Judge: Curtis A. Kin, Case: 25STCV11945, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV11945    Hearing Date: June 5, 2025    Dept: 86

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

RE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Date:               6/5/25 (1:30 PM)

Case:               Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Regents of the Univ. of California (25STCV11945)

TENTATIVE RULING:

The request of plaintiff Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED. While the underlying litigation proceeds, the University is enjoined from enforcing: (a) the March 25, 2025 letters banning Jacinto Lopez and Janeth Vasquez from accessing University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus facilities; and (b) the March 27, 2025 letter banning Sandra Habr from accessing UCLA Health facilities.

As a preliminary matter, the University’s request to introduce oral evidence pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(a) is DENIED.  The University fails to explain why the proposed oral evidence could not have been presented by declaration, as is required by LASC Rule 3.7.  In suggesting that live testimony is necessary, the University claims that “the harm is ongoing and additional evidence will no doubt continue to materialize from the date the University filed its Opposition to the date of the Order to Show Cause Hearing.” (See Request at 2:1-3.) This explanation makes little sense. In opposing the injunction, the University asserts the harm it would suffer is that “AFSCME would then be permitted to act with complete impunity and without any accountability” if the imposed bans were lifted. (Solana Decl. ¶ 8; Solana Supp Decl. ¶ 8.) Logically, then, evidence of purported ongoing harm while the bans have been in place does nothing to advance the University’s argument that it would be harmed if the bans were lifted.

Government Code section 3541.3(j) provides that PERB has the following power and authority: “Upon issuance of a complaint charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair practice, the board may petition the court for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order.”  For this Court to issue such temporary relief upon request of PERB, it “must determine [1] that there exists reasonable cause to believe an unfair labor practice has been committed and [2] that the relief sought is just and proper.” (Public Employment Relations Board v. Modesto City Schools District, (“Modesto”) (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 881, 896, emphasis in original.)  The Court finds both requirements are satisfied.

I.                   Reasonable Cause   

In determining whether there is reasonable cause to believe an unfair labor practice has been committed, PERB has a “minimal burden of proof.” (Ibid.)  That is, PERB “need not establish an unfair labor practice has in fact been committed.” (Ibid.)  Rather, reasonable cause is established so long as PERB’s theory of liability “is neither insubstantial nor frivolous.” (Id. at 896-97, emphasis in original.)  Put another way, “the key question is not whether PERB’s theory would eventually prevail, but whether it is insubstantial or frivolous.” (Id. at 897, emphasis in original.)

In its Complaint against University, PERB charges that the March 25, 2025, letters to Lopez and Vasquez, by denying them access to all UCLA campus facilities for six months, denied their union (American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees Local 3299) of the right to access areas in which employees work, which violates Government Code sections 3568 and 3571(b). (O’Hara Decl. Ex. M at 1-2.)  PERB further charges that such letters interfered with the rights of bargaining unit employees to be represented by their union, in violation of Government Code section 3571(a). (O’Hara Decl. Ex. M at 1-2.)  PERB similarly charges that the March 27, 2025 letter to Habr, which banned her for three months from any UCLA Health area, violated those same provisions. (O’Hara Decl. Ex. M at 2.)  PERB also charged that, by issuing all three letters banning access to Lopez, Vasquez, and Habr, the University made a unilateral change to past policies and practices regarding access without affording their union an opportunity to meet and confer over the policy change, in violation of Government Code section 3571(c).  (O’Hara Decl. Ex. M at 2-3.)

