Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCP03341, Date: 2024-11-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCP03341 Hearing Date: November 12, 2024 Dept: 86
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BI INCORPORATED, |
Petitioner, |
Case No. |
24STCP03341 |
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vs. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TECHNOLOGY, |
Respondent. |
[TENTATIVE] RULING ON (1) ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE RE: WHY THE COURT SHOULD NOT ORDER NON-DISCLOSURE OF SUBJECT MATERIAL
AND (2) MOTION TO FILE RECORDS UNDER SEAL Dept. 86 (Hon. Curtis A. Kin) |
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I.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This
proceeding concerns petitioner’s response to Request for Proposal No. C5611414
(“RFP”) for Global Positioning System (“GPS”) and Electronic Monitoring
Services. (Pet. at 2:1-7.) Petitioner BI Incorporated is the largest provider
of GPS tracking technologies in the United States. (Pet. ¶ 3.)
On
September 5, 2024, respondent California Department of Technology (“CDT”)
notified petitioner that it received a California Public Records Act request
for documents that petitioner submitted to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation in response to the RFP. (Pet. ¶¶ 4, 6.) CDT
allowed petitioner to provide proposed redactions to petitioner’s submission
materials. (Pet. ¶ 7.) CDT disagreed with the extent of petitioner’s proposed
redactions and provided petitioner with a version of its submission materials
with fewer redactions than petitioner desires. (Pet. ¶ 7; Hansen Decl. re: Ex
Parte Application ¶ 3 & Ex. C.)
On
October 11, 2024, CDT provided petitioner up to October 21, 2024 to obtain a
court order preventing disclosure of petitioner’s response to the RFP. (Hansen
Decl. re: Ex Parte Application ¶ 3 & Ex. C.) On October 17, 2024,
petitioner filed an ex parte application seeking to stay the release of
petitioner’s response to the RFP, as well as a motion to seal the parties’
competing redacted versions of petitioner’s submission materials. (See Hansen
Decl. re: Motion to Seal ¶ 3 & Exs. A, B.) Respondent stood by its proposed
redactions but indicated that it would not oppose petitioner’s proposed
redactions in court and that it would comply with the Court’s orders regarding
disclosure. (Hansen Supp. Decl. ¶ 14 & Ex. 1.)
On
October 28, 2024, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining CDT
from releasing its proposed redacted version of petitioner’s response to the
RFP. The Court also issued an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction
should not be ordered enjoining CDT from releasing the redacted version
proposed by it, instead of the redacted version proposed by petitioner, which
contains more redactions.
No
opposition to the Order to Show Cause has been filed.
II.
ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE RE: WHY THE COURT SHOULD NOT ORDER NON-DISCLOSURE OF SUBJECT
MATERIAL
BI
Incorporated seeks a preliminary injunction restraining respondent California
Department from releasing the lesser redacted version of the Response for
Proposal Number C56111414 proposed by respondent instead of the more redacted
version as proposed by petitioner.
“[T]he
question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two
interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the
merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the
granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528,
554.)
Under the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”),
“every person has a right to inspect any public record” of a state or local
agency subject to statutory exemptions. (Gov. Code § 7922.530(a).) Agencies may
withhold any record upon a showing that “on the facts of the particular case
the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the
public interest served by disclosure of the record.” (Gov. Code § 7922.000.)
Third parties seeking to prevent an agency from producing their records can
file a “reverse-CPRA” action to obtain a determination that such records are
exempt from disclosure. (See Marken
v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1265-67.) “The burden
of proof as to the application of an exemption [to the CPRA] is on the
proponent of nondisclosure, who must demonstrate ‘that on the facts of the
particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly
outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.’” (Humane
Society of U.S. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1255.)
The CPRA also does not require disclosure of records
that are privileged under the Evidence Code. (Gov. Code §7927.705.) Under
Evidence Code § 1060, “the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to
disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the
allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work
injustice.” (Evid. Code § 1060.) A “trade secret” is “information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(1) [d]erives independent economic value… from not being generally known to the
public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use; and (2) [i]s the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 3426.1(d).) “[T]he party claiming the [trade
secret] privilege has the burden of establishing its existence.” (Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.)
