Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 24STCV11314, Date: 2024-06-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV11314    Hearing Date: June 6, 2024    Dept: 86

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

RE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Date:               6/6/24 (1:30 PM) 

Case:                           Vinatex, Inc. et al. v. Oxford SCS, Inc. et al. (24STCV11314) 

TENATATIVE RULING:

Plaintiffs Vinatex, Inc. and 3300 Leonis Blvd LLC’s request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.

As a preliminary matter, all evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.

Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from: (1) erecting any fence, barrier, or obstruction that would interfere with plaintiffs’ use of the driveway between the properties located at 1315 S. Main St., Los Angeles, CA 90015 and 1326 Broadway, Los Angeles, CA 90015 for ingress and egress; and (2) maintaining or failing to remove any poles, fencing, or other materials already erected that obstruct or threaten to obstruct plaintiffs’ use of the driveway.  On May 20, 2024, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause as why a preliminary injunction should issue to enjoin Defendants Oxford SCS, Inc. and Jihoon Cho from “obstructing, blocking, or otherwise interfering with Plaintiff’s use of the driveway between the properties located at 1315 S. Main St., Los Angeles, CA 90015 and 1326 Broadway, Los Angeles, CA 90015 for ingress and egress.”

With respect to whether plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction, “the question whether a preliminary injunction should be granted involves two interrelated factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, and (2) the relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.”  (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) 

I.                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This action involves two adjacent commercial parcels of land. Plaintiffs Vinatex, Inc. and 3300 Leonis Blvd LLC (“Leonis”) own and operate a business at 1315 S. Main St., Los Angeles, CA 90015 (“Main Property”). (Ton Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendant Oxford SCS, Inc. (“Oxford”) owns the property located at 1326 S. Broadway, Los Angeles, CA 90015 (“Broadway Property”). (Cho Decl. ¶ 4.) Each property has a rear lot for parking. (Ton Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. 1; Cho Decl. ¶ 6 & Ex. H.) Drivers seeking to access the parking lots can use either of two alley ways. (Ton Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. 1; Cho Decl. ¶ 10.) In the rear lot of the Main Property, a chain link fence enclosure has been constructed which impedes travel from the Main Property to the alley ways. (Cho Decl. ¶ 15 & Ex. M; Ecoff Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. M.)

Defendant Jihoon Cho purchased the Broadway Property on January 19, 2024, after which he transferred the property to Oxford. (Cho Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4 & Exs. F, G.) Plaintiff Leonis purchased the Main Property on December 26, 2023. (Ecoff Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. C.) Prior to the purchase of the respective properties by Cho and Leonis, both properties were owned by Jeremy Paul Sydney Fultheim. (Defs. Exs. C, F.) No easements are reflected in the disclosures associated with Cho’s purchase of the Broadway Property from Fultheim. (Cho Decl. ¶¶ 6-8 & Exs. I-K.)

The Broadway Property has tandem parking spots, parallel to the building structure, and one spot in front of its loading area. (Cho Decl. ¶ 10.) After Cho purchased the Broadway Property, plaintiffs’ representative would tell Cho’s employees to move their vehicles for plaintiffs to access their parking. On a number of occasions, plaintiffs’ vendors also blocked the parking spaces and the loading area on the Broadway Property to load and unload products. (Cho Decl. ¶ 11.) Cho proposed an agreement whereby plaintiffs would pay to use the Broadway Property and maintain and insure a portion of the Broadway Property to alleviate Cho’s concerns of potential liability. (Cho Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13; Ton Reply Decl. ¶ 2.) The parties did not reach any agreement. (Cho Decl. ¶ 13.)

Cho intends to erect a chain link fence that would enclose his parking and property. (Cho Decl. ¶ 14.) The fence would leave an 8-foot entrance for plaintiffs to access the Main Property. (Cho Decl. ¶ 14.)

II.                LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING ON MERITS

Plaintiffs contend that they have an easement for use of driveway on a portion of the Broadway Property based on prior use, necessity, and implication. Plaintiffs contend that the driveway “has been used openly, notoriously, and continuously for ingress and egress to Plaintiffs' property for over 90 years.” (Ton Decl. ¶ 3.)

“To establish the existence of an implied easement, a plaintiff must allege and prove a specific set of circumstances surrounding a particular land transaction: that a common owner of property conveyed a portion of that property to another, that the parties to the transaction must have intended to maintain the benefits and burdens between the newly divided estates after the separation of title, and that the resulting easement was reasonably necessary to the dominant estate.” (Romero v. Shih (2024) 15 Cal.5th 680, 698.) Here, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Fultheim, the common owner of the Broadway and Main Properties, intended to transfer the purported benefit of usage of the Broadway Property to plaintiffs when they purchased the Main Property. Indeed, the Property Information Sheet when Cho purchased the Broadway Property indicated that Fultheim had no actual knowledge of any easements other than those recorded, and the Preliminary Title Report indicated no recorded easements. (Cho Decl. ¶¶ 6-8 & Exs. J, K.)

