Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case Number: 25STCP00046, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling

Respondent Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) demurs to Verified First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate.

Petitioner Salvador Garcia was arrested on March 19, 2022 for driving under the influence. (Pet. ¶¶ 3, 5 & Ex. A.) As a result of this arrest, petitioner was served with an Administrative Per Se Order of Suspension/Revocation Order and Temporary Driver License. (Pet. ¶ 3 & Ex. A at 4.) Based on the chemical test that had been administered, petitioner had a blood alcohol concentration of .15%. (Pet. ¶ 6.) Petitioner did not seek to challenge the administrative per se suspension within the time provided pursuant to the Administrative Per Se Order of Suspension. (Pet. ¶ 8 [indicating “N/A” for when petitioner requested administrative hearing].) On May 26, 2022, DMV issued an Order of Suspension, stating that petitioner’s commercial driving privileges were suspended for life pursuant to Vehicle Code § 13353.3. (Pet. ¶ 10 & Ex. G at 1.)

In connection with petitioner’s criminal case, petitioner had entered a no contest plea to the charge of driving a vehicle under the influence following the denial of his Penal Code § 1538.5 suppression motion. (Pet. Ex. F at 2.) Petitioner then appealed the denial of his suppression motion, maintaining that it had not been established he was lawfully detained. (Pet. Ex. F at 2.) Ultimately, the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles County Superior Court granted petitioner’s appeal, and, on April 29, 2024, the criminal court dismissed the matter pursuant to Penal Code § 1385. (Pet. Exs. E-F.) On August 18, 2024, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office executed a form entitled “Administrative Per Se Notice of Failure to File or Dismissal of Criminal Charges,” indicating that the criminal case against petitioner was dismissed on the basis that petitioner’s arrest had been unlawful. (Pet. Ex. C.) On October 10, 2024, DMV denied petitioner’s request for hearing regarding his lifetime suspension pursuant to Vehicle Code § 13353.2(e)-(f) on the ground that the request had not been made within one year from petitioner’s initial arrest. (Pet. Ex. D.)

On January 6, 2025, petitioner, utilizing Form L-0115, filed a Petition for Alternative Writ of Mandate CCP § 1094.5 and Vehicle Code § 13559 to Set Aside Suspension of Driving Privilege – DUI.

On April 17, 2025, respondent filed a demurrer to the Petition. On April 25, 2025, petitioner filed an opposition. On May 27, 2024, respondent filed a reply.

“The exhaustion of administrative remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite to the courts is well-settled doctrine.” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (194l) 17 Cal.2d280, 292-293.) “Before seeking judicial review a party must show that he has made a full presentation to the administrative agency upon all issues of the case and at all prescribed stages of the administrative proceedings.” (Edgren v. Regents of University of California (1984) 158 Cal. App. 3d 515, 520.) Thus, the administrative agency must have rendered a final decision on the issue before court intervention may be sought. (Ibid.)

DMV demurs to the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not seeking to contest the Administrative Per Se Suspension/Revocation Order that had suspended his driving privileges. (Demurrer at 7-8.) It is clear that petitioner did seek administrative relief through the filing of the form entitled “Administrative Per Se Notice of Failure to File or Dismissal of Criminal Charges,” dated August 18, 2024. (Pet. Ex. C.) Indeed, DMV acknowledges that petitioner requested a hearing. (Demurrer at 5:14-15.) The request went no further, however, because DMV deemed the request untimely. (Pet. Ex. D.)

Thus, respondent’s claim that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must be rejected. Petitioner pursued the administrative process to “a final decision,” and the administrative proceedings were “completed” when the DMV rejected petitioner’s request as untimely. Under such circumstances, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not implicated. (See California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1489.) Moreover, respondent cannot be heard to complain that petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when it is the respondent who declined to permit petitioner to pursue to conclusion any remedy administratively in the first instance. (See id. at 1490 [“[E]xceptions to the exhaustion doctrine also exist where the administrative agency has made it clear it would be futile to pursue the administrative process to conclusion . . . .”].)