Based on the “catch-all” provision of Government
Code § 7922.000 and its assertion that certain information in the response to
RFP is confidential and/or implicates public safety concerns if disclosed,
petitioner proposes redactions to which respondent has not agreed. Based on the
authorities cited above, the Court rules as follows concerning petitioner’s
proposed redactions:
|
Proposed Redaction Number |
Page Number ( __ of 562) |
Ruling |
Reason |
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1 |
28 |
GRANT |
Petitioner takes measures to ensure that the
identity of its supplier remains confidential, from which it derives economic
value due to having vetted the supplier over time. (Murnock Decl. ¶¶ 15-17.) |
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2 |
30 |
DENY |
The title, business telephone number, and business
email address (as opposed to home phone numbers and addresses) of
petitioner’s customer do not implicate any public safety concern that would
outweigh the public interest in disclosure. Petitioner also does not show
that it has taken measures to maintain the secrecy of the identity of its
customer. |
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3 |
33 |
DENY |
Same as #2 |
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4 |
36 |
DENY |
Same as #2 |
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5 |
39 |
DENY |
Petitioner does not demonstrate how knowing the
numbers describing its market reach could confer any advantage on its
competitors or would jeopardize public safety by providing information to
offenders to side step, challenge, or defeat the device. (See Murnock
Decl. ¶ 4.) |
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6 |
40 |
DENY |
Petitioner does not demonstrate how its
competitors could obtain economic value from knowing how much petitioner
spent on research and development. (See Murnock Decl. ¶¶ 4, 13.) |
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7 |
42 |
DENY |
Petitioner does not demonstrate how it derives
economic value from maintaining the secrecy of the number of products it
manufactured. |
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8 |
43 |
DENY |
Petitioner does not demonstrate that it has taken
measures to keep secret that it has a trainer on the specified manufacturing
standards or that it derives any economic value from having such a trainer. (See
generally Murnock Decl.) The assertion in the RFP that there are 3,600
certified trainers globally suggests that the possibility of petitioner
having such a trainer on staff is not a trade secret. |
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9 |
44 |
DENY |
Petitioner does not demonstrate how knowing the
numbers describing its market reach or the number of monitored individuals on
its systems confers any advantage on its competitors. |
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10 |
45 |
DENY |
Petitioner does not demonstrate that it has taken
measures to keep the amount of square feet it utilizes for equipment
production secret or that such information has any economic value. |
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11 |
46 |
GRANT |
Petitioner uses multiple security measures to
protect and maintain the security of its server room and has a valid interest
in preventing the widespread dissemination of the particular security
features employed. There is minimal
public interest in knowing petitioner’s precise security measures. |
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12 |
47 |
DENY |
Petitioner asserts that it has contractual
obligations to keep information about the SmartLINK mobile application
confidential. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 19.) However, the number of individuals who
use SmartLINK does not appear to give insight into how the application works
or the terms of any contract between petitioner and an agency. |
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13 |
48 |
GRANT |
Petitioner seeks to redact information regarding
how it determines whether an offender was near an area where a crime was
committed. The Court finds that the information could be used to evade
monitoring, which implicates public safety and outweighs the public interest
in disclosure. (Murnock Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 22, 23.) |
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14 |
49 |
GRANT |
Same as #13. |
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15 |
50 |
GRANT IN PART |
The response time of petitioner to parole agent
calls could potentially be information that would assist an offender in
evading monitoring. Accordingly, the
phrase beginning with “in less” and ending in “average” may be redacted. The number of outbound calls it places and
the number of hours of its training program do not appear to be information
that offenders could use to evade monitoring. The public interest in
disclosure outweighs any public interest in non-disclosure of such
information. |
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16 |
54 |
DENY |
Petitioner has not demonstrated how it derives any
economic value from keeping secret the number of program managers it would
assign to support personnel at the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). |
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17 |
55 |
GRANT |
Petitioner seeks to redact information concerning
how its technology could be used to track an offender’s movements in critical
situations. The Court finds that the information could be used to evade
monitoring, which implicates public safety and outweighs the public interest
in disclosure. (Murnock Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 22, 23.) |
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18 |
56 |
GRANT |
Same as #17 |
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19 |
57 |
GRANT |
Petitioner seeks to redact information concerning
how it can be determined whether an offender has tampered with a monitoring
device. The information could be used to evade monitoring, which implicates
public safety and outweighs the public interest in disclosure. (Murnock Decl.
