Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case Number: 24STCP03546, Date: 2025-03-20 Tentative Ruling

Respondents County of Los Angeles demurs to the two causes of action in the Petition for Writ of Mandate.

On June 6, 2024, Petitioner Donald Cook sent a California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) request to Edward Yen, Executive Officer for the County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors. (Pet. ¶ 4.) In his CPRA request, Petitioner sought “documents showing how much the County has paid to outside counsel for representation in the following cases: Astorga v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:20-cv09805-AB-AGR; Padilla v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:22-cv-06224 AB-MAR; and Lacoste v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:23-cv-4917-DMG-AGR.” (Id.)

Cook is an individual and a member of the public within the meaning of §§ 7920.515. (Pet. ¶ 2.) Respondent County of Los Angeles, specifically the executive office within the County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors, a county-wide department created by the County of Los Angeles, is a local public agency within the meaning of §§ 7920.510(a). (Pet. ¶ 3.)

On December 13, 2024, Respondent filed a Demurrer with a Motion to Strike. On December 16, 2024, Respondent filed an Amended Demurrer with a Motion to Strike. On March 6, 2025, Petitioner filed an Opposition. As of March 13, 2025, no reply has been filed.

Respondent’s requests for judicial notice as to the following are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d), which permits judicial notice of any court record of the United States:

· Exhibit 1 - “Civil docket sheet in the pending federal matter entitled Astorga v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 2;20-cv-09805-AB-AGR

· Exhibit 2 - Civil docket sheet in the pending federal matter entitled Padilla v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:22-cv-06224 AB-MAR, Case No. 2;20-cv-09805-AB-AGR

· Exhibit 3 – Civil docket sheet in the pending federal matter entitled Lacoste v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:23-cv-4917-DMG-AGR

“A respondent may test the legal sufficiency of a petition for writ of mandate by demurrer.” (Committee for Sound Water & Land Development v. City of Seaside, 79 Cal. App. 5th 389, 399 (2022) [citing May v. City of Milpitas, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 1323 (2013)].) Such demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable; evidence or extrinsic matters are not considered. (CCP §§ 430.30, 430.70; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

“There are two essential requirements to the issuance of a traditional writ of mandate: (1) a clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent, and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to the performance of that duty.” (California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “An action in ordinary mandamus is proper where…the claim is that an agency has failed to act as required by law.” (Id. at 705.)

With respect to the two causes of action alleged in the Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate—violation of the CPRA (Govt. Code § 7920, et seq.)[1] and violation of the California Constitution, Art. I § 3(b)(2)—petitioner seeks a peremptory writ of mandate pursuant to CCP § 1085 directing respondent to provide “documents showing how much the County has paid to outside counsel for representation in three cases: (1) Astorga v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:20-cv09805-AB-AGR; (2) Padilla v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:22-cv-06224 AB-MAR; and (3) Lacoste v. County of Los Angeles, Case No. 2:23-cv-4917-DMG-AGR.” (Pet. ¶4.) The requested documents include accounting records, County spreadsheet files and other electronically maintained data records, and county auditor/controller records showing payments made, including canceled checks. (Pet. Ex. F.)

Respondents argue that petitioner presents no clear, present, and ministerial duty to produce privileged information concerning pending litigation such that a writ of mandate may issue. Petitioner alleges that respondent has a duty to comply with its statutory obligations under the CPRA, which provides in pertinent part that “[e]xcept with respect to public records exempt from disclosure by express provisions of law, each state or local agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly available to any person[.]” (Pet. ¶ 24.)[2]

One express provision of the CPRA that exempts certain records from disclosure is section 7927.200, which states: “[T]his division does not require disclosure of any of the following records: (a) Records pertaining to pending litigation to which the public agency is a party, until the pending litigation has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled.” (§ 7927.200.) Another express provision of the CPRA for exemption of records from disclosure is section 7927.705, which states: “[T]his division does not require disclosure of records, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including, but not limited to provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.” (§ 7927.705.)

The Petition alleges that the requested records are “largely in-house County-prepared accounting records showing payments made as to particular litigation,” and accordingly are “public records not exempted from disclosure” under the CPRA, because “the requested records [a]re by definition not covered by the attorney-clients or attorney work-product privileges or, for that matter, the CPRA’s pending litigation exception.” (Pet. ¶¶ 14, 23.)