Accordingly, the Court overrules the demurrer on the asserted ground that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

DMV additionally demurs to the petition on the ground that the relief sought is time-barred because petitioner failed to comply with the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Vehicle Code § 13353.2(e). (Demurrer at 8-9.)

A complaint must affirmatively disclose on its face that the statute of limitations has run in order for a demurrer to be sustained. (See Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 881 [“It must appear clearly and affirmatively that, upon the face of the complaint, the right of action is necessarily barred”].) “[A]s with any other cause of action, a proceeding for writ of mandamus is barred if not commenced within the prescribed limitation period . . . .” (Sinetos v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1172, 1174

Vehicle Code § 13353.2(e) provides that a person has a renewed right to request an administrative hearing before the DMV pertaining to their license suspension where criminal charges are not filed by the district attorney due to lack of evidence or if those charges are dismissed by the court due to an insufficiency of evidence. Any such request must be made within one year from the date of arrest. (Ibid.) Here, the petition states that petitioner was arrested on March 19, 2022. (Pet. ¶ 3, 5.) While not stated explicitly within the petition, it must be logically inferred from the petition that petitioner made his renewed request for an administrative hearing on or after August 18, 2024, the date the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office executed the pertinent DMV form to permit petitioner’s “renewed right to request a hearing” under Vehicle Code § 13353.2. Accordingly, it appears on the face of petition that it is time-barred, as petitioner failed to make his renewed request within one year from the date of his March 19, 2022 arrest.

In opposition, petitioner raises several arguments as to why the petition is not time-barred, but none of them are persuasive. First, petitioner contends that “procedural deadlines may be excused where a party’s inability to timely challenge agency action was impaired by circumstances beyond their control, including a lack of notice or denial of constitutional fairness.” (Opp. at 2, relying on In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813 as modified (Sept. 30, 1993), reh'g denied and opinion modified (Sept. 30, 1993) disapproved of by Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842.) In this regard, plaintiff claims that he was not “meaningfully notified that the DMV’s administrative process would continue permanently and independently from the outcome of the criminal case.” (Opp. at 2.) With regard to petitioner’s reliance on In re Harris, the case is inapplicable to the matter at hand because In re Harris addressed the issue concerning a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus of a minor. (In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th at 824.) There, the court recognized that the procedural bar for substantial delay in raising claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus does not apply where the sentencing court acted in excess of its jurisdiction, because the court could correct a sentence unauthorized by law “whenever the error comes to the attention of the court.” (Id. at 842.) These issues are not present here, and petitioner provides no other authority for the proposition that the unambiguous, one-year statutory deadline in Vehicle Code § 13353.2(e) for renewed requests may be ignored.

Furthermore, as for petitioner’s lack of notice argument, the Administrative Per Se Suspension/Revocation Order that he had received from the arresting officer indicated that petitioner could be subject to commercial license disqualification if he held a commercial driver license and had been driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% or more. (Pet. Ex. A at 4.)[1] This order further detailed how petitioner could challenge why the suspension or revocation was not justified. (Pet. Ex. A at 4.) Nothing in this order indicates that petitioner could alternatively pursue relief through criminal court or delay seeking relief administratively pending the results of his efforts in the criminal court.

Second, petitioner argues that “continuing to enforce a time bar in the face of an overturned conviction undermines basic principles of justice.” (Opp. at 3, relying on Helmandollar v Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 52.) Petitioner’s reliance on Helmandollar is also misplaced. The issue in that case was whether DMV was required to reinstate the petitioners’ licenses when they were convicted on a charge of alcohol-related reckless driving but acquitted of the charge of driving with a blood-alcohol level of .08 percent or more. (Helmandollar, 7 Cal.App.4th at 55.) The appellate court found that the DMV must restore an individual’s driving privileges in those circumstances. (Id. at 57.) Notably, because the issue was not before it, the appellate court had no occasion to address whether such restoration of privileges must still occur when a renewed request for a rehearing is made beyond the one-year deadline set forth under Vehicle Code § 13353.2(e). The case is, therefore, unhelpful here. (In Marriage of Cornejo (1996) 13 Cal.4th 381, 388 [“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered”].)