¶ 24.) |
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20 |
58 |
GRANT IN PART |
Petitioner seeks to redact information regarding
the contents of TotalAccess reports (paragraph beginning with “Total Access
reports include” and ending with “discharges”). It is not readily apparent
how an offender could use this information to evade monitoring. The
information concerning the TotalAccess reports shall not be redacted. The other highlighted information which petitioner
seeks to redact concern tamper detection technology. The information could be
used to evade monitoring, which implicates public safety and outweighs the
public interest in disclosure. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 24.) This information
concerning tamper detection shall be redacted. |
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21 |
63 |
DENY |
Petitioners do not show how numbers concerning the
GPS locations processed per day and the comparison of GPS points with
reported crimes could be used to evade monitoring. |
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22 |
64 |
GRANT IN PART |
Petitioner seeks to redact information concerning
crime scene correlation. The Court finds that the information could be used
to evade monitoring, which implicates public safety and outweighs the public
interest in disclosure. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) The information concerning crime
scene correlation shall be redacted. With respect to the location of petitioner’s
Monitoring Operations, however, petitioner does not demonstrate any threat to
public safety that would result from disclosure of this information.
Petitioner only asserts that the information should remain confidential and
non-public. Petitioner does not show that the public interest in
non-disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. The
location of petitioner’s Monitoring Operations shall not be redacted. |
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23 |
65 |
DENY |
Respondent CDT’s proposed redactions are
sufficient and strike the proper balance between withholding any information
that could be used to evade monitoring and the public’s right to inspect any
public record. Petitioner only speculates that an experienced IT professional
could guess the redacted information. Even if such a professional guesses the
redacted information, petitioner does not state how an offender could use the
information to evade monitoring. |
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24 |
70 |
DENY |
Same as #23 |
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25 |
72 |
GRANT |
It is unclear what independent economic value
petitioner derives from how it trains supervision authorities. Nevertheless,
offenders could use the training subjects to determine what supervision
authorities know and exploit such determination accordingly to evade
monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 10.) |
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26 |
73 |
GRANT |
Same as #25 |
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27 |
74 |
GRANT |
Information concerning petitioner’s
troubleshooting processes and process to ensure its location map data is
updated every 60 seconds could be exploited to evade monitoring. |
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28 |
75 |
GRANT |
Information concerning petitioner’s tracking
processes could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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29 |
76 |
GRANT |
Information concerning petitioner’s data storage,
data retrieval, and contingency plans in the event of an emergency could be
exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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30 |
77 |
GRANT |
Information concerning how petitioner’s geo-fence
monitoring works could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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31 |
78 |
GRANT |
Information concerning how the device is monitored
and how motion is detected could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock
Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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32 |
79 |
GRANT |
Information concerning how the device works during
electrical power-related events, how a device can confirm signal coverage,
and how the device can detect if its case has been compromised could be
exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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33 |
80 |
GRANT IN PART |
Information concerning how the device can detect
if its case has been compromised and petitioner’s quality assurance processes
prior to delivery of devices could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock
Decl. ¶ 7.) This information shall be redacted. However, the number of GPS products that
petitioner manufactured neither sufficiently implicates public safety nor
imparts any independent economic value on petitioner. This information shall
not be redacted. |
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34 |
81 |
GRANT |
Petitioner takes measures to ensure that
information concerning its suppliers remains confidential and derives
economic value due to having vetted the suppliers over time. (Murnock Decl.
¶¶ 15-17.) |
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35 |
82 |
GRANT IN PART |
Information concerning petitioner’s inventory
management capabilities and how petitioner’s devices operate in the event of
low battery could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) This
information shall be redacted. However, the amount of money that petitioner
spends for research and development, set forth in Figure 20 on page 82, shall
not be redacted. Petitioner does not demonstrate how its competitors could
obtain economic value from knowing how much petitioner spent on research and
development. |
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36 |
83 |
GRANT |
Information concerning how petitioner’s devices
operate in the event of low battery could be exploited to evade monitoring.
(Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
|
37 |
84 |
GRANT IN PART |
Information concerning petitioner’s monitoring
operations could be exploited to evade monitoring. However, for the reasons stated above with respect
to #22, the location of petitioner’s Monitoring Operations shall not be
redacted. |
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38 |
86 |
GRANT |
Information concerning petitioner’s monitoring
operations could be exploited to evade monitoring. |
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39 |
87 |
GRANT |
Same as #38. |
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40 |
88 |
GRANT |
Same as #38. |
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41 |
89 |
DENY |
Information concerning petitioner’s testing
requirements for staff prior to working in monitoring operations does not
sufficiently implicate public safety to warrant non-disclosure. |
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42 |
90 |
DENY |
Information concerning petitioner’s data center
transition is not specific enough to implicate any public safety concerns or
warrant non-disclosure. Petitioner also does not set forth efforts it has
taken to keep secret information concerning the two federal agencies for
which petitioner currently serves as a cloud service provider. |
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42 (sic) |
91 |
DENY |
Petitioner does not demonstrate any threat to
public safety that would result from disclosure of the cities where its data
centers are located. Petitioner does not show that the public interest in
non-disclosure outweighs the public interest in disclosure. |
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43 |
92 |
DENY |
It is not readily apparent how offenders could
exploit information concerning petitioner’s accreditation and the fact that
it takes anti-virus software practices to evade monitoring. |
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44 |
93 |
GRANT |
Details concerning the measures petitioner takes
to secure its systems, as well as how its systems are designed, could be
exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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45 |
94 |
GRANT |
Same as #44. |
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46 |
95 |
GRANT |
Details concerning the testing of petitioner’s
systems could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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47 |
96 |
GRANT |
Details concerning how petitioner intends to
protect its records from unauthorized access could be exploited to evade
monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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48 |
97 |
GRANT |
Same as #47. |
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49 |
98 |
GRANT IN PART |
With respect to how petitioner’s software will
interface with CDCR’s systems, respondent CDT’s proposed redactions are
sufficient and strike the proper balance between withholding any information
that could be used to evade monitoring and the public’s right to inspect any
public record. Petitioner only speculates that an experienced IT professional
could guess the redacted information. Even if such a professional guesses the
redacted information, petitioner does not state how an offender could use the
information to evade monitoring. This information shall not be redacted. With respect to the number of agencies that
petitioner currently supports, it is not readily apparent how this
information could be exploited to evade monitoring. This information shall
not be redacted. With respect to petitioner’s TotalAccess
architecture and how agencies could use the software, this information could
be exploited to evade monitoring. The paragraph beginning with “TotalAccess
architecture” and ending with “contacting BI” shall be redacted. |
|
50 |
99 |
GRANT |
Information concerning the possible configurations
in TotalAccess could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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51 |
100 |
GRANT |
Information concerning the possible configurations
in TotalAccess and how the software identifies locations visited by an
offender could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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52 |
101 |
GRANT |
Information concerning how petitioner’s software
identifies locations visited by an offender could be exploited to evade
monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) As the information pertains to petitioner’s
central goal of tracking the location of offenders, petitioner derives
independent economic value from its efforts to keep the information secret.
(Murnock Decl. ¶ 9.) |
|
53 |
103 |
GRANT |
Offenders could use the training subjects to
determine what supervision authorities know and exploit such determination to
evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 10.) |
|
54 |
104 |
GRANT |
Same as #53. |
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55 |
105 |
GRANT |
Same as #53. |
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56 |
106 |
GRANT |
Information concerning how petitioner’s software
could be used to track offenders could be exploited to evade monitoring.
(Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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57 |
107 |
GRANT |
Same as #56. |
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58 |
109 |
GRANT |
Details concerning the integration of CDCR’s data
with petitioner’s systems and how GPS location information is queried in
petitioner’s software could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl.
¶ 7.) |
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59 |
110 |
GRANT |
Details concerning how GPS location information is
queried in petitioner’s software could be exploited to evade monitoring.
(Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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60 |
111 |
GRANT |
Details concerning how GPS location information is
queried in petitioner’s software, as well as information concerning the
correlation of GPS location data with crime scene data, could be exploited to
evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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61 |
112 |
GRANT |
Details concerning the correlation of GPS location
data with crime scene data and collection of GPS location data could be
exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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62 |
113 |
GRANT IN PART |
It is not readily apparent how offenders could
exploit information concerning petitioner’s accreditation and the fact that
it takes anti-virus software practices to evade monitoring. This information
shall not be redacted. However, details concerning the measures
petitioner takes to secure its systems, i.e., the information after
the sentence “Key aspects of BI’s approach to anti-virus software include:”,
could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) This information
shall be redacted. |
|
63 |
114 |
GRANT |
Details concerning the measures petitioner takes
to secure its systems, as well as how its systems are designed, could be
exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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64 |
115 |
GRANT IN PART |
Details concerning the measures petitioner takes
to secure its systems, i.e., the information above the “Hiring
Practices” section, could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.)