The Court finds these charges are neither insubstantial nor frivolous.  Employee unions have a statutory right of access to employer facilities, subject to reasonable regulation. (Govt. Code. § 3568.)  The employer bears the burden to show that any restriction of this right is (1) necessary to the efficient operation of the employer’s business or the safety of employee or others and (2) is narrowly drawn to avoid overbroad and unnecessary interference with the exercise of statutory rights. (County of San Joaquin (2021) PERB Decision No. 2775-M at p.26.)  Here, there is a substantial and nonfrivolous argument that the University cannot justify the ban of Lopez and Vasquez from all areas of UCLA for six months or the ban of Habr from all UCLA Health areas for three months.  One could reasonably conclude from the evidence that none of them engaged in any activity that threatened safety or meaningfully disrupted University operations and that a multi-month ban from entire areas of the University is not narrowly tailored to mitigate against any risk of minor disruption they have demonstrated.  (Cf. Regents of the University of California (2004) PERB Decision No. 1700-H [30-day, campus wide ban of union representative was overbroad].)  Further, PERB has recognized that banning a union representative from access to campus “interfered with [the union]’s “right o[f] access for the purpose of representing employees, in violation of section 3571(b), as well as the right of employees to be represented by [their union], in violation of section 3571(a).” (Regents, PERB Decision No. 1700-H at p. 5 [adopting proposed decision at p. 65].)

In addition, the bans against Lopez, Vasquez, and Habr arose from their purported violations of revised time, place, and manner policies for campus access that were implemented unilaterally by the University in September 2024.  It would appear there is a substantial and nonfrivolous argument that those policy changes are subject to the requirement of providing the union with notice and an opportunity to bargain, which the University failed to do before implementing them. (See O’Hara Decl. ¶ 17 & Ex. O at pp. 573-91 [Unfair Practice Charge No. SF-CE-1496-H], pp. 889-891 [PERB Complaint].)

Accordingly, the Court finds that PERB has satisfied the “minimal” showing of reasonable cause to believe an unfair labor practice has been committed.

II.                Just and Proper

As for whether the requested injunction is “just and proper,” “[t]his standard has often been described” as follows: “Where there exists a probability that the purposes of the Act will be frustrated unless temporary relief is granted . . . [or] the circumstances of the case create a reasonable apprehension that the efficacy of the Board’s final order may be nullified, or the administrative procedures will be rendered meaningless, [the just and proper standard is met] . . . Preservation and restoration of the status quo are then appropriate considerations in granting temporary relief pending determination by the Board.” (Modesto, 136 Cal.App.3d at 902.)  Injunctive relief for PERB “may be used whenever either an employer or union has committed unfair labor practices which, under the circumstances, renders any final order of the Board meaningless or so devoid of force that the remedial purposes of the Act will be frustrated.” (Id. at 902-03.)

Without the requested injunctive relief, if PERB ultimately were to determine the University committed unfair labor practices with respect to Lopez, Vasquez, and Habr, it could not issue an effective remedy for the harm as to those individuals, because their bans from campus will have ended under their own terms before any final decision by PERB would be rendered.  In essence, the harm will have been done and could not be undone.  By contrast, the Court is not persuaded by the University’s claim that it would suffer irreparable injury if the bans of Lopez, Vasquez, and Habr were stayed pending the litigation.  Even assuming they violated one or more valid policies concerning access to campus, the University does not demonstrate any meaningful disruption to operations or threat to security that Lopez, Vasquez, and Habr pose.  Indeed, the University’s reliance on what purportedly occurred at an April 1, 2025 strike on campus is puzzling, as that strike occurred after the bans of Lopez, Vasquez, and Habr were imposed and there is no evidence they participated in that strike.  (Opp. at 11; Solana Supp. Decl. ¶ 7; Saffarian Decl. ¶ 4.)  Ironically, to the extent the April 1, 2025 strike proves anything relevant to the Court’s determination here, it is that the University may theoretically experience greater disruption when Lopez, Vasquez, and Habr are barred from campus.

III.             Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, plaintiff Public Employment Relations Board’s request for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED. While the underlying litigation proceeds, the University is enjoined from enforcing: (a) the March 25, 2025 letters banning Jacinto Lopez and Janeth Vasquez from accessing University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) campus facilities; and (b) the March 27, 2025 letter banning Sandra Habr from accessing UCLA Health facilities.