. In such a case, there is no abuse of discretion. (Hanna, 212 Cal.App.4th at 764.)

Petitioner highlights the Gainers’s testimony that they feel comfortable sending their children to petitioner for child care services, Rodrick Stummans’ testimony that Victim No. 1 and petitioner have agreed that Victim No. 1 will not be at the facility when children are present during business hours, and Margarita Lopez’s testimony that petitioner operates a safe childcare facility. (Pet. Br. at 15-16.) These are undoubtedly mitigating factors. Nonetheless, while reasonable minds might weigh such evidence differently and impose a less severe sanction for petitioner’s violations, it is not unreasonable to conclude that revocation of petitioner’s license is nonetheless warranted in light of the evidence of significant potential harm her conduct presents to the children under her care. As such, there is no abuse of discretion. (Hanna, 212 Cal.App.4th at 764.)

Petitioner contends that the imposition of probation pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 4982.15 would be a sufficient remedy to address public safety concerns. (Pet. Br. at 16.) To begin with, B&P § 4982.5 is entirely inapposite here, as it relates to licensing for marriage and family therapists, not childcare providers. Regardless, to the extent probation is a permissible discipline for petitioner’s violations as a childcare provider, for the reasons discussed above, respondent’s decision to impose a more serious penalty was not an abuse of discretion.

The petition is DENIED. Pursuant to Local Rule 3.231(n), respondent California Department of Social Services shall prepare, serve, and ultimately file a proposed judgment.

[1] Victim No. 1 is petitioner’s husband. His identity was placed under seal during the administrative hearings.

[2] All further statutory references and citations are to the Health and Safety Code, unless otherwise indicated.

[3] In her Opening Brief, petitioner contested the chosen punishment but did not challenge the findings that she committed the violations set forth in the Accusation. For the first time in Reply, petitioner argued that she did not commit any violations and challenged the ALJ’s findings. (Reply at 5-6.) Insofar as petitioner has not waived the challenge entirely (see Kahn v. Wilson (1898) 120 Cal. 643, 644), the Court finds petitioner failed to meet her burden. In its independent judgment, the Court finds that the weight of the evidence, as recounted above, supports the ALJ’s conclusion and supporting findings that petitioner committed the violations set forth in the Accusation. (See Finnerty v. Board of Registered Nursing (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 219, 227 [“When a trial court rules on a petition for writ of mandate following a license revocation, it must exercise its independent judgment to determine whether the weight of the evidence supported the administrative decision”].)

[4] To explain the significant inconsistencies in her testimony, petitioner contends in Reply that they were a “product of trauma, language barriers, and lack of legal sophistication.” (Reply at 6.) However, this fails to explain why petitioner testified for the first time at the hearing that Victim No. 1 strangled her (AR 528) or why her testimony differed from what she first told the responding officers. (Compare AR 146 with AR 524-534.) It also ignores the fact that Officers Carrasco and Pulido questioned petitioner in Spanish—Pulido’s first language and a language in which Pulido has been a certified as an interpreter for nine years. (AR 231, 233.)