This information shall be redacted. With respect to the “Hiring Practices” section,
however, it is not readily apparent how offenders could exploit information
concerning the background checks of its employees and the goals of staff
training to evade monitoring. This information shall not be redacted. |
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65 |
116 |
GRANT IN PART |
It is not readily apparent how information
concerning petitioner’s background check and data segmentation requirements
could be used to evade monitoring. This information shall not be redacted. With respect to petitioner’s crime scene
correlation capabilities, however, the Court finds that the information could
be used to evade monitoring, which implicates public safety and outweighs the
public interest in disclosure. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) The information
concerning crime scene correlation shall be redacted. |
|
66 |
117 |
GRANT |
Information concerning how petitioner’s device
tracks offenders could be exploited to evade monitoring. (Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) |
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67 |
118 |
GRANT |
Information concerning how petitioner’s software
could be used to track offenders could be exploited to evade monitoring.
(Murnock Decl. ¶ 7.) As the information pertains to petitioner’s central goal
of tracking the location of offenders, petitioner derives independent
economic value from its efforts to keep the information secret. (Murnock Decl.
¶ 9.) |
|
68 |
119 |
GRANT |
Same as #67. |
|
69 |
120 |
GRANT |
Same as #67. |
|
70 |
121 |
GRANT |
Same as #67 with respect to how petitioner’s
software can be used to track offenders. How CDCR Parole Agents can use SmartLINK to verify
offender attendance at appointments and treatment locations may defeat
monitoring of the offender and shall be redacted. With respect to the identities of petitioner’s
employees, the Court agrees that, for personal safety reasons, this
information shall be redacted. |
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71 |
122 |
GRANT IN PART |
Information concerning how petitioner would
respond to a subpoena does not implicate public safety that would warrant
non-disclosure. Nor does this information imparts any independent economic
value on petitioner. On its face, how petitioner would respond to a subpoena
does not reveal communications between a client and lawyer. (See Evid.
Code § 954.) This information shall not be redacted. With respect to the goals of its Quality Control
program, i.e., the information after Question 50, the Court agrees
that the information imparts independent economic value on petitioner and
would pose a threat of competitive harm if revealed. This information shall
be redacted. |
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72 |
123 |
GRANT |
With respect to the goals of its Quality Control
program, the Court agrees that the information imparts independent economic
value on petitioner and would pose a threat of competitive harm if revealed. With respect to the identities of petitioner’s
employee, the Court agrees that, for personal safety reasons, this
information shall be redacted. |
|
73 |
124 |
GRANT |
With respect to the identities of petitioner’s
employee, the Court agrees that, for personal safety reasons, this
information shall be redacted. |
|
74 |
132 |
DENY |
The title, business telephone number, and business
email address (as opposed to home phone numbers and addresses) of
petitioner’s customers do not implicate any public safety concern that would
outweigh the public interest in disclosure. Petitioner also does not show
that it has taken measures to maintain the secrecy of the identity of its
customers. |
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that petitioner has demonstrated a
probability of demonstrating at trial that certain information, as specified in
the table above, should be redacted in the interest of public safety and/or to
protect trade secrets. This is
particularly so given that the CDT has not provided the identity of the
requestor to petitioner (Supp. Hansen Decl. ¶ 4),
Petitioner has also demonstrated the harm that would
result from denial of a preliminary injunction to enjoin disclosure of the
information that the Court has deemed should be redacted, as set forth above.
Should respondent CDT disclose the information subject to redaction prior to
trial, confidentiality of the information can no longer be ensured.
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner’s request for
a preliminary injunction is GRANTED IN PART as set forth in the table above. The Court’s Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re: Preliminary Injunction issued on
10/28/24 is DISCHARGED.
III.
MOTION
TO FILE RECORDS UNDER SEAL
For
the reasons stated above with respect to petitioner’s request for a preliminary
injunction, petitioner’s UNOPPOSED motion to seal is GRANTED IN PART. Exhibits
A and B to the declaration of Lisa Kralik Hansen in support of the motion to
seal (i.e., the parties’ respective proposed redaction to petitioner’s
response to the Request for Proposal) shall be filed under seal, as it is
impracticable to separate redactable information from non-redactable
information contain in electronic files located on USB drives.
However,
“the public has an interest, in all civil cases, in observing and assessing the
performance of its public judicial system, and that interest strongly supports
a general right of access in ordinary civil cases.” (NBC Subsidiary
(KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1210.) California
recognizes a common law and First Amendment right of access to court records. (Overstock.com,
Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471, 483; see
also Rule of Court 2.550(c) [court records presumed to be open].)
Accordingly,
pursuant to the general right of access to court records, by no later than
11/20/24, petitioner BI Incorporated shall file a version of its response to
the RFP with the redactions approved by the Court as set forth in the table
above, so there is a public record of what this Court decided may and may not
be preliminarily enjoined from disclosure pursuant to the CPRA.