While reasonable necessity is sufficient to show an easement by implication, an easement by necessity requires strict necessity.  (Pipkin v. Der Torosian (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 722, 730.) “The right of way from necessity must be in fact what the term naturally imports, and cannot exist except in cases of strict necessity. It will not exist where a man can get to his property through his own land. That the way over his own land is too steep or too narrow, or that other and like difficulties exist, does not alter the case; and it is only where there is no way through his own land that a grantee can claim a right over that of his grantor. It must also appear that the grantee has no other way.” (Kripp v. Curtis (1886) 71 Cal. 62, 65.) Here, it is undisputed that defendants intend to leave an eight-foot opening for plaintiffs to access the Main Property. (Cho Decl. ¶ 14.) Even if the existence of a fence were to make “getting any car in and out is very hard” (Ton Reply Decl. ¶ 5), strict necessity to use of the Broadway Property is not present here.

“To establish the elements of a prescriptive easement, the claimant must prove use of the property, for the statutory period of five years, which use has been (1) open and notorious; (2) continuous and uninterrupted; (3) hostile to the true owner; and (4) under claim of right.” (Mehdizadeh v. Mincer (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1305.) It is undisputed that, prior to plaintiff Leonis’ purchase of the Main Property in 2023, Fultheim owned both the Broadway and Main Properties. (Defs. Exs. C, F.) “A servitude thereon cannot be held by the owner of the servient tenement.” (Civ. Code § 805.) Civil Code § 805 “prevents a landowner from holding an easement on his own land…. [T]his rule proceeds from the rationale that a person does not need an easement in his or her own land, because all the uses of an easement are already included in the general right of fee ownership.” (Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1473.) Accordingly, the five-year statutory period could not have begun to run until 2023, when ownership of the two properties was no longer joint, meaning that the time for a prescriptive easement to be established has not elapsed.

Lastly, plaintiffs claim entitlement to an equitable easement.  This, too, fails.  Where there has been an encroachment on land without any legal right to do so, the Court may exercise its equity powers to affirmatively fashion an interest in the owner’s land which will protect the encroacher’s use, namely, a judicially created easement sometimes referred to as an “equitable easement.”  (Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 764-765; see also Tashakori v. Lakis (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1008.)  In determining whether to do so, the Court engages in equitable balancing to determine whether to prevent such encroachment, on the one hand, or instead to permit it and award damages to the landowner, on the other hand.  (Hirshfield, 91 Cal.App.4th at 759.)  In order to create an equitable easement, three factors must be present: (1) the encroacher must be “innocent” in that his or her encroachment is not willful or negligent; (2) the landowner must not suffer irreparable injury from the encroachment; and (3) the hardship to the encroacher must be greatly disproportionate to the hardship the continued encroachment would cause to the land owner.  (Shoen v. Zacarias (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, 19; Hirshfield, 91 Cal.App.4th at 759; Tashakori, 196 Cal.App.4th at 1009.)  Here, as discussed below, the Court does not find sufficient harm or hardship to plaintiffs, let alone “greatly disproportionate” harm.  Further, even if plaintiffs could establish the prerequisite to permit an equitable easement, on the current showing, it is not likely the Court would exercise its discretion in equity to create an easement in favor of plaintiffs.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are likely to prevail on their contention that they are entitled to an easement for use of the Broadway Property.

III.             HARM

Having failed to show a likelihood of prevailing on any cause of action, plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED, notwithstanding any harm that may result from the denial of plaintiffs’ request. (Jessen v. Keystone Savings & Loan Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 459 [“In a practical sense it is appropriate to deny an injunction where there is no showing of reasonable probability of success, even though the foreclosure will create irreparable harm, because there is no justification in delaying that harm where, although irreparable, it is also inevitable”].)

In any event, plaintiffs also fail to establish any great or irreparable harm that would warrant the issuance of a preliminary injunction.  To begin with, nothing prevents plaintiffs from accessing their property in the front on Main Street.  With regard to access to the back of their property, plaintiffs notably do not dispute that, at the very least, there is an eight-foot entrance permitting such access. (Cho Decl. ¶¶ 14, 16.)  Further, plaintiffs do not dispute that the ability to widen such access is entirely within the control of plaintiffs, who can adjust the use of their property on which they have erected a chain link fence enclosure that limits their own access to the rear loading and parking area of the Property.  (See Cho Decl. ¶ 15.)  Indeed, given plaintiffs’ ongoing and continuous access to their property, plaintiffs in conclusory fashion merely claim that narrower access than what they would prefer makes access more “difficult” or “challenging,” which causes some “burden and inefficiency” to their business operations.  (See Pl. Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6, 7.)  This is insufficient to demonstrate the requisite harm to merit injunctive relief.

The Court also notes plaintiffs’ argument in reply that an 8-foot opening is insufficient under fire codes requiring fire apparatus access roads to be at least 20 feet wide. It is unclear whether a 20-foot width requirement even applies, as the Main Property is less than 150 feet from the edge of a roadway—Main Street—providing access to fire trucks to the Main Property. (Los Angeles Municipal Code [“LAMC”] § 57.503.1.4 [“If any portion of the first story exterior walls of any building structure is more than 150 feet from the edge of the roadway of an approved street, an approved fire lane shall be provided so that such portion is within 150 feet of the edge of the fire lane.”]; Ton Decl. ¶ 4 & Ex. 1.) Even if a 20-foot width requirement were to apply, plaintiffs have not established that, even without the fence that defendants intend to build, there would actually be room for a 20-foot opening. (See International Fire Code § 503.1.1 [exception from requirement to provide fire apparatus access road when such road cannot be installed because of location on property]; LAMC § 57.503.1 [incorporating section 503.1.1 of International Fire Code].)

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. The temporary restraining order entered on May 20, 2024 is hereby DISSOLVED. The Court’s Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction is DISCHARGED.