Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case Number: 24STCV02973, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCV02973, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV02973 Hearing Date: January 28, 2025 Dept: 86

MOTION TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT PENDING APPEAL

Date: 1/28/25 (1:30 PM)

Case: Chester P. Kim et al. v. Alex Myung Cha et al. (24STLC00247)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Alex Cha’s Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment Pending Appeal is GRANTED.

On 10/2/24, after having conducted an evidentiary hearing, the Court entered the following judgment:

1. On the first cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Corporation Code section 5527 re: election of Defendants Alex Myung Cha, Young Nae Lee aka Brandon Lee, and Benedict J. Pak as directors of the Foundation election, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants.

2. On the second cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Corporation Code section 5527 re: election of Defendant Alex Myung Cha as chair of the board, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendant.

3. On the third cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Corporation Code section 5527 re: removal of Plaintiffs as director of the Foundation, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiffs and against Defendants.

4. The Court declares that the election of Defendants Alex Myung Cha, Young Nae Lee aka Brandon Lee, and Benedict J. Pak as Directors of the Foundation on January 23, 2023 was invalid.

5. The Court declares that the election of Defendant Alex Myung Cha as chair of the Board of Directors of the Foundation on January 3, 2024 was invalid.

6. The Court declares that the removal of Plaintiffs Chester P. Kim, Howard Park, and Al Ilsoon Choe as Directors of the Foundation on January 3, 2024 was invalid.

On 10/3/24, defendant Alex Cha filed a Notice of Appeal.

Defendant Cha now moves for an order staying enforcement of the judgment pending his appeal, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 916 and 918. Defendant Cha contends that the judgment set forth above is a mandatory injunction, which is subject to an automatic stay pending appeal. (Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1035.)

CCP §§ 916 and 918 are located in part 2, title 13, chapter 2 governing stay of enforcement and other proceedings. “No statute in chapter 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, part 2, title 13, specifically addresses the stay of injunctive orders, as distinct from other kinds of judgments. From the start, however, courts have understood the default statutory rule governing stays pending appeal to apply to some injunctive orders but not others, embracing a common law distinction between prohibitory, or preventive, injunctions and those mandating performance of an affirmative act.” (Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1039-40, footnote omitted.)

“[T]he core rationale underlying the mandatory-prohibitory distinction was based on an abiding concern with preserving the status quo pending appeal. The idea was that a prohibitory injunction is exempt from stay because such an injunction, by its nature, operates to preserve the status quo; by definition such an injunction prevents the defendant from taking actions that would alter the parties’ respective provisions. To stay enforcement of such an order pending appeal would not preserve the status quo but instead invite its destruction; a stay would leave the parties free to alter conditions during the appeal, with sometimes irreversible consequences…. Not so with the injunction that mandates the performance of an affirmative act — the so-called mandatory injunction. Such an injunction, by definition, commands some change in the parties’ positions. The cases hold that before such orders are executed and the defendant must detrimentally alter its position, the defendant is entitled to know whether the order is correct.” (Id. at 1041.)

On its face, the language of the judgment in this matter appears not to command any particular action or inaction and merely declares the parties’ respective rights concerning the validity of their election or removal from certain positions within the Foundation. However, as recognized and conceded by defendants, the effect of such declarations is to “require[e] defendants to vacate their seats on the board of directors, and install plaintiffs on the board.” (Mtn. at 3:12-14.) In Daly, 11 Cal.5^th at 1047, the Court similarly observed that the “ousting” of a District Supervisor and “seating her replacement” “were merely incidental to parts of the judgment declaring [the prior Supervisor]’s appointment null and void.” Here, too, while the judgment does not explicitly remove defendants from their positions or replace them with plaintiffs, the Court’s declaration in the judgment that the January 23, 2023 and January 3, 2024 were invalid calls for defendants’ removal and replacement as an incident to such declaration of invalidity.

The judgment’s effective removal and replacement of defendants is, therefore, a mandatory injunction. It “commands some change in the parties’ positions.” (Daly, 11 Cal.5th at 1041.) Indeed, that is precisely what plaintiffs now demand in light of the Court’s judgment. (Cha Decl. ¶ 7 [“Plaintiffs and their counsel have since made repeated demands that I and the other defendants turn over control of the Foundation’s board”].) Because, as recognized by both parties, the judgment effectively calls for performance of an affirmative act, it constitutes a mandatory injunction.

To circumvent the automatic stay of a mandatory injunction pending appeal, plaintiffs contend the judgment in this matter is merely a declaratory judgment. The Court disagrees. As noted above, that is not the position plaintiff appear to assert in their post-judgment attempts to reassert control over the Foundation’s board. (See Cha Decl. ¶ 7.) Moreover, the judgment at issue would seemingly provide no meaningful remedy or relief to plaintiffs if it were merely a declaratory judgment. Declaratory relief is different from injunctive relief. “Unlike coercive relief (such as damages, specific performance, or an injunction) in which a party is ordered by the court to do or to refrain from doing something, a declaratory judgment merely declares the legal relationship between the parties.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 898.) “Declaratory relief operates prospectively, serving to set controversies at rest before obligations are repudiated, rights are invaded or wrongs are committed. Thus the remedy is to be used to advance preventive justice, to declare rather than execute rights.” (Kirkwood v. California State Automobile Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 49, 59; see also California School Bds. Assn. v. State of California (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 770, 790 [“declaratory relief is generally available to settle the parties' rights with respect to future actions, and not to correct conduct that occurred in the past”].) In other words, declaratory relief does not remedy past wrongs.

Here, the judgment in plaintiffs’ favor remedies the past wrongs of the January 23, 2023, and January 3, 2024 elections and removals by invalidating them. That is coercive relief and an execution of rights; it is not a mere declaration of rights to guide the parties going forward.

In any event, even if the judgment in this matter were deemed a declaratory judgment, it would be of no moment to plaintiffs, because the result of this motion would be the same. As pointed out in reply, CCP § 916(a) generally operates to stay enforcement of a judgment pending appeal, subject to exceptions not applicable here. (See CCP § 916(a) [“[T]he perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order”]; see also, e.g., CCP §§ 116.810 [small claims court judgments and orders], 917.1 [undertaking required to stay enforcement of money judgment].) Accordingly, a declaratory judgment would be subject to a stay of enforcement per CCP § 916(a).

For the foregoing reasons, irrespective of whether the judgment is declaratory or injunctive, defendant Cha’s perfecting of an appeal stayed its enforcement. The motion is GRANTED. Enforcement of the judgment entered on 10/2/24 is stayed pending resolution of defendant Cha’s appeal.