Third, petitioner contends that the DMV’s refusal to restore his commercial driving privileges in light of his conviction reversal violates due process. (Opp. at 4.) In making this argument, petitioner cites to the following cases without any accompanying pinpoint citation: (1) Doe v. DMV (2022); (2) Ledezma v. DMV; (3) People v. Maclay (2020). As set forth in the reply declaration of DMV”s counsel, these cases either do not exist or are inapplicable to the case at hand. (Montero Decl. ¶¶ 3-5 & Ex. 1-2.) Due to petitioner’s failure to cite to any legal authority to support his due process argument, the Court need not entertain it. (See In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 845 [“Contentions supported neither by argument nor by citation of authority are deemed to be without foundation and to have been abandoned””].) In any event, “the state does not violate due process by imposing both criminal and civil sanctions for the same act or omission.” (Peretto v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 449, 462.) Even though petitioner’s criminal conviction has been overturned, petitioner does not dispute his .15% BAC on March 19, 2022 or his failure to request an administrative hearing to challenge the BAC determination. Given these undisputed facts, the DMV did not violate petitioner’s due process rights by imposing a civil administrative penalty pursuant to an administrative statute to protect public safety. (Id. at 460.)

Lastly, petitioner argues that equitable tolling should apply because he had been pursuing relief through criminal court to overturn his conviction. (Opp. at 4-5.) In order for equitable tolling to apply for pleading purposes, the following elements must be alleged: (1) “timely notice to the defendant”; (2) “lack of prejudice to the defendant”; and (3) “reasonable and good faith conduct by the plaintiff.” (See Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710, 725, citing Addison v. State of California (1978) 21 Cal.3d 313, 319.) Here, there are no allegations to suggest that petitioner placed DMV on notice of his intention to focus solely on his criminal case to overturn the conviction and thereafter utilize the administrative hearing process at some unknown point in the future. Further, there are no allegations to demonstrate that it was reasonable for petitioner to ignore the civil administrative appeal process, which operates independent of any criminal court proceeding. Indeed, Vehicle Code § 13353.2(e) makes clear that the determination of whether to suspend a licensing privilege “is a civil matter that is independent of the determination of the person’s guilt or innocence, shall have no collateral estoppel effect on a subsequent criminal prosecution, and shall not preclude the litigation of the same or similar facts in the criminal proceeding.” Here, petitioner could have timely brought an administrative appeal and (1) sought a stay of those proceeding pending litigation in the criminal matter or (2) litigated his dispute in the administrative proceeding over whether he had driven with a .08% or more BAC without risking any detrimental, binding effect in the criminal matter from an adverse administrative determination. Petitioner did not do so.

Because petitioner is time-barred from obtaining the relief he seeks in his petitioner for mandamus, the demurrer is SUSTAINED. As for leave to amend, the Court takes judicial notice of petitioner’s Motion for Leave to Amend, filed May 8, 2025, as a proffer of how petitioner might reasonably amend his petition to cure the fatal defects raise in the Demurrer. (See 5/8/25 Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to Amend Petition for Writ of Mandate.) Petitioner fails to identify how he would or could amend his petition to overcome the untimeliness of his claims for relief. Because petitioner does not demonstrate any reasonable possibility of curing the defects in his petition, the Court declines to grant leave to amend. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)

For the foregoing reasons, the demurrer to the Petition is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Respondent shall submit a Proposed Judgment of Dismissal.

[1] In relevant part, the Order states the following under the section entitled “COMMERCIAL DISQUALIFICATION”: “A commercial disqualification action will be taken due to any of the following: if you . . . held a commercial driver license and were driving any vehicle when you had a 0.08% BAC or more.”