In determining whether the requested records fall within the CPRA express provisions for exemption from disclosure, the Court finds Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court dispositive. (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 288 [hereinafter “LA County”].) In LA County, the ACLU sought “‘invoices’ specifying the amounts that the County had been billed by any law firm in connection with nine different lawsuits” against the County claiming excessive force on inmates, including pending lawsuits. (Id. at 288.) Interpreting former section 6254(k),[3] the predecessor to section 7927.705, our Supreme Court examined “whether invoices for legal services transmitted to a government agency by outside counsel are categorically protected by the attorney-client privilege and therefore exempt from disclosure . . . , and if not, whether any of the information sought . . . is nonetheless covered by the privilege.” (LA County, 2 Cal.5th at 290.)

Recognizing that “[i]nvoices for legal services are generally not communicated for the purpose of legal consulation,” our Supreme Court refrained from holding that “everything in a public agency’s invoices for legal services is categorically privileged.” (LA County, 2 Cal.5th at 295, 300.) Instead, the Court held: “[C]ontents of an invoice are privileged only if they either communicate information for the purpose of legal consultation or risk exposing information that was communicated for such a purpose. This latter category includes any invoice that reflects work in active and ongoing litigation.” (Id. at 300.) The Supreme Court explained “information contained within certain invoices may be within the scope of the privilege” insofar as billing information “is conveyed ‘for the purpose of legal representation’—perhaps to inform the client of the nature or amount of work occurring in connection with a pending legal issue.” (Id. at 297.) Indeed, the Court declared that “such information lies in the heartland of the attorney-client privilege.” (Ibid.) The Court further explained that “even if the information is more general, such as aggregate figures describing the total amount spend on continuing litigation . . . , it may come close enough to this heartland to threaten the confidentiality of information directly relevant to the attorney’s distinctive professional role.” (Ibid.)

In addition to recognizing that the privilege protects both specific and aggregate information from disclosure, our Supreme Court also observed that the privilege extends to protect against the disclosure of such information irrespective of where it may be contained, stating: “The attorney-client privilege protects the confidentiality of information in both those categories, even if the information happens to be transmitted in a document that is not itself categorically privileged.” (LA County, 2 Cal.5th at 297.) The Supreme Court thus held explicitly:

When a legal matter remains pending and active, the privilege encompasses everything in an invoice, including the amount of aggregate fees. This is because, even though the amount of money paid for legal services is generally not privileged, an invoice that shows a sudden uptick in spending “might very well reveal much of [a government agency]’s investigative efforts and trial strategy. [Citation omitted.] Midlitigation swings in spending, for example, could reveal an impending filing or outsized concern about a recent event.

(Ibid.) The Court noted that such application of privilege and protection from disclosure was “sensitive to the County’s concern” that disclosure of billing information during a pending litigation “can provide adversaries a window into litigation strategies—‘a road map as to how the matter is being litigated, or may be litigated in the future.’” (Id. at 300.)

Here, the Petition seeks disclosure of records from three pending cases in which the County is a defendant. (See Amened RJN Exs 1-3.) Such requested records seek documents “showing how much the County has paid to outside counsel for representation” in these pending cases. (Pet. ¶ 8.) This is precisely the information the Supreme Court held in LA County to be exempt from disclosure. (LA County, 2 Cal.5th at 297.) Although petitioner contends otherwise, the form of the documents sought, such as spreadsheets, canceled checks, auditor/controller records, and billing invoices (see Pet. Ex. F) does not change the result, as the information in such types of records would reveal the privileged information of amounts paid to an outside law firm, thereby threatening the confidentiality and privilege of how much work is being conducted by counsel and when during the pending litigation.

Accordingly, because the Verified Petition seeks the production of records specifically exempted from disclosure under the CPRA, it fails to allege any ministerial duty required of respondent County. The Demurrer must be SUSTAINED.

The County requests the Court strike Paragraph 28 and Prayer for Relief at Items 3 and 4 of the Petition. Because the Court sustains respondent’s Demurrer as to the entire Verified Petition, the Motion to Strike portions of the Verified Petition is MOOT.

The Demurrer to the Petition is SUSTAINED. The Motion to Strike is DENIED as MOOT.

In his Opposition Brief, petitioner states that “[t]o the extent there is a pleading defect, if necessary the petition can be amended,” but proffers no explanation as to how the pleading defect might reasonably be cured by amendment. (Opp. at 6-7.) The Court will hear from petition at the hearing a proffer as to what, if any, amendment might reasonably cured the pleading defects discussed herein.

[1] All further statutory references herein are to the Government Code, unless otherwise specified.

[2] Petitioner erroneously cites “CPRA § 7927.200” as the source for this requirement, but such language from the CPRA actually is found at Government Code section 7922.530. (Compare § 7927.200 [Disclosure of records relating to pending litigation involving public agencies] with § 7922.530 [Prompt availability of records upon request].)

[3] Section 6254(k) allowed public agencies to withhold “records, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.” (LA County, 2 Cal.5th at 291, quoting § 6254(k).)