Judge Curtis A. Kin, Case Number: 25STCP00678, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling

Pursuant to CCP § 128.7, respondent City of Santa Monica moves for sanctions on the grounds that the underlying petition was brought for an improper purpose and without legal and factual support. Specifically, respondent seeks monetary sanctions against petitioner 7^th Street Partners LLC and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $9,360, as well as nonmonetary sanctions in the form of either dismissal of the Verified Petition for Writ of Administration and Traditional Mandamus or an amendment to the pleadings along the following lines: “correct Exhibits C and D to the Petition, remove all factual claims that the City did not provide appeal rights to Petitioner or to landlords and tenants generally, and removing [sic] all claims for writ relief so related.” (Mtn. at 18-19; see also Notice of Mtn. at 2-3.)

Petitioner 7^th Street Partners LLC owns real property located at 914 7^th Street, Santa Monica, California 90403 (the “Property”), which consists of 12 residential units. (Pet. ¶¶ 8-9.) In 2022, only 2 units were occupied; real party in interest Dan Snierson resided in Unit 7, and real party in interest Janis Conlin resided in unit 5. (Pet. ¶ 10.) Around that time, petitioner submitted permit applications with respondent City of Santa Monica (“City”) to rehabilitate the ten vacant units and the Property’s common area, as well as to add three Accessory Dwelling Units. (Pet. ¶ 11.) On February 22, 2022, petitioner submitted its proposed Means and Methods Plan, which requested that the existing tenants be relocated temporarily off-site during construction due to anticipated disruptions that would occur during the construction period. (Pet. ¶¶ 12-13 & Ex. A.) City denied the proposed relocation plan, indicating that such an order can only be made by a building official per SMMC § 4.36.100, and, as a result, petitioner resubmitted an amended Means and Methods Plans without reference to a relocation plan. (Pet. ¶¶ 14-15 & Ex. B.)

On August 30, 2023, the real parties in interest were ordered to be relocated, and petitioner claims that the Habitability Determination Orders Numbered C05113 and C05129 lacked any notice on how to appeal those orders. (Pet. ¶¶ 16-18.) Petitioner complied with those orders and relocated the real parties in interest off-site for approximately four months. (Pet. ¶ 19.) Thereafter, City’s building officer lifted the relocation orders on January 17, 2024; petitioner alleges that the Notices of Lifting of Relocation Orders included information on how to appeal those relocation lifting order at the bottom of document. (Pet. ¶¶ 20-21.) On that same date (January 17, 2024), City’s building officer issued new Habitability Determination Orders that demanded relocation “back dated” to December 18, 2023 as to Unit 5 and December 21, 2023 as to Unit 7. (Pet. ¶¶ 22-23 & Exs. C-D.) As with the prior Habitability Determination Orders, petitioner claims that the newly issued Habitability Determination Orders, Numbered C05755 and C05756, lacked instructions on how to appeal. (Pet. ¶¶ 23(a), 39.)

On an unspecified date, petitioner’s representative contacted City’s Building Officer, Benson Reed, to inquire about the new Relocation Orders and to request an extension to file an appeal. (Pet. ¶¶ 24(a)-(d).) Petitioner claims that Building Officer Reed provided “no form or means to effectuate that appeal request,” despite petitioner’s representative requesting such. (Pet. ¶ 24(d), 25(a)-(b).) On January 18, 2024, petitioner’s representative again spoke with Building Officer Reed and requested an extension to file an appeal of the Habitability Determination Orders, Numbered C05755 and C05756. (Pet. ¶ 26.) Building Officer Reed granted the request, purportedly extending the deadline to appeal to February 15, 2024.[1] (Pet. ¶ 27.)

In light of this extension approval, petitioner filed its appeals with City on February 15, 2024, but the City did not respond. (Pet. ¶¶ 28-30.) In or around March 2024, petitioner received Code Enforcement Citations relating to its failure to comply with the January 17, 2024 Relocation Orders. (Pet. ¶¶ 31-36.) On March 21, 2024, petitioner followed up on the status of its appeal and requested a hearing from the City, but did not receive a response. (Pet. ¶¶ 37-38.)

On February 19, 2025, petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate and Traditional Mandate. On April 3, 2025, respondent filed its answer.

On May 6, 2025, respondent filed the instant motion for sanctions pursuant to CCP § 128.7. On May 20, 2025, petitioner filed its opposition. On May 27, 2025, respondent filed its reply.

Petitioner’s objection to City’s Notice to Appear and Produce Documents, served via email on May 20, 2025, requesting the production of documents and the appearance of Christopher Charles “Bo” Drake (“Drake”), pursuant to CCP § 1987(b), is SUSTAINED on the following grounds. First, the request to produce records at the hearing is untimely, as it was not served at least 20 days before the hearing. (CCP § 1987(c).) Second, if it was City’s intention for Drake to provide oral testimony at the June 3, 2025 hearing, then City was required to first submit a written request in accordance with Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(b).

