Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 25STCP00069, Date: 2025-04-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCP00069    Hearing Date: April 24, 2025    Dept: 86

MOTIONS (3) TO REQUIRE THAT PETITIONERS POST $70,000 IN SECURITY AS VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS

Date:               4/24/25 (1:30 PM)

Case:               Irwin Jacobowitz, et al. v. California Dept. of Social Services, et al. (25STCP00069)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Respondent County of Los Angeles Department of Public Social Services’ Motions to Require Petitioners to Each Post $70,000 in Security as Vexatious Litigants are GRANTED.

Petitioners Irwin Jacobowitz (“Irwin”), Pearl H. Jacobowitz (“Pearl”), and Dakota Zeigerman-Jacobowitz (“Dakota”) have brought the instant Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus against respondents California Department of Social Services (“CDSS”) and Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services (“DPSS”).

On 1/30/25, in a separate case brought by Irwin, Pearl, and Dakota, captioned as Irwin Jacobowitz, et al. v. California Department of Social Services, et al., Los Angeles County Superior Court case number 24STCP02193, the Court (Hon. James C. Chalfant presiding) declared each of them to be a vexatious litigant within the meaning of CCP § 391. (Brenner Decls. Ex. A.) In the Court’s decision, of which this Court takes judicial notice pursuant to Evidence Code §§ 452(c) & (d), the Court explained as follows:

“The County provides evidence that each Petitioner has filed at least five actions in propria persona in the last seven years where there as a final ruling against him or her. Of the judicially notices cases, all 11 were filed and lost by Pearl and Irwin. Their son Dakota filed and lost five of those cases . . . Each Petitioner is a vexatious litigant.”

(1/30/25 Decision on Motions to Declare Vexatious Litigants at 4; see CCP § 391(b)(1) [defining “vexatious litigant” as a person who “[i]n the immediately proceeding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations . . . that have been . . . finally determined adversely to the person”].)

Because Irwin, Pearl, and Dakota have each been deemed a vexatious litigant, upon motion of the defendant, they may be required to furnish security for the benefit of the moving defendant upon a showing that there is not a reasonable probability that they will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant. (CCP §§ 391.1(a), 391.3(a).)

DPSS contends that there is no reasonable probability that Irwin, Pearl, and Dakota will prevail in the present litigation. DPSS argues this case involves an administrative writ seeking review of a single CDSS hearings, concerning Irwin as beneficiary. Thus, according to DPSS, Pearl, and Dakota lack standing to pursue this matter, and, in any event, they have not exhausted any administrative remedies as to any purported claims for which they may have standing. As for Irwin, the petition concedes that his administrative appeal had been granted. Thus, there is no claim for which Irwin may obtain relief through a writ of mandamus. Further, DPSS argues that the lawsuit is procedurally improper because the actual respondent should be the California Department of Social Services (CDSS), not the DPSS, thereby making the petition frivolous and burdensome as to moving party DPSS.

Irwin, Pearl and Dakota have filed no opposition to the motions and have not otherwise meaningfully disputed any of the foregoing. Accordingly, the Court concludes that DPSS has demonstrated that Irwin, Pearl, and Dakota each have no reasonable probability of prevailing in the present litigation against DPSS.

DPSS requests that the Court should require Irwin, Pearl, and Dakota each to post a $70,000 security as a condition for proceeding with the litigation. The security serves as an undertaking to cover the defendant’s reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and other recoverable litigation costs. (CCP § 391(c) [defining “security”].) DPSS asserts that the $70,000 amount is reasonable based on projected defense costs. California courts require an “individualized determination” of security amounts (Wolfe v. George (9th Cir. 2007) 486 F.3d 1120), and prior cases have established that arbitrary figures are improper (Muller v. Tanner (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 445). The amount should reflect potential recoverable defense costs rather than actual expenses. If DPSS prevails through summary judgment, directed verdict, or a defense verdict at trial, they would be entitled to recover these costs. DPSS estimates that, if the case proceeds to trial, their total legal fees will exceed $75,000. (Brenner Decls. ¶ 6.) Petitioners have submitted no opposition to this estimation of defense costs, which the Court finds to be reasonable.

Accordingly, the motions are granted. Petitioners Irwin Jacobowitz, Pearl Jacobowitz, and Dakota Jacobowitz are vexatious litigants who, pursuant to CCP §§ 391.1, 391.3, are each ordered to post security for $70,000 for the benefit of respondent County of Los Angeles Department of Public Social Services in order to proceed with the instant litigation.

The Court hereby issues an Order to Show Cause re: Dismissal for Failure to Post the Required Security.  The hearing on the Court’s Order to Show Cause is scheduled for ____________.