Exhibit A - Section 4.36, et seq., of the City of Santa Monica’s Charter (Evid. Code § 452(b), (c); Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn. v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection Dist. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 583, 599 [judicial notice taken of official acts of local agencies].)

Exhibit B - City’s response to multiple California Public Records Act (Evid. Code § 452(b), (c); Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn., 62 Cal.App.5th at 599 [judicial notice taken of official acts of local agencies].)

Exhibit C – Complaint in City of Santa Monica v. 7^th Street Partners LLC, et al. (LASC Case No. 25SMCV01421) (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Exhibits D-E – Copies of demurrers filed in 25SMCV01421 (Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Pursuant to CCP § 128.7, an attorney or party must certify through their signature the following regarding any pleading, petition, notice of motion, and other similar papers submitted: (1) they are not being presented primarily for an improper purpose; (2) the legal contentions are warranted by law or non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (3) the allegations and factual contentions have evidentiary support or are likely to have such support after a reasonable opportunity to further investigate; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted by the evidence.¿

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the motion is procedurally proper because City has abided by the 21-day safe-harbor provision. (See Proof of Service; Mtn. at 13:17-22; McGranahan Decl. ¶ 14.)

City argues that petitioner has falsely alleged that its Habitability Determination Orders (numbered C05756 and C05755), issued January 17, 2024, failed to apprise petitioner of their appeal rights because, either by negligence or design, petitioner omitted the backside of the forms that are attached as Exhibits C and D to the Petition. (Mtn. at 8.) In support of this argument, City contends that its Relocation Orders are issued in triplicate carbon paper copies, consisting of a top white copy retained by City, a middle yellow copy for landlords, and a bottom pink copy for tenants. (Mtn. at 10:15-17; Reed Decl. ¶ 8.) Further, City asserts that the instructions for appealing a Relocation Order are found on the backside of each colored copy. (Reed Decl. ¶ 8.) On January 17, 2024, petitioner was mailed a two-sided yellow copy for Relocation Orders Nos. C05755 and C05756. (Reed Decl. ¶ 10.) On the white-copies of Relocation Orders Nos. C05755 and C05756 retained by City, the appeal instructions appear clearly on the forms’ backside. (Reed Decl. ¶¶ 8-9 & Exs. 1-2.) Based on this information, City’s counsel informed petitioner’s counsel on March 10, 2025 that the underlying petition is based on untrue factual representations and includes frivolous legal claims and requested that the petition be dismissed or amended. (Mtn. at 12:21-25; McGranahan Decl. ¶ 9 & Ex. 5.)

In opposition, petitioner unnecessarily spends significant time attempting to set forth facts and making contentions as if it were litigating the merits of its Petition. (See Opp. at 5-11.) As to the motion at hand, petitioner raises some arguments that are relevant to the Court’s analysis. First, petitioner argues that Building Officer Reed’s declaration used in support of the City’s motion includes contradictions regarding who had mailed the January 17, 2024 Relocation Orders. (Opp. at 9; see Reed Decl. ¶¶ 7, 10.) To the extent Reed’s averments regarding who mailed the Relocation Order can be viewed as contradictory, such contradictions are immaterial for purposes of this motion because they do not detract from the City’s evidence that instructions on how to obtain the proper form to appeal was listed on the backside of the orders. The Court does not find that Building Officer Reed’s declaration lacks credibility.

Second, petitioner takes issue with the City’s so-called “go-fetch approach” to having an appellant obtain the form to appeal from the City, claiming that doing so

does not comply with City’s Municipal Code. (Opp. at 8:20-21.) This argument lacks merit, because, under SMMC § 4.36.100(i), the Municipal Code does not set forth how the City must provide an appeal form to a landlord or tenant who disputes a notice or order for temporary relocation benefits. Instead, it merely states that such a form needs to be provided by the Building Officer. (SMMC § 4.36.100(i).) Thus, the City’s decision to include information on how to obtain from a Building Officer the correct appeal form on the backside of a Relocation Order does not fun afoul of SMMC § 4.36.100(i).[2]

Third, petitioner claims that the public records that will be a part of the administrative record will show that there is no backside to the January 17, 2024 Relocation Orders. (Notice of Opp. at 2:13-15.) In support of this contention, petitioner relies on the records that it procured from City through its California Public Records Act (“CPRA”) request. (Opp. at 8:3-8, 8:22-25; Cordero-Sacks Decl. ¶¶ 9-11; RJN, Ex. B.) Additionally, petitioner’s representative (Drake) attests that the January 17, 2024 Relocation Orders were single-paged and lacked any appeal information. (Drake Decl. ¶ 100.) To have resolved the issue on this motion definitively, petitioner could have submitted proof of the front and back side of the yellow January 17, 2024 Relocation Orders included as Exhibits C and D to the Petition. Notably, petitioner chose not to do so and, instead, relies on the results of a CPRA records request as its primary proof that a backside of these orders does not exist. It is widely accepted that “[i]f a party provided weaker evidence when it could have provided stronger evidence, you may distrust the weaker evidence.” (CACI 203.) The Court finds petitioner’s showing entirely lacking as compared to the City’s proof that the pertinent orders are two-sided. (See McGranahan Decl. ¶¶ 9, 12, 14 & Exs. 5, 7; Reed Decl. ¶¶ 8-10 & Exs. 1-2.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner’s allegations that the January 17, 2024 Relocation Orders were only one-sided and lacked information on petitioner’s appeal rights lacks factual support. (See Pet. ¶¶ 18(a), 23(a), 39.) Consequently, the request for a traditional writ of mandate pursuant to CCP § 1085 lacks a factual foundation, as it has been shown that City’s Habitability Determination Relocation Order forms apprise the relevant parties of their appeal rights. (See Pet. ¶ 55.) When confronted with City’s evidence that undermines the factual and legal arguments asserted in the petition (McGranahan Decl. ¶¶ 8-10, 12-13 & Ex. 7), it was not objectively reasonable for petitioner and its counsel to ignore the City’s contentions, “bury [their] head in the sand,” and “cling tenaciously” to the unsupported position that the two-sided from they received was missing a side. (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 190.) Because petitioner’s request for a traditional writ of mandate is not well-grounded in fact, it is factually frivolous. (Id. at 189.)

Given that certain factual allegations and legal theories raised within the petition lack factual foundation as required under CCP § 128.7(b)(2), (3), the Court GRANTS City’s motion for sanctions.[3]

Under CCP § 128.7(c), the Court may award sanctions against a party or attorney who has violated section 128.7(b). Specifically, “[a] sanction imposed for violation of subdivision (b) shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” (CCP § 128.7(d).) The sanction “may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.” (Id.)

City seeks monetary sanctions against petitioner and its counsel of record, Ada R. Cordero-Sacks, jointly and severally, in the amount of $9,360, as well as nonmonetary sanctions in the form of dismissal or appropriate amendments to the petition. In connection with its request for monetary sanctions, City’s counsel attests that the preparation of the motion, reply, and anticipated appearance at the hearing amounts to 15.6 hours and that her hourly rate is $600. (McGranahan Decl. ¶¶ 19, 20-21.) Under the circumstances and because petitioner does not argue that the claimed rate and hours are unreasonable, the Court finds that the requested monetary sanctions are appropriate. (CCP § 128.7(d).)

As for City’s request for nonmonetary sanctions, the Court declines to dismiss the Verified Petition in its entirety, as such an outcome would be too extreme in relation to the scope of petitioner’s frivolous claims in the petition. “A decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly.” (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 702.) Instead, the Court finds that requiring petitioner to amend its pleadings to conform with the findings in this order is more appropriate and provides sufficient deterrence to petitioner’s repetition of such conduct. Therefore, petitioner shall amend its petition in the following manner: (1) remove factual claims that City does not provide appeal rights to petitioner or to landlords and tenants in general (see Pet. ¶¶ 18(a), 23(a), 39, 50-51, 55); (2) remove its traditional writ of mandate, which is based on such factual claims (see Pet. ¶¶ 54-57); and (3) augment Exhibits C and D attached to the petition to reflect the front and back sides of the January 17, 2024 Relocation Orders. If petitioner still seeks to petition for a traditional writ of mandate pursuant to CCP § 1085, then petitioner will need to obtain leave to do so by stipulation or through noticed motion.

The motion for sanctions pursuant to CCP § 128.7 is GRANTED. Petitioner and its counsel of record, Ada R. Cordero-Sacks, jointly and severally, are ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $9,360 to City’s counsel within 30 days of this order. Additionally, petitioner is ordered to file and serve an amended petition within 30 days of this order in accordance with the above. The request for terminating sanctions is denied.

[1] The petition alleges Reed granted the request for an extension of time to appeal on February 8, 2024. After City filed its Answer to the petition on April 3, 2025, petitioner filed a “Notice of Errata Re: Verified Petition for Writ of Administrative and Traditional Mandamus” on May 19, 2025, purporting to “amend” paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Verified Petition to reflect that Reed allegedly granted the extension on January 18, 2024. The Court is unaware of any authority or procedure that would allow for amendment of the operative pleading after the opposing party has answered and accordingly inquires whether the Court should strike petitioner’s Notice of Errata on its own Motion.

[2] Whether petitioner had orally requested an appeal form from Building Officer Reed after receiving the January 17, 2024 Relocation Orders but did not receive one is not relevant to this motion. (See Notice of Opp at 2:15-17; Opp. at 13:22-23; Drake Decl. ¶ 100.) That claim goes to whether the City followed its procedures for appeals and not the issue here—the frivolity of petitioner’s position that the City provided to procedure to appeal at all.

[3] Because the Court makes the finding of frivolity by petitioner and petitioner’s counsel, the Court does not address the City’s claim that the Petition was also presented primarily for an improper purpose in violation of CCP 128.7(b)(1).